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WHY PREPAREDNESS 



Why Preparedness 

THE OBSERVATIONS OF AN AMERICAN 

ARMY OFFICER IN EUROPE 

1914-191S 



BY 

CAPTAIN HENRY J. REILLY 

Late First Lieutenant 15th U. S. Cavalry; Captain ist Field Artillery 
III. N. G.; Late Instructor in History U. S. Military Academy; 
Graduate U. S. Military Academy, West Point, N. Y.; 
Special War Correspondent Chicago ^^ Tribune" 
■with the Armies in France, Belgium, Eng- 
land, Germany, Austria and 
Poland, IQ14-IQ15 

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY 

MAJOR-GENERAL LEONARD WOOD 

Commandingjhe Eastern Division of the United 
Slates Army 

ILLUSTRATED 



CHICAGO 

DAUGHADAY AND COMPANY 
1916 






J] 5-2 



Copyright, 191 6, by 

Daughaday and Company 

Chicago 



JUN 10 1916 

©aA433643 



INTRODUCTION 

HENRY J. REILLY has performed a dis- 
tinctly public service in the preparation of 
his work "Why Preparedness." It is unfortunate 
there should be any uncertainty on this vitally 
important matter. Such as there is must be 
charged to the lack of interest in this subject, which 
has been general until recently. Captain Reilly's 
very clear and able statement of the reasons for 
preparedness is most opportune at this time. 

The American people as a whole do not appre- 
ciate the fact that to-day all the other great nations 
of the world are thoroughly organized and prepared 
either for offense or defense. They do not realize 
that wealth and numbers avail little when opposed 
by well-thought-out preparation, discipline, and 
good leadership. Many of our people have been 
taught to believe that money can serve as a sub- 
stitute for patriotic service; that willingness can 
take the place of willingness plus preparation; that 
one can buy preparedness ready made, as it were; 
that our vast population is an insurance against 
attack; that untrained men can meet successfully 
equally good men physically who are trained and 
disciplined. 



X 



vi WHY PREPAREDNESS 

'- All these assumptions are wholly false. Great 
wealth without ability to protect it is an incentive 
to war, a temptation to the would-be aggressor, and 
a menace to the world's peace. Great numbers 
untrained, undisciplined, without leadership and 
ignorant of the use of arms, are of little value unless 
adequate time is given for training and preparation. 
Modern war does not give time for preparation. 
Its approach is that of the avalanche rather than 
that of the glacier. 

Captain Reilly is a graduate of West Point. 
He served for a long time in the regular army and 
had extensive experience in various parts of the 
world. He is a capable, skilled, and critical ob- 
server. He has had almost unexampled oppor- 
tunity for observation during the Great War and 
has seen it from various standpoints as an actual 
observer in the field. What he writes from the 
military standpoint can be depended upon as 
accurate, and is entitled to the most careful consid- 
eration by our people. Such consideration cannot 
fail to create in the minds of the great majority of 
intelligent people reading this book a realization of 
the vital need of systematic, well-thought-out 
preparation; nor will it fail to dispel false ideas as 
to the value of undeveloped resources in the face 
of the type and degree of organization and p're- 
paredness for action which exists throughout the 
world to-day. 



INTRODUCTION vii 

Modern war involves the organization of the 
financial and material resources of a nation as well 
as the training, discipline, and equipment of its 
soldiers. This organization must be such that the 
nation can apply its maximum strength in the 
minimum of time, and maintain it at top pressure 
for the maximum period. This all means organi- 
zation in time of peace. It means an observance of 
Washington's advice, " In time of peace prepare for 
war." 

The question as to preparedness can be answered 
in various ways. The answer most to the point 
is that we believe our country is worth defending 
and we know it cannot be successfully defended 
without thorough preparation, a preparation which 
rests not only upon organization of the industrial 
and financial resources of the nation, the train- 
ing of its men, and the provision of adequate 
supplies, but also upon a moral organization which 
will create in the heart of each and every one of 
us a sense of our obligation to prepare to render 
efficient service for the nation in time of war as well 
as in time of peace; an organization which involves 
the practical application of the basic principle on 
which democracy and representative government 
rest — that with the privileges and opportunities 
of citizenship go its obligations in war as well as 
in peace; that manhood suffrage means manhood 
obligation for service. 



viii WHY PREPAREDNESS 

We believe in arbitration and in the support of 
the great effort to establish world peace. While 
striving to attain these ends, we must not be unmind- 
ful of the conditions under which we live or forgetful 
of the fact that never at any time in the world's 
history was thorough preparedness more essential 
for national peace and safety than to-day. 

Leonard Wood. 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction — Major-General Leonard Wood . . v 
Author's Preface ?:v 

PART I 

The Entente Allies at War 

chapter 

I. From Manila to France in War Time . i 

II. France at War 15 

III. How France Goes to War .... 22 

IV. A Trip to Arras 31 

V. Why France in 1914 was not the 

France of 1870 41 

VI. How France Has Maintained a Large 
Trained Army since the Beginning, of 

THE War 51 

VII. What Invasion Means to the French 

People 58 

VIII. The Experiences of a French Woman 

AND HER Daughter 72 

IX. The British Campaign in France and 

Belgium 88 

tx 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 

X. The British Land Forces 95 

XL Kitchener's New Army 104 

XIL Conscription Needed in Great Britain 112 
XIIL Summary of the Western Campaign to 

the end of May, 1915 122 

PART II 
Swiss Preparedness for War 

XIV. The Military Preparedness of the Swiss 145 

PART III 
The Central Powers at War 

XV. The German Army 155 

XVI. The German Army in the War . . . 164 
XVII. The Austro-Hungarian Army as a 

Factor in the Present War . . .175 
XVIII. Communications of the Austro-Hun- 
garian-German Armies in Russian 

Poland 182 

XIX. The Russians as Seen from the Austro- 
Hungarian Side ....... 187 

XX. What Invasion Has Meant to the Poles 193 
XXI. Summary of the Russian Campaign to 

THE End of August, 19 15 . . . . 204 



CONTENTS xi 

PART IV 
Modern Battle 

PAGE 

XXII. The Volunteers' First Sight of War . 215 

XXIII. The Approach to a Modern Battlefield 223 

XXIV. How the Armies Have Become En- 

trenched 237 

XXV. The Psychology of Battle 278 

XXVI. How THE Wounded are Brought in from 

THE Battlefield - . .288 

XXVII. Modern Infantry in Battle .... 307 

XXVIII. The Famous French Field Gun . . .313 

XXIX. Artillery in the Present War . . .326 

XXX. Cavalry in Modern War 345 

XXXI. Machine Guns in the Present War . .352 
XXXII. Aircraft in the Present War . . .357 

XXXIII. Reconnaissance and Espionage in the 

Present War 370 

XXXIV. Fortresses in Modern War . . . .381 

Conclusion 

XXXV. Lessons America Should Learn from 

the Great War 389 



ILLUSTRATIONS 

FACING PAGE 

French 75-mm. Gun mounted on Motor-Truck. .Frontispiece'^ 
Gurkhas in Egypt on their^way from India to France . lo"^ 
Gurkhas about to make Camp at Ismailia .... 10 "^ 

French Infantry in their Trenches 18'^ 

French Infantry on the March 26'^ 

The Town Hall of Arras after Bombardment . . . . 38 
The Graves of French Soldiers on the Marne Battlefield . 54 '^ 

French Chasseurs d Pied 54"^ 

Ypres after Bombardment, showing Ruins of the Cloth 

Hall and Cathedral . 66^^ 

Ruins of French Houses on the Battlefield of the Marne . 74 -^ 
British Infantry about to go into Action near Bethune . go- 
British 4. 7 -inch Gun in Action on a Rainy Day . .90 

Infantry of Kitchener's New Army 98'' 

Infantry Wagons of Kitchener's New Army . . . .98*^ 

Field Artillery of Kitchener's New Army 106'^ 

Signal Section of Engineers, Kitchener's New Army . 106'^ 
A Recruiting Meeting at Trafalgar Square, London . 116'^ 

Swiss Infantry on the March 148'^ 

German Field Artillery changing Position . . . .160"^ 

Typical German Infantry Reservists 160'''^ 

German Infantry at Brest Litovsk 170"^ 

A German 15-cm. Howitzer 17C 

Austrian Infantry on the March in Poland . . . .178" 
Austro-Hungarian Field Piece in front of Ivangorod . 178"' 
Ruined Railway Bridge over the Vistula at Ivangorod . 184^'' 
German Reservists on their way to the Front in Poland . 184'^' 
Russian Prisoners leaving the Citadel of Brest Litovsk . 190' 

Russian Soldiers captured at Ivangorod 190 

Field Sketch of the Fighting along the Vistula . . . 194" , 
Polish Refugees 202 ^ 

xiii 



xiv ILLUSTRATIONS 

FACING PAGE 

Ruins of Nova Alexandria 202- 

British Lightly Wounded arriving at Bet hune . . .218'- 

British Heavily Wounded at Bethune 218"^ 

French Munition Wagons en route to the Front . . . 234<^ 
Looking down on a Communicating Trench .... 250^ 
Russian Trench from the Front showing Loopholes . .250'^ 
French Sappers at work underground on a Mine Gallery . 266'^ 
Serbian Infantry advancing under Artillery Fire . . .282*^ 
French Lightly Wounded taking a Hospital Train . 298*^ 

Austro-Hungarian Wounded 298^^ 

British Infantry in a Reserve Breastwork 310*^' 

Where twelve Russian Infantrymen were killed . . .310"^^ 

A French 75-mm. Gun in Action 314'^ 

Mounting a 305-mm. Mortar in Poland 330^ 

A 305-mm. Mortar mounted and ready for Action . . 330 '^ 
French Dismounted Cavalrymen Armed and Operating as 

Infantrymen in Flanders 346"^ 

Hungarian Cavalrymen 346*^ 

French Machine Gun ready for Action 354*^ 

On the Parapet of Fort Kobilyani in Front of Brest 

Litovsk, showing Shell Holes 382^ 

One of the Ivangorod Forts Demolished by the Russians 

before their Retreat 382 >/ 

MAPS AND DIAGRAM 

The Campaign in the Western Theatre of War . . Map 142^ 
The Campaign in the Eastern Theatre of War . . Map 212"^ 
How the Armies have become Entrenched . . Diagram 276 



AUTHOR'S PREFACE 

WHEN the great European war broke out in 
the latter part of the summer of 19 14, the 
author happened to be in Manila, Philippine 
Islands. He immediately proceeded by way of 
Hong-Kong, Singapore, Ceylon, and the Suez 
Canal to Marseilles and Paris. The news of the 
victory on the Marne had reached Marseilles the 
day before his arrival. After spending several 
weeks in Paris and London, he joined the American 
Ambulance Corps in France, where he served in 
various sections in the field, from the middle of 
October, 19 14, to about the middle of February, 
19 1 5. During this time, he was with the British 
and French armies in northern France, and, on one 
occasion, was with the Belgian army for several 
days. In the latter part of February, 19 15, in com- 
pany with Mr. Robert R. McCormick, president 
of the Chicago Tribune, he again visited both the 
French and British fronts in northern France. 
Seeing the similarity of England's problem in time 
of war to that which would confront the United 
States under similar circumstances, the author 
returned to England in order to observe the 
workings of the system of raising big armies by 

XV 



xvi WHY PREPAREDNESS 

voluntary enlistment. After a month in England 
he went back to France, and soon came to the 
conclusion that the British and French were not 
going to attempt a real general offensive during the 
spring or summer of 191 5. 

Italy entered the war at this time, and the 
author, considering the possibilities good of Ger- 
many and Austria-Hungary making a combined 
offensive against Italy, decided to accompany, if 
possible, the troops of the Central Powers in the 
Italian campaign. This decision was made prima- 
rily for the reason that, having seen the British 
and French troops on the defensive against heavy 
attacks, the author desired to see something of the 
methods of an army acting on the offensive; also, 
he wished to see something of Germany, because 
of his interest in the question of how far compara- 
tively small resources, well organized prior to war, 
could sustain an army in the field, as against 
immensely superior but unorganized potential re- 
sources. So much had been said of the inevitable 
downfall of the German army due to exhaustion 
of its supply of men, material, and food, with conse- 
quent victory for the Allies, even though they 
attempted no real offensive, that the author desired 
to see for himself how far the German army was 
being hampered through economic causes. 

Accordingly, toward the end of May, 1915, the 
author crossed from France to Switzerland, thence 



PREFACE xvii 

to Bavaria, and later proceeded to Berlin. Finding 
that there was no intention in Germany of declaring 
war on Italy, at least for the time being, and that 
consequently there would be no offensive campaign 
by Germany in that direction, permission was 
obtained to go instead to the Polish front with the 
Austro-Hungarian troops. 

Having joined the field headquarters for the 
correspondents and military attaches, which was 
maintained near the general headquarters of the 
Austro-Hungarian army, the author made two trips 
to the actual front — one to the Twelfth Corps, 
General von Kovos, in front of Nova Alexandria 
and Ivangorod, and the other to the Sixth Corps, 
General Artz, at the time of the capture of Brest 
Litovsk. As German troops were operating along- 
side of these two corps, the opportunity was afforded 
of seeing them, as well as the Austro-Hungarians, 
in action. In the latter part of September, the 
author returned to the United States from Vienna 
by way of Bavaria, Switzerland, Paris, Bordeaux, 
and New York. 

The time actually spent in Europe was a few 
days over a year. Having been a professional 
soldier for nearly fourteen years, and therefore 
being deeply interested in everything connected 
with his profession, the author tried from the begin- 
ning of his observations in Europe to put aside 
personal prejudice and to study the armies and 



xviii PREFACE 

countries visited with a view of getting at the real 
historical and military lessons to be learned from 
this great war, particularly those lessons which 
should be of imiportance to the United States. 

This book is founded on the personal experiences 
of the author and the accounts of those participants 
engaged in the actual fighting whom the author 
considered to be competent eye-witnesses. Writing 
of events but recently past, and in some cases not 
yet completed, necessarily increases the likelihood 
of some error creeping in. The part which any one 
individual can see of such a tremendous whole as 
the present war is very small, indeed. Even when 
^his limitation is well understood, and an attempt 
is made to guard against it, there is but little doubt 
that those events actually witnessed are frequently 
given importance out of all proportion to their true 
value. Another difficulty in getting at the truth 
is due to the fact that the average person who 
has participated in scenes of great excitement is 
frequently not competent to describe what has 
happened. This is true enough of such exciting 
incidents as may occur in time of peace; so much 
the more is it true in war time, when there is added 
to undue excitement the lack of technical military 
knowledge, which results in the witness being con- 
fused because only partly, or not at all, understand- 
ing the reason for what is going on around him. 
Few people, until they have seen it, have any 



WHY PREPAREDNESS xix 

conception of what war really is. Too many have 
considered it a sort of a game somewhat more 
dangerous, perhaps, than big game shooting. As 
a consequence, when they first come in contact 
with it, and in some cases, even for some time after, 
it makes an entirely disproportionate impression 
on them. For this reason, it frequently happens 
that the statements of many intelligent and honest 
people, who are far from being cowards, are prac- 
tically valueless. Rumors, inexact observation, 
suppression or omission of part of the facts, with 
exaggeration of others, and the taking of isolated 
incidents as representative of the whole, have been, 
and still are, responsible for many false impressions 
of the war. 

Much of the material in this book has appeared 
from time to time in the Chicago Tribtme and is 
here published with the kind permission of that 
paper. The photographs, with a few exceptions, 
were taken by the author. 

The author wishes to express his appreciation 

of the kindness of First Lieutenant H. S. Baker 

and C. C. Saner, Company ''A," Battalion of 

Engineers, Illinois National Guard, for valuable 

assistance in preparing the maps for publication. 

H. J. R. 
Chicago, 

January, igi6. 



PART I 

THE ENTENTE ALLIES AT WAR 



Why Preparedness 



CHAPTER I 

FROM MANILA TO FRANCE IN WAR TIME 

September, IQ14. 

FROM the date of the assassination of the 
Archduke Ferdinand and his wife, the Manila 
papers had diseussed the Balkan question. The 
possibility of the Balkans precipitating a European 
conflict had been so frequently spoken of, however, 
that few people thought the long-predicted gen- 
eral European war was actually on the point of 
breaking out. 

When it was learned that Austria had declared 
war on Serbia, and that Russia was ready to inter- 
fere, I believed that the war had finally come, and, 
accordingly, arranged to leave Manila for Europe. 

Up to the time of leaving Manila on August 2, 
no news had been received other than of Austria's 
declaration of war on Serbia. The two days' trip 
to Hong-Kong was without incident, but full of 
violent discussions on the part of the passengers. 
On arriving off Hong-Kong at daylight, the port 
was found to be closed. A patrol boat informed the 
captain of our ship that he must anchor and be 
examined before he would be permitted to enter 



2 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

the harbor. Among the several ships of various 
nationaHties waiting outside was a German tramp. 
The only incident of a two hours' wait, without 
news and before being examined and permitted 
to enter the harbor, was the passing by of two sub- 
marines which were escorting a considerable fleet 
of mine-laying tugs. Going up the harbor, the 
turbine liner Empress of Asia, belonging to the 
Canadian Pacific, was seen lying at the navy yard 
having guns put in her, she having been taken as 
an auxiliary cruiser. 

On landing, it was learned that while Great Britain 
and Germany were still at peace, it was probably 
only a question of a few days before they would 
declare war on each other. The British had called 
out their naval reserves, had put the station battle- 
ship in commission, and had taken over all the 
merchant ships belonging to the auxiliary navy. 
The question of getting to Europe was found to 
be a difficult one. The German liner due had failed 
to show tip. It transpired later that at Shanghai, 
just as all her passengers were on the tender ready 
to go down stream to embark on her, they were 
told that she would not sail. Instead, she went 
straight to Tsing-Tau, the fortified naval and land 
base of the German Empire in China. 

Nobody could say whether the French and Eng- 
lish mail steamers would leave or not. The mails 
were no longer being sent over the Trans-Siberian 



FROM MANILA TO FRANCE IN WAR TIME 3 

railway, and the Russian Consul refused to vise 
any passports to enter Siberia, which meant that, 
for the time being, the Siberian road was out of the 
question. The only ship about which there seemed 
to be any certainty was a Japanese steamer, sailing 
within a week. 

After a few days, proclamations were posted 
everywhere announcing that Germany and Great 
Britain were at war. The white people, on the 
whole, took it very calmly; not so the Chinese. A 
rumor was circulated among them that the Germans 
would soon capture Hong-Kong, with the conse- 
quence that thousands fled by the different boats 
to Canton. As time went by, however, and noth- 
ing happened, many came back. 

As the days passed, the wildest rumors were 
circulated, even among the white population. The 
British squadron, joined by a French cruiser and 
several destroyers, had coaled and gone to sea to 
hunt for the German squadron, which was con- 
siderably weaker both in ships and guns. Every 
day there was a new rumor about a naval action 
having been fought. One time it would be that 
the Schanihorst, the flagship of the German squad- 
ron, had been found by the Allied squadron a short 
distance up the coast lacking food, water, and coal, 
and with ninety per cent of her men down with an 
epidemic. The next day the rumor would be that 
the British fleet had sunk the German fleet in^tlie 



4 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

North Sea, and the most elaborate details would 
be furnished to prove it. 

In the meanwhile, the British authorities were 
busy gathering tip all the German reservists they 
could lay their hands on. An American steamer 
from Manila was obliged to remain outside until 
the authorities had removed the German reservists 
known to be on board. Stonecutters' Island, a 
small island near Hong-Kong, was designated as 
the place on which they would be confined. 

Different parts of Hong-Kong Island were pre- 
pared for defense. Some of the barricades erected 
showed very plainly that it was not so much a 
German attack which was feared, as the possibility 
of mob violence on the part of the many thousands 
of Chinese who lived in Hong-Kong. 

The Hong-Kong volunteers, made up of various 
Britishers in commercial life, were mobilized. The 
older ones were used to guard banks and streets 
within the towns ; the younger ones were sent, some 
to Stonecutters' Island to guard the German 
prisoners, and others to various important points 
in the defense of Hong-Kong. 

The small river gunboats which the Germans had 
near Canton were hurriedly taken by them well 
up the river into China, where the breech-blocks 
and all ammunition were thrown overboard and 
the ships abandoned. The crews, taking the wire- 
less apparatus with them, were put on passenger 



FROM MANILA TO FRANCE IN WAR TIME 5 

boats by their officers with instructions to rendez- 
vous, if possible, at Tsing-Tau. 

A number of British merchant vessels in the 
harbor were prepared for transports. The rumor 
was that they were to carry the troops which could 
be spared to Europe. Others said that a com- 
bined expedition made up of Russians from Vladi- 
vostok, French from Indo-China, and British from 
Hong-Kong, was to attack Tsing-Tau, and that the 
Australian squadron was on its way to join the 
French and British squadron. 

Food prices rose fifty per cent, partly due to the 
government having bought up large quantities of 
supplies, partly due to the price of exchange having 
gone up, but probably more than an3rthing else due 
to the readiness of the Chinese to make as much 
money as possible on the slightest pretext. Every- 
where the Chinese were keenly interested in the 
war. If a white man entered a shop or office, and 
gave the Chinese there half an opportunity, they 
immediately besieged him with questions concerning 
the war, particularly as to who would win. They 
all seemed to be impressed with the strength of 
Germany. 

The British point of view was an interesting one. 
According to them, the war would be over soon, 
because the Allies undoubtedly would crush Ger- 
many almost immediately. Little or no attention 
was paid to the armed strength of the Germans, 



6 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

or to the fact of their being perfectly prepared. 
The point most frequently made was the immense 
advantage Great Britain possessed in her wealth. 
The average man in the street allowed the Germans 
no good qualities of any kind, not even foresight. 
The few Britishers who thought differently were 
pooh-poohed and ridiculed every time they spoke. 

The most noticeable thing about Hong-Kong was 
the excellent way in which the naval mobilization 
was carried out. The naval reserve made up of 
men and officers of the merchant marine, and of 
those on shore having to do with dockyards and 
such, quietly put on their uniforms, took their 
places, and set to work. In a very short time the 
big Empress of Asia was painted gray from water- 
line to truck, armed with 4.7 guns, with artillery- 
men as gunners, and was out at sea just off the 
harbor having target practice. In the navy yard all 
preparations were complete, so that when the other 
ships of the same line appeared they could be 
rapidly turned into auxiliary cruisers. 

On several occasions the British caught German 
spies. One of them was caught at night cutting 
military telephone wires, and was promptl}^ beaten 
up by the guard before being arrested. 

Finally, after a week's delay, the Japanese ship 
appeared in the harbor, and announcement was 
made that she would sail the next day. 

The day of departure was an interesting one, as 



FROM MANILA TO FRANCE IN WAR TIME 7 
the passenger list contained a number of French 
reservists and French volunteers from Shanghai, 
who were joined by others from Hong-Kong. They 
sang the "Marseillaise" and toasted the British 
and the Allies, while several Britishers, who had 
been in the Boer War, and who were on their way 
home, sang "God Save the King" and toasted the 
French and the Allies. The German consul-general 
from Hong Kong, who being entitled to it, had a 
safe conduct, was also a passenger. After much 
cheering, to the accompaniment of considerable 
whistle blowing, the ship finally got under way and 
passed through the narrow entrance to the China 
Sea beyond. The batteries on both sides of the 
entrance had many tents in rear of them, and 
around them trenches and barbed wire entangle- 
ments to resist infantry attacks by landing parties. 
Buoys with red flags indicated a channel through 
the mines which had been laid outside. 

The six days from Hong-Kong to Singapore were 
distinguished by a complete absence of news and 
by considerable discussion of the war, mostly 
founded on conjecture. One young Englishman on 
board, of a military family, who was on his way 
home to join the volunteers, was sure that the war 
would be a very easy one; in fact, he was worried 
because he thought it would be all over before he 
could get to England. The main argument ad- 
vanced by the Britishers was quite similar to that 



8 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

heard so often in America when the question of war 
is brought up: having plenty of money, they did 
not need to have much of an army, because when 
the time came they could get all the men they 
wanted and buy all the things they needed for them. 

The attitude of the French was entirely different. 
With one exception, they had all completed their 
military service and were in the reserve. They all 
appreciated the value of military training and of a 
proper preparation for war. They all understood 
the tremendous strength of Germany and the tre- 
mendous advantage which her being prepared to 
start an aggressive campaign immediately gave her. 
They knew that the war was going to be a serious 
and hard one. They had no illusions as to its being 
over in a very short time. Though most of them 
were conscripts, they were perfectly willing to go 
to war; in fact, two of them, who were too old to 
be called to the colors, were nevertheless going home 
to see if they could not get back into the service. 
They showed plainly that a conscript can be just 
as ready and jvist as willing to fight for his country 
as any volunteer. 

On reaching Singapore, it was learned that Japan 
had sent an ultimatum to Germany telling her to 
evacuate Tsing-Tau or she would take such steps as 
might be necessary. The effect of the news upon 
the different passengers was interesting. With 
practically no exceptions, all of them, regardless of 



FROM MANILA TO FRANCE IN WAR TIME 9 

nationality, were quite opposed to permitting Japan 
to take part in the war. All felt quite sure that 
anything Japan took would never be given back, 
no matter what she might say, and that any 
strengthening of Japan could not but be a great 
mistake from the point of view of all white nations 
with interests in the Far East. 

In Singapore, as in Hong-Kong, the hunt for 
German reservists had been going on. A consid- 
erable number of them who had succeeded in getting 
on a Dutch steamer were removed by a British 
officer with forty infantry soldiers. Alongside one 
of the wharves were three German merchant ships 
seized by the British, when the war broke out. 
One, in endeavoring to escape capture, had re- 
painted her funnels and printed a Chinese name in 
large Chinese characters on her side. 

Many French reservists coming from the Straits 
Settlements and Siam joined our ship at Singapore, 
including thirteen Catholic priests going back to 
serve in the army as ordinary soldiers. Among 
the reservists also was the French Consul-General to 
Siam. The French Bishop of Siam, who was going 
home to join the army, had sailed a few days 
before on a British ship. 

When the ship sailed from Singapore, so far as 
could be seen, the only Frenchman left behind was 
the French Consul. This sailing was another occa- 
sion for the opening of considerable champagne, 



10 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

the singing of the ''Marseillaise" and of "God 
Save the King," to the accompaniment of frantic 
cheering. 

All sorts of rumors had been heard by the passen- 
gers while ashore. The Japanese said they had 
been told at their consulate that the British were 
going to use in the campaign in Europe not only 
white troops from India but the natives as well; 
also, that Japanese troops were to replace these 
troops in India. Of one thing there was no doubt: 
the British were accumulating a large store of 
coal at Bombay. 

Malacca, the next day, showed no evidence of 
having been influenced by the war. However, 
Penang, struck the following day, was different. 
Here the police station and the residency had had 
their verandas filled in with sand bags built around 
steel plates with loop-holes in them, while around 
both buildings was a mass of barbed wire entan- 
glement. 

On leaving Penang, the ship's company again 
relapsed into a period of utter darkness so far as 
any news was concerned. The interminable dis- 
cussions concerning the war continued. The Brit- 
ishers, in their arguments, took the Boer War as 
a model for future military operations, entirely 
ignoring the tremendous difference in regard to 
the number of men engaged and the great dis- 
similarity of the geographical features of the two 
theatres of war. 




//. ./ A'. 

GURKHAS IN EGYPT EN ROUTE FROM INDIA TO FRANCE 




GURKHAS ABOUT TO MAKE CAMP AT ISMAILIA 



FROM MANILA TO FRANCE IN WAR TIME ii 

Finally, one morning, we entered Colombo Har- 
bor. Here were six merchant ships which had been 
captured by the British. The pilot, on coming on 
board, said the Germans had entered Brussels, had 
captured Namur, were shutting the Belgians up 
in Antwerp and cutting off those in Liege. He also 
told of an engagement going on in the neighborhood 
of Charleroi and Mons. 

After leaving Colombo, we experienced another 
period of twelve days without news. The captain 
had been warned that the German cruiser Emden 
had left an east African port some time before, and 
was hunting around for ships of the Allies. As a 
consequence, he took a course somewhat to the 
north of the regular one, so that he might get into 
the track of the British transports with their naval 
escorts going from Bombay to Suez. The possi- 
bility of being captured by the Emden caused con- 
siderable comment. Each of the few Americans 
on board, who being the only neutrals, received 
requests from other passengers to take charge of 
money and jewelry should she be met with. Hav- 
ing heard in Colombo that German cruisers had 
sunk several British merchant ships without taking 
off their passengers, the possibility of our meeting 
a like fate was one of the favored topics of discussion. 

After a number of uneventful days, Aden was 
sighted early one morning. Several miles outside, 
a British cruiser approached which inquired whether 
3 



12 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

any German ships had been seen. The captain 
ran close in to the signal station at Aden. This 
station told him that the route was clear and that 
he coiild proceed on his way, but gave him no war 
news. It was quite provoking to be so close to land 
that the shore batteries, infantry defenses, and other 
details were plainly visible, and to be denied all 
opportunity of landing and obtaining any news. 

Several days later Suez was reached at sunset. 
A fleet of fourteen British transports escorted by two 
cruisers was lying in the roadstead. This fleet had 
brought 15,000 British troops from India — about 
half of them white and the other half native. It 
was said that the white troops were to go to 
Europe, while the natives were to relieve the white 
troops in Egypt, who would then be sent to 
Europe. 

The next morning in Suez, several troop trains 
loaded with Indian troops were seen going out. 
Later a battalion of Gurkhas was seen at Ismailia. 
These troops are hardy little men from the Himal- 
ayas; they are the best native troops in India, are 
full of fighting spirit, and are said to resemble Japa- 
nese troops in many particulars. One British trans- 
port loaded with white soldiers was seen going 
through the Canal. 

On reaching Port Said, the Frenchmen were told 
that 150,000 Russians had come in English ships 
from Archangel to Scotland, thence by train through 



FROM MANILA TO FRANCE IN WAR TIME 13 

Great Britain, and by boat across to Ostend, 
from which place they were going to join the 
Belgians in an attack on the German flank and line 
of communications. This cheered the Frenchmen 
up considerably, and somewhat offset the news 
learned the night before in Suez of the German 
advance close to Paris and south of the Marne. 

In the harbor of Port Said were two British 
cruisers. A short distance from them were quite 
a number of German merchant vessels interned for 
the war, all flying the German flag, for Port Said 
was a neutral port. 

From Port Said, instead of taking the usual 
course through the Straits of Messina and then 
between Corsica and Sardinia to Marseilles, the 
captain, not feeling sure as to wandering German 
cruisers, took a route which brought him close to 
Malta, and then close into Cape Bon, the northern 
end of Tunis. Malta was passed at night, and 
seemed to be literally bristling with searchlights, 
all busily engaged in searching the sea in every 
direction. Off Cape Bon, the ship was picked up 
and spoken to by the French battleship Saint Louis 
and another one too far off for us to make out her 
name. Two days later, the pilot was picked up 
off Marseilles. Though it was quite early in the 
morning, the French were so eager for news that 
they were all up waiting. When they heard that 
the Germans had been driven back,, they were 



14 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

greatly relieved and more than delighted. The 
old castle on the island at the entrance to the 
harbor was doubly pleasing to them; first, because 
it meant the end of their long journey, and, secondly, 
because they were told that it was full of German 
prisoners. 

The harbor at Marseilles was crowded with 
ships, practically all lying idle. Ashore, the city 
had a holiday, or Sunday, appearance. In the 
streets were quite a number of British officers, 
sent there to make preparations for the landing of 
the British white and native troops from India. 

Undoubtedly, the most delighted to arrive of 
the French who had been on board was a small 
man with a little gray-black moustache, who had 
done his three years' service in the French army in 
the early eighties. He had been in China for 
sixteen years, where during the Boxer outbreak 
he was wounded in the defense of the legations at 
Peking. Napoleon's old guard must have been of 
the same type of man. Older than any of the men 
called to service, he had given up a good position 
in China and had come home of his own free will 
to ask that he be permitted to serve again. Quiet 
and reserved, it was easy to see that he thought 
only of war, dreamed only of war, and that nothing 
could give him greater happiness than to be once 
more in uniform, with the medal of the Legion 
of Honor won in China pinned to his breast. 



CHAPTER II 

FRANCE AT WAR 

September, 1914. 

THE talk in Marseilles was of nothing but the 
war. While the shipping and wholesale dis- 
tricts had a Sunday appearance, the retail district 
appeared normal. The cafes everywhere were 
crowded. The city was full of Belgian refugees 
and slightly wounded French sent there to be well 
out of the way. The slightly wounded were 
having the time of their lives sitting in cafes, the 
center of groups hanging on their words who were 
only too willing to buy them anything they might 
want to drink or to smoke. 

The most noticeable thing about the French 
in Marseilles was their sober attitude when com- 
pared with their usual attitude in times of peace. 
Everyv^^here in France the seriousness with which 
the people take the war is striking. There is no 
wild talk ; no cafe fighting enthusiasm which begins 
and ends in the cafe, and does not lead the possessor 
of it into a uniform and to the firing line. 

Everyone is quiet, and anxious to perform any 
service his or her country might demand. All 
recognized the necessity for military control and 
did not complain when steps were taken by the 
military authorities which, while necessary from 

15 



1 6 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

a military point of view, interfered with the plans 
or likes of individuals or families. The discipline 
which the men received during their service in the 
army in the days of their youth makes them 
imconsciously, willingly, and without griimbling 
or complaining, put duty above self. 

That there may be no chance of distress, the 
richest people in the city have banded together to 
prevent want. They have divided the city into 
districts and themselves into a corresponding 
number of groups. Each group is responsible that 
no want shall be felt among the people of its 
district. This, coupled with the police regulation 
of food prices and the per diems paid by the govern- 
ment to the wives and minor children of soldiers 
at the front, is to prevent misery during the coming 
winter. 

One effect of the almost universal mobilization 
of the active men of the country has been to create 
a greater demand for labor. There being no short- 
age of work and at the same time fewer available 
men to do it, most businesses which are still run- 
ning, if anything, find themselves short-handed. 

The train from Marseilles to Paris, which left 
Marseilles late in the afternoon, was made up of 
crowded coaches; not only were all the seats taken 
but the passageways were crowded. As there 
were neither sleepers nor dining cars, and no 
certainty of being able to get food at the stations. 



FRANCE AT WAR 17 

nearly everyone started provided with food and 
drink of some kind. 

Instead of reaching Paris at 8 o'clock the following 
morning, when the train was due, it arrived at 
3 : 30 in the afternoon. Everyone was quite con- 
tent, as many fully expected the journey would 
take two or three days. 

The crowd on the train was a mixed one — 
many were French reservists, recently arrived from 
foreign countries and bound for their regimental 
dep6ts; a few were Britishers, trying to get through 
to London; some were Parisians, who had fled 
from Paris during the battle of the Marne and who 
considered it safe to return since the Germans had 
retired. 

In one compartment were a French captain and 
lieutenant of field artillery, who had just arrived 
from Morocco from which country they had been 
ordered to join a battery which had lost its officers 
in one of the fights. In the same compartment 
was a former British cavalry officer who had 
resigned before the Boer War but who went with the 
yeomanry to that conflict and was on his way back 
to try for a commission in the new army Lord 
Kitchener was raising. There were also two civil- 
ians neither of whom ever had seen service — one 
an old Frenchman and the other a middle-aged 
Belgian, just returning from China. 

The conversation was interesting. The two 



1 8 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

civilians believed every story of German atrocities 
and told with much emphasis the most extravagant 
tales. Nothing would satisfy them but the most 
bloody vengeance. All their conversation about 
the war was inclined to be extravagant. The two 
French officers and the former British officer, 
inclined to doubt the truth of most of the statements 
made, were calm and careful in all their expressions 
of opinion concerning the war. 

From Marseilles to a point somewhat south 
of Lyons, where it became too dark to see, the 
country was beautiful. The harvest seemed to 
have been gathered everywhere. At all the bridges 
and culverts were guards made up of the older 
men of the territorial army. All were anned. 
]\Iany had complete uniforms, but most of them 
had to content themselves with the infantry cap. 
All the stations were full of people. IMost of 
the men were in uniform, many of whom were 
slightly wounded. 

A wounded colonel of infantry was put on the 
train at one station. He had to be carried on the 
train, but was able to sit up, and was fully dressed. 
He had a new medal of the Legion of Honor on 
his breast. A short distance farther on he was 
lifted off the train, into the arms of his wife and 
two good-looking daughters, who were waiting 
for him. 

At many of the stations during the night, slightly- 



FRANCE AT WAR 19 

wounded men and officers boarded the train, only 
to get off farther up the Hne at some railway 
junction. 

As Paris was approached, the number of wounded 
in the railway stations increased. At all the more 
important stations the authorities had beds placed 
in the waiting-rooms, and staffs of doctors and 
nurses were in attendance. They also had hot 
beef-tea and mutton-broth waiting. The food 
for sale to passengers passing through had a sign 
over it stating that the money received was for the 
needs of the wounded. 

The closer Paris was approached, the more 
frequent and the longer were the stops. Occasion- 
ally trains containing reserve soldiers, horses, and 
supplies, bound for the front would be seen; more 
often, however, long trains of the wounded would 
be met with. 

The slightly wounded were sitting up for the 
most part in first- and second-class coaches, many 
cheerfully grinning. The badly wounded were 
stretched sometimes on straw at the bottom of 
freight cars and at other times on stretchers placed 
in the same kind of cars. The regular hospital 
trains provided have been entirely inadequate to 
take care of the large number of wounded. 

When the train entered the environs of Paris, 
quite a number of British soldiers and officers 
connected with their hospital and lines of com- 



20 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

munication service were seen. These always excite 
the hveHest interest on the part of the French. 
"Look, the EngHsh soldiers!" would be heard from 
all parts of the train whenever any of them came 
into view. The British soldier will probably have 
the fondest memories of France, as the people 
press around them offering them things to eat 
and to drink, while the girls look on them with 
most ardent admiration. 

The Gare de Lyon reached, everyone got off 
the train with his baggage as best he could. 

Paris, as is proper, is taking the war seriotisly. 
With the exception of a few cinematograph halls, 
all places of amusement are closed. All cafes close 
at 9:30 o'clock prompth^ The street railways stop 
nmning early in the evening. The race-courses at 
Longchamp and Auteuil have been turned into 
huge cattle and sheep ranches. All the entrances 
to the innermost line of fortifications around the 
city have been prepared for defense by the erection 
of barricades, the building of sandbag trenches, 
and the digging of ditches across the great part of 
the roadway. At only a few gates are vehicles 
permitted to enter and leave. No automobiles 
may leave the city except by special permit, which 
can be obtained only in extreme cases. Every 
foreigner must have a wiitten permit from the 
commissary of police of his district to live in that 
district. 



FRANCE AT WAR 21 

Nearly all the hotels, especially the big ones, have 
been closed; many have been turned into hospitals. 
More than forty per cent of the regular population 
of Paris has left, so that many houses are vacant 
and shut up. Except along the boulevards, the 
street traffic amounts almost to nothing, while at 
the market places and in the cheaper shopping dis- 
tricts, there are no crowds. 

Paris has thrown aside all its gayety, and is seri- 
ously attending to its business of sending men and 
supplies to the front, taking care of the wounded 
that come back, and keeping so far as possible the 
more important affairs of life going. Due to excel- 
lent regulations about food supplies, food is not 
only plentiful but much cheaper than ordinarily. 

By ten o'clock at night the streets are deserted, 
except for the police, an occasional newspaper- 
man going to the telegraph office to send in such 
scraps of news as he may have gathered despite 
the vigilance of the censor, and the military police, 
on duty just back of the army, who delight in 
arresting correspondents who have slipped out of 
Paris. 

The only other signs of life are the searchlights 
busily sweeping the heavens, hunting for German 
airships. 



CHAPTER III 

HOW FRANCE GOES TO WAR 

September, IQ14. 

IN France, as in every country of the world of 
any importance, with the exception of Great 
Britain and the United States, the system of uni- 
versal compulsory military service in time of peace 
as well as war has been adopted. By this system, 
men when twenty years of age, if physically fit for 
service, become liable. Those unfit are called 
reformes; those fit are known as belonging to the 
class of some particular year. From their twen- 
tieth birthday to the end of their forty-eighth year, 
they are liable to service of some kind during war. 
In peace, their active service commences when they 
are twenty, and continues for three years. During 
this time they actually do continuous duty as sol- 
diers with their regiment, or other unit. At the 
end of the three years, they pass into the first re- 
serve, where they remain until the end of their 
thirty- third year. During these eleven years, they 
are called out from time to time for a few days' 
or a few weeks' service. 

These two periods — the active, and the first 
reserve — make up the first line of the French army, 
or what might be called its active army. The units 
of the army in peace time are below their war 

22 



HOW FRANCE GOES TO WAR 23 

strength. The idea of the reserve is that when 
war comes, the units are filled to their proper 
strength by the reservists. As in peace time the 
army has its proper number of officers and proper 
organization, all that has to be done when war 
comes to bring the army up to its war strength is 
for the reserve soldiers to report to the dep6t of 
their regiment, receive their clothing, equipment, 
arms, and ammunition, and take their places in the 
ranks. 

The number of men in the first reserve in France 
was so large that not only did they fill the active 
army up to its war strength, but enough were left 
over to form an additional regiment, made up en- 
tirely of reservists, for each regiment of the active 
army. In addition, there were still men left over 
who are kept at the dep6ts until needed to make 
good losses at the front. In other words, the adop- 
tion of this system has given France twenty army 
corps of approximately 33,000 men each at war 
strength, backed by twenty army corps made up of 
reservists, and a large number of first reservists left 
at the dep6ts to make good the losses. All these 
men are less than thirty-four years of age. 

At the beginning of a man's thirty-fourth year, 
he passes from the reserve of the first line into the 
territorial army, where he serves until the end of his 
forty-eighth year. He spends the first seven years 
of this period in the active units of the territorial 



24 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

army. After these first seven years in the terri- 
torial army, he passes into the reserve of the ter- 
ritorial army, where he remains until the end of 
his forty-eighth year. 

The territorial army is primarily intended for 
home defense. The reserves of the territorial army 
are to make good losses which may be suffered by 
the active territorial units. These active terri- 
torial units include approximately 400,000 men. 
The troops of the active and territorial army 
belong to what is called the Metropolitan Army. 
One army corps of the Metropolitan Army serves 
in Algeria. Attached to this army corps are the 
native Algerian troops, and the Foreign Legion 
made up of white foreigners. 

In addition to the Metropolitan Army, France 
has a Colonial Army, including both white and 
native troops. The native troops nimiber roughly 
50,000 men, and the white troops about 55,000 men, 
at war strength. A certain number of units of 
the white colonial troops are always kept in France. 
These units brought to war strength number about 
40,000 men. This gives France what is practically 
an extra army corps for home use. 

Roughly, then, France's armed strength consists 
of twenty army corps of the Metropolitan Army, 
to one of which are attached the Foreign Legion 
and the native Algerian troops; twenty reserve 
army corps made up of first line reservists; 400,000 



HOW FRANCE GOES TO WAR 25 

territorials; a Colonial Army of about 55,000 
white troops and 50,000 natives, of which approxi- 
mately 40,000 white troops are stationed in France; 
and a large number of reservists at the regimental 
dep6ts and the territorial reserves. 

In Europe it has been recognized for some time 
that by preparing for war not only are fewer lives 
lost because of ignorance of officers and inability 
of the men to take care of themselves, but, what 
is of more importance, perfect readiness allows 
the immediate striking of a powerful blow against 
an enemy. To be able to strike this blow as 
quickly as possible, there are worked out in years 
of peace the most minute details of the mobilization 
of the army — that is, putting it on its war basis; 
and of its concentration for battle — that is, 
getting it into the position from which the first 
blow is to be struck. Nothing is left to chance 
or to the last moment. 

The period of mobilization extends over a 
nimiber of days, known as "the first day of mobiliza- 
tion," "the second day of mobilization," and so on. 
In all the orders and instructions pertaining to 
mobilization, they are spoken of in this manner: 
each organization — that is, each -unit of the army 
down to the smallest — has prepared a table of 
events in case of mobilization. In this table is 
included everything necessary to complete the 
mobilization, and to get away from the garrison. 



26 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

To insure these matters being done in logical order, 
and without confusion, the French divide the 
time up into the first hour, second hour, third 
hour, etc. Under each hour is listed exactly 
what is to be done. This is carried to the extent 
that even the sergeants in charge of platoons have 
lists posted telling the steps which are to be taken; 
such as, for instance, what details of men the 
platoon must furnish, the number of men to run 
errands, and the time and place where they are 
to go. 

During peace, twice a year, the troops have 
practice mobilizations, when they go through all 
the work of packing up, tying up their old uniforms 
to turn into the dep6t, issuing the new uniforms, 
closing all their accounts, loading the wagons, 
leaving the barracks, going to the station, and 
loading ever)rthing on the necessary trains. 

Wlien a man has finished his three years' active 
service, he is given a small book, in the back of 
which are the instructions which he is to follow 
in case of mobilization. Here he is told where 
he must report, on which day of mobilization he 
must do it, and, if it is necessary for him to go b}^ 
rail, what route he will have to take. The routing 
given in the instructions in the back of these books 
is the mobilization routing of the trains, which 
is quite different, as a rule, from the ordinary 
routing in peace times. This re-routing of the 



HOW FRANCE GOES TO WAR 2"] 

trains has also been carefully worked out in time 
of peace. The directions which are necessary to 
carry it out are kept in each railway station under 
seal until the order for mobilization arrives. 

As it is impossible in peace time to maintain 
the large number of horses, wagons, and auto- 
mobiles which are necessary for an army, arrange- 
ments are made by which on mobilization they are 
requisitioned from people in civil life. To provide 
for this, each year a board of officers is assembled 
in each district. All owners of horses and rolling 
stock of any kind are required to present such to 
this board. If these are fit for service they are 
given an estimated price and the owners are told 
to present them at a certain place on a certain 
day of mobilization. Lists are kept so that the 
military authorities are always in a position to 
know just what they can count on getting. On 
presentation at mobilization, the owners are paid 
the estimated price for the articles taken. 

While all the details of mobilization had been 
worked out with the utmost care, the French were 
a bit anxious as to the result, because this war 
gave them the first opportunity to have a complete 
mobilization under the new system. Their fore- 
sight and preparation proved to be admirable. 
Ever3rwhere throughout the country the mobiliza- 
tion and concentration worked quickly, easily, 
and with a complete absence of noise, confusion, 
delay, or unnecessary expense. 

4 



28 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

In most towns, the first notification of mobiliza- 
tion was the beating of a drum in the streets, and 
the reading by a gendarme of the order for the 
mobiHzation the next day. 

August 2 was the first day of mobilization. All 
that had to be done was for the civil officials in 
every district to fill in the dates on the mobilization 
orders, which they had been holding for some 
time, and paste them up throughout the country 
in conspicuous places. Immediately the military 
authorities took charge of all the railway stations. 
The civil officials of the railroads, ipso facto, 
became members of the military train-service. 
The routing prescribed for mobilization was started. 
In every garrison throughout France, the schedules 
already prepared, were followed, step by step, 
throughout each hour of each day and throughout 
each day of mobilization. Each reservist the 
country over did exactly what his little book of 
instructions told him to do. The owners of horses 
and rolling stock presented them where they had 
been told to do so, and received their orders of 
payment, which were promptly cashed on pre- 
sentation at the government pay departments 
in the different towns. 

The military authorities virtually took control 
of the whole country. Ever3rwhere rigid steps 
were promptly taken for the preservation of order. 
Caf6s were ordered to close early in the evening. 



HOW FRANCE GOES TO WAR 29 

The sale of absinthe was absolutely forbidden. 
Gendarmes were stationed in all the markets with 
orders to prevent dealers from raising their prices. 
In most places the gendarmes also had instructions 
to prevent any one person from buying more than 
an ordinary amount of food in one day. A self- 
imposed censorship of all the newspapers with 
respect to the position or movements of troops 
and other details of military value was insisted 
upon. 

The mobilization did not work the hardships 
which would naturally be expected. It is true, a 
large part of the industry of the country came to 
a standstill. However, as the men had been taken 
for the army, there was not a large number of 
unemployed roaming around hunting for work; in 
fact, in some ways, there seemed to be more work 
than there were men to do it. 

The requisitioning of horses and rolling stock has 
relieved the people of the burden of supporting 
them at a time when, in many cases, they cannot 
afford to do it. The payment for horses and wagons 
has been very close to their real value. In the cases 
of automobiles, the price paid was not commen- 
surate with their real value. The more expensive 
the automobile, the more this was true. This 
worked no hardship, because the owners of such 
machines are rich. The possession of actual cash 
by the former owners of horses and wagons gave 



30 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

them money to leave behind with their famihes 
when they left for their regimental dep6ts. 

The contrast is startling between the orderly, 
efficient, quiet, and relatively inexpensive manner 
in which France mobilized and put into battle 
the greater part of two million men in a com- 
paratively few days, and the noise, confusion, 
waste of money, waste of life through avoidable 
diseases, and failure to equip properly the great 
majority of our troops, and the placing of only 
17,000 men in Cuba b}^ our owai goveniment after 
a period of more than two months' mobilization 
in 1898. 



CHAPTER IV 

A TRIP TO ARRAS ^ 

March, 1915. 

WHEN the Germans advanced into France, 
they occupied, among other places, Arras, 
an important railway and road center of 25,000 
inhabitants in the north of France, at the northern 
edge of the hilly country which is the v/atershed 
between the rivers of Flanders and the Somm.e 
and the Oise. 

During the great flanking movement which took 
place in the first part of October, the German 
detachment was forced to leave Arras, and when 
this movement ended in the two armies facing each 
other in a long line of trenches never more than 
a few hundred yards apart. Arras remained in the 
hands of the French. To-day, it still remains in 
their hands, although it protrudes boldly into the 
German lines, their trenches occupying the territory 
to the north and south of Arras as well as to the 
east, so that they can fire into it with their artillery 
from three sides. 

The French authorities kindly consented to 
show to a group of war correspondents this interest- 
ing point of their lines. We arrived at the head- 

iThis description of a trip to Arras is here given because it is 
typical of trips made to the front by correspondents. 

31 



32 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

quarters of the French army early in the morn- 
ing. The streets of this typical northern French 
town were full of motor transports, ambulances, 
officers, and soldiers, and of the higher ranking 
officers in their automobiles. 

While waiting for the passes which would permit 
us to travel within the region of this army, we had 
an opportunity to witness the issue of the daily 
allowance which the French government has given 
to the wives and children of soldiers since the begin- 
ning of the war. 

The passes obtained, we took the road in the two 
automobiles which had been furnished us by the 
French authorities. These cars, incidentally, were 
driven by their former owners, who, having been 
mobilized as soldiers, had been assigned to duty 
operating the cars which in peace time they them- 
selves had owned. 

Everywhere along the road were signs of the life 
of an army. One small village would be full of 
cavalry horses and the men left behind to take f 
care of them, the rest of the men being in the 
trenches. Another small village woiild be a dep6t 
for food supplies. Here and there men could be 
seen loading motor-trucks, and everywhere on 
all the roads in the vicinity were long lines of 
motor-trucks either standing or in motion. On 
the roads, staff officers would pass by, going 
quickly on some mission in their automobiles. As 
we approached the front we began to meet troops. 



A TRIP TO ARRAS 33 

In one field were several batteries of artillery, the 
guns limbered, the horses hitched, and the men 
mounted. Along a parallel road was a long line of 
field artillery moving toward the front. It was a 
cold, wet day, so all the men had on their blue 
overcoats with long blue capes. These overcoats, 
the kepis, very much the shape of the forage cap 
worn by the Union Army in the Civil War, the 
long coats of the horses, the horses of all colors in 
each battery, the general war-worn appearance of 
men, horses, and guns, and the mud liberally 
splashed over everybody and everything, strongly 
reminded one of battle pictures of our Civil War. 

The villages just on the edge of the enemy's 
artillery zone were full of troops who were resting 
between tours of duty in the trenches. Here and 
there in the villages were field ambulances, gener- 
ally established in some large group of farm build- 
ings whose ample barns afforded plenty of room 
for the wounded. In the field ambulance the 
wounded remain on straw-covered ground until 
they can be sent to the rail-head, and thence on to 
the real hospitals established in the towns far to 
the rear. Outside of each, were parked the horse 
ambulances which go out at night to bring in the 
woimded from the dressing stations, 

Finally, the headquarters of the division occupy- 
ing the region of Arras was reached. Here the offi- 
cer in charge of us went to pay his respects to the 
division commander and to ask if it were possible 



34 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

to get into Arras. We could plainly hear the sound 
of gun fire, but it was not at all a heavy fire. The 
officer came back in a few minutes with another 
staff officer who informed us that probably we 
could get to Arras safely, as everything v/as quite 
calm for the moment along the front, although 
Arras had been shelled heavily that same morning. 
He added that we would make the trip in one motor 
instead of two, as the Germans generally let one 
motor go down the road into Arras without shelling 
it, but almost always shelled two or more motors. 
We took our seats in the one motor, the chauffeur 
opened the throttle wide, and away v/e went for AiTas. 

Off' to our left, we could see what was left of the 
church tower of St. Eloi which had been shot to 
pieces by the Germans. 

They told us of a village just to our north, one- 
half of which was in the hands of the French and 
the other half in the hands of the Germans. They 
said that for some time, the soldiers of the two 
armies in this village had drawn water from the 
same fountain between the two lines of trenches. 

As we entered Arras through the gate of the old 
fortification built by Vauban, we could see ample 
evidence of the shelling that same morning. Every- 
where were lying branches of trees, the walls of the 
houses nearby were scarred and pitted by fragments 
of shells, while here and there were holes made in 
the ground by exploding shells. 



A TRIP TO ARRAS 35 

We were taken first to the building which had 
been the permanent hospital of Arras. As we went 
up the street few marks of the bombardment were 
to be seen. Now and then a house would be 
passed which had large holes through the walls, 
while other houses around it apparently would 
be untouched. 

While most of the houses and practically all the 
shops were closed, here and there small shops could 
be seen still open. There were still a few civilians 
wandering about the streets. 

The hospital, however, had been badly damaged. 
Large sections of the walls in different places had 
been completely demolished by the shell fire, which 
also had killed twenty of the patients. 

The old concierge was waiting at the gate when 
we arrived, eager to show us around, and, above all, 
to show us what a narrow escape he himself had 
had. The side of his room faced one of the court- 
yards of the hospital. A shell exploded in this 
yard about six feet from the wall of his room, throw- 
ing black dirt all over the whitewash and making 
fully one hundred holes in the wall itself, against 
which the man's bed had rested. The concierge 
was asleep at the time of the explosion, and he was 
most fortunate to have escaped, as the many frag- 
ments and shrapnel bullets passed above, below, 
and all around his bed. 

While we were in the hospital several shells burst 



36 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

in the town. It is always easy to distinguish an 
enemy shell, because first is heard the whistling 
sound of the shell and then a loud hang as it bursts 
in your vicinity. 

When we left the hospital, and approached the 
eastern part of the town, that is, the part nearest 
the German trenches, more and more evidences of 
the shelling were seen. More houses had been par- 
tially destroyed by shell fire. The belfry of Arras, 
a tall tower, although still standing, had its eastern 
face battered out of shape. Here and there were 
lines of barricades across the streets. 

The maximum destruction was seen in the square 
in which stands the railway station. The railway 
station itself had been pretty badly mauled. The 
houses around this square consisted only of a mass 
of ruins. While it was impossible to see them, 
because of the many houses intervening, the Ger- 
man trenches were only 800 yards to the east. 
Occasional rifle shots could be heard, followed by 
the typical crackling sound small-arms bullets 
always make. Now and then, off in the distance, 
slight bursts of machine-gim fire could be heard. 
Most prominent of all was the unmistakable sound 
of French field-gun batteries firing at intervals. 

From the railway station, we went to the Grand 
Place. At first, it looked as if little damage had 
been done. Closer examination, however, showed 
that there was not a house on the west side of this 



A TRIP TO ARRAS 37 

square — that is, the side facing the Germans — 
which had not been damaged by shell fragments. 
Many were badly scarred, some having large shot 
holes in the walls. 

The eastern side of this square looked undamaged, 
but on going through to the eastern part of one of 
the houses, nearest the Germans, we found the 
end wall had been blown in by the explosion of three 
large shells. 

When we entered the square, all the inhabitants 
who had remained in town came out of their cellars 
where they had been living since the beginning of 
the bombardment. Most of them had put stoves 
in these cellars. The stove pipes, sticking out and 
giving off black smoke about the height of the front 
door-steps, gave the houses a most peculiar appear- 
ance. 

One of the cellars entered was typical of all. 
Here the family had gathered its most precious 
possessions, all its bedding, and a certain number of 
cooking utensils. 

The military authorities encourage the people 
to leave the town, but do not force them to do so. 
If they do leave, however, they are not permitted 
to come back again. To those who remain, they 
make regiilar issues of food, so that there is no 
danger of starvation. Of the original 25,000 inhab- 
itants, 3,000 still remain. 

While in the Grand Place, five small boys gathered 



38 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

around us, and offered to show us the ruins of the 
town hall. As they appeared to pay no attention 
to the firing, which we could hear, or to the explo- 
sion of several Geniian shells which hit the town 
just then, we asked them if they were not afraid. 
They said, "No, not now; w^e used to be at the 
beginning, but we have become accustomed to it." 
On telling them that they were like old soldiers, 
they were very much pleased, and became even 
more eager to show us where the greatest destruc- 
tion in the tow^i had been wrought. 

The ruins of the town hall were the next visited. 
There is very little left ; in fact, so little that restora- 
tion is impossible. It will have to be rebuilt com- 
pletely. The houses on the square nearest the 
Germans did not suffer much, but those just on the 
other side of the town hall were nothing but ruins. 

In this square, the keeper of an inn had trans- 
ferred his sign advertising drinks of all kinds from 
its usual position just above the front door to a 
position just over the cellar door, from which pro- 
truded a stove pipe giving forth clouds of black 
smoke. 

From the square we proceeded to the cathedral, 
which had been struck a nimiber of times and, 
although not seriously damaged extemalh^ had 
suffered hea\^y inside. 

In Arras, as in other places bombarded b}-^ the 
Germans, the railway station, the churches, the 



t--'- 




A TRIP TO ARRAS 39 

city hall, and other public buildings have been the 
targets for shell fire. The private buildings near 
these also have been badly damaged. 

Returning to our motor, we made as hasty a 
trip back to division headquarters as we had made 
from there to Arras. Here the division commander, 
a large, vigorous, determined looking man, with iron- 
gray moustache and hair, received us most cordially, 
and asked if we had been bothered by the German 
shells while in Arras. He said the civilians remain- 
ing in his territory gave him more trouble than his 
whole division, because the soldiers had learned 
not to expose themselves unnecessarily, while civil- 
ians seem inclined to think that simply because 
for the moment a certain street or place was not 
being shelled, it was safe. Thus they were con- 
tinually being killed and wounded. He said that 
he had just received word that six had been killed 
and wounded while we were in Arras. 

The division commander then told one of his 
staff officers to take us to an observation point 
on a hill, and added: " I do not think you will see 
even one of my guns. They are so well hidden, 
that although we have been here several months, 
the Germans have not yet found one." This 
proved perfectly true. From the observation point, 
as is usual when looking at a modern battlefield 
from a distance, we saw nothing but the typical 
rolling French country with lines of tall, straight 



40 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

trees marldng the roads, and the red roofs of the 
houses of the villages, usuall}^ in the hollow. 

The staff officer named the \'illages, and told us 
which were in Gennan hands and which in French 
hands. He said that opposite his troops were the 
4th Priissian Army Corps and the ist Bavarian 
Army Corps, and added that the Prussians were 
the better soldiers of the two. 

The salient points of the trip were the cheerful- 
ness of the French soldier wherever seen; the fact 
that although Arras juts out into the Gemian lines, 
the French hold more territory here than they did 
several months ago; and that the bombardment 
had not been general but directed at certain 
buildings since all parts of the to\^'n have not 
suffered equally. 



CHAPTER V 

WHY FRANCE IN I914 WAS NOT THE FRANCE OF 187O 

April, 191 5. 

NOW that the war is in its ninth month, it is 
interesting to look back and note what the 
French have done, and to see why there is such a 
difference between what France has accomphshed 
in this war and what she accomphshed in 1870. 

The plans of the French mobilization were made 
primarily to meet a German attack coming from 
the east. The bulk of her standing army was 
placed on this frontier. While the Germans 
attacked practically all along the French frontier, 
their main attack came through Belgium and 
Luxemburg. This necessitated at the last moment 
a decided change in the French plan of mobiliza- 
tion, since it became imperative to put the bulk of 
the French forces to the north and northeast, 
rather than to the east. Although the French 
mobilization worked without a hitch, the prepared- 
ness of the Germans and the suddenness of their 
attack enabled them to strike the French before 
they were quite ready. Due to this, and in spite of 
some local successes, the French were compelled 
to retreat. 

As hopeful as the French were at the beginning 
of the war, they naturally thought of 1870. As 

41 



42 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

they retreated day after day, fighting rear-guard 
engagements, naturally they thought still more of 
1870. Finally, however, when mostly south of the 
Mame, General Joffre issued his now famous order: 
"You have retreated far enough. Go forward, 
and if you cannot go forward, die where you are!" 
This was the beginning of the battle of the Mame. 
By moving large numbers of troops from extreme 
Alsace and eastern and southern France to the 
north of Paris, and then by attacking the German 
right flank with these troops, General Joffre com- 
pelled the Germans to retreat, and won the battle 
of the Mame. The British troops were present at 
the battle of the Mame, but played only a minor 
part. Their effectives probably did not exceed 
40,000, while the French effectives numbered from 
800,000 to 1,000,000. The French casualties were 
120,000, the killed being 30,000. The French 
soldiers thus survived the hardest test an}^ soldier 
can be put to. It is easy enough to go on after 
victory; but it is very hard to be defeated, com- 
pelled to retreat, and then finally to stand and 
whip the hitherto victorious enemy. 

The retreating Germans were followed closely 
by the French. The position which the Germans 
then took up has been, and is still being, attacked 
by the French. For inonths, the armies have been 
engaged in that most vicious kind of warfare, termed 
trench warfare, formerly called siege warfare. 



FRANCE, 1914, NOT FRANCE, 1870 43 

The demands made on a soldier by a battle in 
the open field are as nothing when compared with 
the demands made on him when fighting in trenches 
and mining his enemy or being mined by his enemy. 
In spite of this, the French soldiers remain cheerful 
and determined, and, incidentally, hold 543 miles 
out of 591 miles of trench in the western theatre 
of war, the British holding but thirty-one miles 
and the Belgians but seventeen miles. 

All this is in decided contrast to 1870. Then 
the French started with confidence; they were 
quite sure they would be in Berlin before long. 
But their army was soon beaten. The civilians of 
the country sprang to arms and hurriedly organized 
an army imbued with patriotism and with the idea 
of repelling the invaders. The hastily organized 
army, however, was easily defeated by very small 
bodies of trained German troops. 

It is, above all, interesting to an American to ask 
the reason for this contrast. In 1870, the French 
had a professional, long-service army; to this were 
added citizens of the country who took up arms 
for national defense in a manner not to be excelled 
by any patriotic people — and yet they were badly 
beaten. A long-service regular army, .backed by 
untrained patriotic civilians who spring to arms 
when the time comes, is the system we have 
professed and still profess to believe in for war. 

In the present war, every French soldier is a 
5 



,#»>**' 



44 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

conscript. He was not asked whether he wanted 
to go to war or whether he did not want to go — 
he simply was taken. With very few exceptions, 
those who are now serving in the army, when the 
war began, had seen two to three years' service 
with the army during times of peace; in other 
words, the French army of to-day is one made up 
of trained conscript soldiers, led by professional 
officers. With this system, of which we in America 
have always strongly professed our disapproval, 
the French have set, and are setting to-day, an 
example of willing patriotism in the face of the 
enemy which is not to be excelled. 

The reason France to-day has universal, com- 
pulsory military service is because she learned in 
1870 the lesson which Napoleon I taught Prussia 
on the battlefields of Auerstadt and Jena in 1806: 
"In time of peace prepare for war." George 
Washington told the American people the same 
thing many years ago, but we never have paid any 
attention to his advice. 

It may well be asked. What does preparation for 
war mean? and. Why are not patriotic citizens who 
take up arms at the beginning of a war competent 
to wage it with success? 

In order to wage modern war successfully, it 
is necessary to have men, money, equipment, and 
the machinery to keep on making equipment to 
replace what is lost or used up. Any populous, rich 



FRANCE, 19 14, NOT FRANCE, 1870 45 

nation can have these. Experience has shown, 
however, that the number of men necessary to 
prosecute successfully a big war cannot be obtained 
by voluntary enlistment. Both the North and 
South found this to be true in our Civil War, and 
both resorted to conscription. England to-day is 
finding that, notwithstanding the patriotic response 
of large numbers of her citizens, she cannot get 
enough men in her armies to prosecute the war in 
the way her leaders believe it should be prosecuted. 
All continental European nations have learned 
through their military history that conscription is 
the only way to get enough men and to insure 
that the burden of military service shall be dis- 
tributed equitably so that all do their duty. 
Machinery to make equipment must be on hand 
when war breaks out, for the lack of equipment will 
necessitate delays which only operate to the enemy's 
advantage. To-day both Russia and Great Britain 
are hindered in their military operations because 
they do not possess sufficient machinery to manu- 
facture the equipment for which their troops in 
the field now have urgent need. 

Men taken for military service must have a good 
physique; any nation fond of out-door sports and 
with proper sanitation has these by the hundreds 
of thousands. 

The men must be individually self -disciplined — 
that is, able to see their duty and to put the 



46 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

perfonnance of it above their personal feelings and 
all else. Such men are found in all walks of life, 
in all businesses, and in all professions. 

A soldier must know how to use his weapons so 
well that he gets the maximum result from them. 
An officer must understand his business so thor- 
oughly as to handle his men with the maximum 
effect and the minimum loss. These things can 
be obtained only by training extending over a 
considerable period of time. 

Lastl}^ and probably more important than all the 
other considerations taken together, is the discipline 
of the whole — a discipline which causes the whole 
army to respond to the w411 of the supreme com- 
mander. This discipline is the thing least thought 
of and least understood by a civilian ; it is the thing 
most thought of and most insisted upon by soldiers 
and officers who have been in action. The more 
fighting they have seen, the more they insist on the 
necessity of discipline above all other considerations. 
What is the reason for this insistence on discipline 
on the part of those having the most experience 
on the battlefield? The primary reason goes back 
to the purpose of war: either to inffict your will 
on the enemy, or to prevent the enem}^ from inflict- 
ing his will on you; generally, it is the two together. 

In the beginning, each side is determined to 
inffict its will on its enemy. The instruments used 
are armed forces. Therefore, to succeed, the will 



FRANCE, 1914, NOT FRANCE, 1870 47 

of the enemy's armed force must be broken to such 
an extent that that force is no longer of any value. 
Once this is accomplished, the enemy is helpless, 
for when a nation's army is defeated, all history 
shows that civilians who have hastily taken up 
arms, no matter how brave or patriotic, cannot 
overcome a well- trained armed force. 

The question, then, is how to break the will of the 
enemy's army. Undoubtedly, one of the strongest 
instincts of a human being is the instinct of self- 
preservation. The way to break the will of an 
enemy's army is to put it in such position that the 
instinct of self-preservation is uppermost in the 
minds of the majority, and, therefore, they either 
will run away or will surrender. This is the primary 
purpose of killing and wounding in battle. It is 
not so much that this killing and wounding removes 
effectives from the battle line, as it is the effect 
that such killing and wounding has on the morale 
of the well men still left on the battle line. When 
this killing and wounding has had such effect that 
men no longer want to stay on the battlefield, or 
want to fight, their will is broken and they are 
defeated. Now discipline has for its purpose the 
subordination of the instinct of self-preservation 
and every other innate selfishness of man to the 
extent that soldiers and officers think of nothing 
but the performance of their duty, and will perform 
that duty even unconsciously in greatest danger. 



48 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

It may be asked, Why cannot this be done by an 
army of men individually self -disciplined? The 
answer is, An army is a crowd. It is a well-known 
psychological fact that a crowd under excitement 
is very prone to psychological influence. The 
excitement in battle is intense. An untrained army 
is an untrained crowd, from a psychological point 
of \aew. Such a crowd is always peculiarly open 
to, and ready to respond to, the worst influences, 
probably because they represent the easiest course 
of action. This results in such an army responding 
readily to the bad example set by the men in whom 
the instinct of self-preservation is uppermost, 
whom we commonly call cowards. These men 
bolt, or otherwise fail to do their duty, and set a 
bad example, which, for the most part, is uncon- 
sciousty followed by men arotmd them. This is 
why untrained troops often are panic-stricken, and 
why large nimibers of men who participate in these 
panics do not know until afterward that they have 
taken part in them. 

A disciplined amiy, on the other hand, is a trained 
crowd. A trained crowd responds readily to the 
wishes of its leaders — in this case, the officers. 
Hence the necessity that the officers should have 
confidence in themselves, have sufficient training 
to know what to do and when to do it. It is not 
enough that the officers should have the desire and 
the will to remain under fire; they must also have 



FRANCE, 1914, NOT FRANCE, 1870 49 

the will to go ahead. A trained officer through 
years of experience, study, and thought has devel- 
oped a point of view which makes him forget him- 
self, and even unconsciously concentrate all his 
energies, physical and mental, to the accomplish- 
ment of the proper end of all battles — the destruc- 
tion of the enemy. The confidence of the officers 
reacts on the men and gives them further confidence. 
This confidence of the men reacts on the officers 
and increases their own confidence. In this way a 
tremendous will is created, which is extremely 
difficult to resist and still more difficult to destroy. 
This will is built up by the discipline of training and 
mental associations extending over years, and can 
be developed in no other way. 

The French have thoroughly learned this lesson. 
Although individualists of the most- extreme type, 
as is shown by their political history, they have 
adopted com-pulsory universal military service, 
and shortly before the war increased the term of 
service with the colors from two to three years. 
The discipline to which they have in this way 
voluntarily submitted — for France is a republic and 
there could be no compulsory service did not the 
people wish it — is the explanation of the spirit and 
worth of the French army to-day. Furthermore, 
it explains the marvelous way in which, at the 
outbreak of the war, all political differences, and 
no country had more of them, disappeared, and 



50 WHY PREPAREDNESS ♦ 

why back of the French army to-day is found 
only a united people, calmly and determinedly 
supporting the military authorities. 

War is a serious business, and, like every other 
serious business that men engage in, the maximum 
results should be demanded for the minimum 
expenditure. Amateurs cannot bring this about. 
Amateurs may succeed when opposed by other 
amateurs; they cannot succeed when opposed by 
professionals. In such a case, they will lose money 
and lives without result, and, what is worse, may 
bring about the downfall of principles which are 
infinitely more valuable than money or lives. 



CHAPTER VI 

HOW FRANCE HAS MAINTAINED A LARGE TRAINED 
ARMY SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR 

April, IQIS- 

IN accordance with the pre-arranged plan of 
mobiHzation by which nothing was left to 
chance or to be done at the last moment, the 
French reserves of the active army were called out 
and the territorial army was mobilized. Imme- 
diately war was declared, a large number of the 
active reserves were taken to fill the regular army 
to its war strength. Others were used to organize 
new army corps, there being a reserve army corps 
for every active army corps. The balance of the 
reserves were kept in the dep6ts to make good the 
losses as they might occur. The territorials were 
organized into battalions. 

When war broke out, therefore, France imme- 
diately raised her regular army, composed chiefly 
of men from twenty to twenty-two years of age 
inclusive, to its war strength, by adding to it men 
of from twenty-three to thirty-three, each of whom 
had served previously at least two years in the 
regular army. For every regular army corps, she 
organized a reserve army corps made up of men 
from twenty-three to thirty- three inclusive, each 
of whom had done at least two years' service in 
the army. Nevertheless, she still had left a large 

SI 



52 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

number of men between thirty and thirty-three 
inclusive, each of whom had done at least two years' 
service in the army, who remained in regimental 
dep6ts undergoing additional training until they 
should be needed to replace losses by casualties 
among the troops at the front. In addition, she 
organized many territorial battalions made up of 
men from thirty-four to forty, each of whom had 
done at least two years' service in the army. 

Back of these, she still had a considerable 
number of men of the territorial reserve of from 
forty-one to forty-eight years of age inclusive, each 
of whom had done at least three years' service in 
the army. 

Not only did France have this immense number 
of trained soldiers to draw on, but, what is more 
important, she had trained officers to lead them. 
In the first pla.ce, in the regular army, in time 
of peace, France not only has enough trained 
officers and noncommissioned officers for the 
regular army at its war strength, but also a 
considerable number of additional officers. Con- 
sequently all the new army coips organized from 
the active reserve were officered from the top down, 
including most of the chiefs of battalions, by 
officers in active service. Even the remaining 
officers were not green men, but had had experience 
as officers of reserve; that is, in peace time they 
either had been officers of the regular service 



HOW FRANCE MAINTAINS HER ARMY 53 

who had resigned from that service and passed into 
the reserve service, or they were men who had 
taken special courses to become reserve second 
Heutenants. These reserve second Heutenants 
became reserve first Heutenants only after four 
years, provided during that time they had done 
two periods of service with a regular regiment. 
In a similar manner, first lieutenants could be 
promoted to be captains of reserve only after six 
years and after having done at least three periods 
of service with a regular regiment. None but 
captains who actually had served as officers in the 
regular service could be promoted to be majors of 
reserve, and this only after six years as captains 
and after having done at least three periods of 
service with a regular regiment, each period of 
service covering twenty-nine days. The noncom- 
missioned officers of the reserve are men who have 
been noncommissioned officers in the active army. 
The officers of the territorial army are men who 
have spent certain periods as officers of reserve 
and who then have passed into the territorial army. 
In the lower grades, they frequently are men who 
have, as noncommissioned officers in the regular 
sei'vice, received^^certificates of proficiency to com- 
mand a section. The noncommissioned officers 
of the territorials are men who have^finished their 
service in the active reserve. 

In making their plans for mobilization, the 



54 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

general staff figured that due to death, absence 
from the country, and desertion, at least sixteen 
per cent of the reservists would fail to report. 
Instead, only two per cent failed to do so. For 
this reason during the first few days there was a 
considerable number of men who could not be 
equipped immediately. The average American 
or Britisher thinks that a conscript is unwilling 
to serve. The French conscripts not only were 
not unwilling, but hurried to report by the thou- 
sands, days ahead of the time when they were 
ordered to do so. During mobilization, there was a 
rumor that there would be no war, as matters 
had been arranged. Not in one case, or only in 
one locality, but all over France, men who had been 
called said, "It makes no difference whether 
Germany is willing to arrange matters or not, this 
time we must have war and settle that business once 
for all." In addition, thousands of Frenchmen 
came from all over the earth to report for military 
service. Many, though exempt from service, came 
at their own expense. During the years of peace, 
a considerable number of men who were in reality 
not unfit for military service had by hook or crook 
got themselves in the reforme class; when war was 
declared thousands of these came forward and 
asked to be taken. 

Since the war began, the classes of 1914, 1915, 
and 19 1 6, have been called to the colors, and now 






//. J. R. 

GRAVES OF FRENCH SOLDIERS ON THE MARNE BATTLEFIELD 




//. ./. R. 

FRENCH CHASSEURS A PIED 600 YARDS FROM THE GERMAN 

TRENCHES 

Region of Arras 



HOW FRANCE MAINTAINS HER ARMY 55 
the class of 191 7 is being called. Not including 
the class of 191 7, France has mobilized up to date 
something over 4,500,000 men. 

Those of the classes recently called are young 
men who are twenty or will be twenty in these 
years. These men are sent to the regular regimental 
dep6ts. Here they immediately commence a 
regular course of training under trained noncom- 
missioned officers and officers. At these depots 
are likewise the officers and noncommissioned 
officers and soldiers who have recovered from 
their wounds. The French wounded, since the 
beginning of the war, have numbered something 
under 700,000. Of these, many have recovered 
and again are fit for service. In addition, at the 
regimental dep6ts there are the remnants of units 
which have suffered very heavy losses ; for invStance, 
when a company has been reduced from two hun- 
dred and fifty to twenty-five or thirty men, this 
remnant frequently is sent to the regimental dep6t. 

After the men of a new class have undergone a 
number of months of training at the dep6t, the 
most vigorous are picked out. These, together 
with the remnants of the units which have suffered 
heavily, the officers, noncommissioned officers, 
and the soldiers who have recovered from their 
wounds, are organized into new regiments. The 
balance of the new class is sent to the front to fill 
up the gaps in the regiments. They wait until 



56 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

the regiments are in repose — that is, have come 
out of the trenches for several days' rest. The 
new men are then assigned to their proper com- 
panies. The day before the regiment is due to go 
back to the trenches, the older men often make 
fun of the new ones, and tell thern what a hard 
time of it they are going to have, and how they are 
going to be scared to death when they first go 
under fire. The veterans thus forget temporarily 
their own troubles, and the new men make up their 
minds that they will show the older men how 
well they can undergo the test. 

In the early days of the war, many of the officers 
foiuid that it took the reservists several weeks to 
settle down again to military life. They were too 
much inclined, especially in action, to take things 
into their own hands and not to pa}^ enough atten- 
tion to their officers' commands. Freqviently when 
troops were l3dng down b}" order of their officers, 
men would stand up to see what was going on, or 
crawl farther to the front, so that a great many 
were shot needlessly. Others were too eager to 
attack and pushed forward too fast, resvilting in 
heavy losses, which had a discouraging effect on the 
remaining troops. For this reason, many of the 
officers now favor a more rigid discipline than 
obtained before. All the men have settled down 
now, however, to the full realization of the necessity 
of carr}dng out their officers' commands. 



HOW FRANCE MAINTAINS HER ARMY 57 

The army corps made up of active reservists have 
done so well that they are no longer called reserve 
corps, but Army Corps with the proper nu- 
meral prefixed, the word reserve being omitted in 
the title. As the result of their experience in this 
war, many officers now maintain that, instead of 
having all the men of a unit come from one particu- 
lar district of the country, it is better to have a 
unit made up of men from all parts of the country. 

These are, however, comparatively minor details, 
and on the whole it can be said that this war has 
demonstrated the wisdom which the French showed 
after 1870, when they followed the German system 
of preparing in peace time an army made up of the 
manhood of the nation, all trained to military ser- 
vice and led by trained officers and noncommis- 
sioned officers. Not only has this system enabled 
France to put an immense trained army in the field 
at the beginning of the war and to keep it filled to 
its maximum with trained men, but it has enabled 
the republic to do so at a cost which is small, in- 
deed, compared with what Great Britain or the 
United States would have to pay to put the same 
number of men in the field, and these mostly green 
and led by untrained officers. 



CHAPTER VII 

WHAT INVASION MEANS TO THE FRENCH PEOPLE 

April, 1 91 5. 

THE first as well as the most important point 
in what the war means to the French people 
is that it is without exception everybody's war. 
It probably would be impossible to find a single 
family in the whole of France of which at least one 
member is not a soldier. To hear a woman or a 
child say, "My father, two uncles, my two brothers 
and three cousins are in the army" is not uncom- 
mon. As a result, everyone is always extremely 
interested in, and anxious about, what is going on. 
Therefore, there are not, as in England and as has 
been the case in the United States in time of war, 
thousands of families who have no direct interest 
in the war because none of their members is a 
soldier with the army in the field. 

No casualty lists are issued in France. Any rela- 
tive of a missing soldier, however, may, by filling 
out a blank furnished by the government, make 
inquiries as to what has become of the missing man. 
This blank is returned endorsed with the informa- 
tion that the soldier was killed in action at a certain 
place on a certain date, or that he is in a certain 
hospital wounded, or that he was last seen at a 
certain place, on a certain date, and probably was 

captured. 

S8 



WHAT INVASION MEANS TO FRANCE 59 

Information as to soldiers captured by the enemy 
may be had by means of the bureau estabHshed for 
this purpose in Switzerland. Once the prison camp 
in which the soldier is confined has been located, 
his family can write to him and he is permitted to 
write to them on post cards sent through Switzer- 
land. 

Anybody in France may write to any soldier in 
the army. The letters or post cards must be sent 
to the regimental dep6t of the soldier. From there 
they are forwarded to the front, as the soldiers are 
not allowed to tell where they are stationed. The 
French government has now issued various colored 
post cards for the different branches of the service, 
so that in sorting the mail for the army, it is easy to 
separate the cards intended for infantry soldiers 
from those for artillery soldiers, or cavalry soldiers, 
and so forth. As may easily be imagined, the mail 
for the army is so enormous that in the big post- 
offices nearly all the boxes are marked: " Reserved 
for Military Mail." The soldier may write home, 
post free. The cards and letters have no post 
marks which indicate the place from which they 
are sent. 

Every wife of a soldier who is dependent upon 
her husband's earnings for support, is allowed i 
franc and 25 centimes per day for herself, and 50 
centimes per day for each child 16 years or under. 
Widows are entitled to the same allowance for them- 
6 



6o WHY PREPAREDNESS 

selves and their children. Unmarried women who 
are without work and have no incomes are given 
I franc 25 centimes per da}'-. Very careful inquiries 
are made in order to be sure that only those 
entitled to it get this allowance. A common sight 
in any village or town is a crowd of women and 
children at the town hall drawing this dispensation. 

Aside from the fact that practically everybody in 
France is a soldier, or has many relatives v/ho are, 
the war is a national one, for it is being fought 
largely on French tenitory and a considerable por- 
tion of that territory is in the hands of the enemy. 
This brings the war home as nothing else can, 
because thousands of people, instead of knowing 
of the war only as a distant disturbance of which 
they sometimes read in the newspapers, are right 
in the midst of it; they see different phases of it 
daily and suffer from it directly. This is particu- 
larly true of those who live in the zone of the armies. 
They either must leave their houses and become 
refugees or remain and be subjected to great dan- 
ger, often to find themselves behind the enemy's 
line in temtory controlled by him. 

The first sign of a reverse is the crowd of refugees 
one meets flocking to the rear, made up of old men, 
women, children, and boys too j^oung to be soldiers. 
They are on foot, on bicycles, and in wagons. They 
bring along with them every sort of household 
article and wearing apparel. Some lead live-stock 



WHAT INVASION MEANS TO FRANCE 6i 

of different kinds. The assortment of articles 
which the peasants in their hasty departure select 
as essential or of most value is certainly curious. 
Many grow tired from time to time and rest along 
the road, or in the fields just off the road. Some- 
times at night little groups will camp in the open 
field aroujid a small fire. Many have definite 
destinations toward which they are heading, but 
more have no definite objective, and just drift to 
the rear to get out of danger. They never seem 
to give any evidence of being terror stricken; quite 
to the contrary, they appear, on the whole, to take 
the entire matter with great calmness and even 
considerable indifference. 

The unfortunate thing about a crowd of refugees, 
particularly in a retreat such as preceded the battle 
of the Marne, is that when they enter a village they 
communicate their desire for flight to the people 
of that village, who before had probably no thought 
of leaving. This often results in a whole village 
soon being in an uproar as its inhabitants gather up 
their belongings and join the mass of fugitives. 

As the war goes on, people abandon their homes 
much less frequently than in the beginning. Never- 
theless, a not unusual sight in the larger towns back 
of the battlefield is a number of refugees in front of 
the city hall surrounded by mounted gendarmes. 
Fearing that there may be spies among these people, 
they are always compelled to move on by designated 



62 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

routes to towns well in the rear of the zone of the 
armies. Another reason is that to supply the towns 
near the armies with sufficient food is more or less 
of a difficult matter, because of the constant use of 
the railways by the military authorities for the 
supply and equipment of the armies and for other 
purposes. It is desired, therefore, to reduce the 
number of people remaining in these towns to a 
minimum. 

Pasted in conspicuous places in all these towns 
are large yellow sheets of paper on which is printed 
in black ink an order of the following type : 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES No. i 

By order of the General Commanding 
THE Army: By Sunday, the ist of October, all 
^migr6s, without exception, must have evacuated 
the arrondissements of Dunkerque and Haze- 
brouck. Only the inhabitants of the communes 
are authorized to live therein. 

The mayors of the towns will be held personally 
responsible that this order is executed. 

The Emigres are forbidden to return. 

Any disobedience of this order will be punished 
immediately. 

Signed: The General Commanding. 
Merville, 30 October, 19 14. 

It is to the personal interest of these people to 
leave the zone of the armies, as no work is to be 
found there. They have much better opportuni- 
ties to find work farther back in the country. 

In their flight, families occasionally become 
separated. What happens more often is that when 
a family has been compelled to leave its home, the 



WHAT INVASION MEANS TO FRANCE 63 

men of that family who are in the army do not 
know what has become of their wives, children, and 
other relatives. In the districts where there are 
refugees, the local paper always has a column or 
two, headed, "Refugees," in which advertise- 
ments such as the following are seen: 

■Dunkerque seeks Madame Paul FOU- 



QUART and her children. 

2. Madame of Malines informs her hus- 
band and her son that she can be found at 
7 Rue Camot, Le Portel, near Boulogne- 
swc-Mer. 

3 . The soldiers John and Joseph VAN HEMEL- 
RYCK inform their parents that they are in 
good health. 

4. , refugee from Lille, will be found at 

the City Hall of Ambazec, and wishes news 
of his family. 

5. The families DOUCOURANT and DEL- 
BARRE inform their parents that they are 

at the house of at Abbeville. They 

wish news of Charles and Stephanie DOU- 
COURANT. 

The people in the towns just off the battlefield 
suffer various vicissitudes. In the first place, due 
to the presence of the army and the absolute neces- 
sity of the army's using all means of transportation, 
particularly the railroads, the ordinary means of 
communication are entirely upset. While supplies 
in large quantities can be procured occasionally 
by rail, more often to make their purchases the 
local tradesmen have to drive to some town farther 
to the rear where communications are better. This 
inevitably results in an increase in prices, but 
seldom a great one. 



64 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

These towns are always headquarters of one kind 
or another. They are also frequently the rail- 
head and the point from which supply motor- 
trains start for the army. The Grand Place and 
other public squares, as well as the principal roads 
leading out of town, are the places where these sup- 
ply motors are parked when not in use. Often 
they are the centers in which are located the 
evacuation hospitals; this means long strings of 
ambulances coming and going either to the battle- 
field to get the wounded or to the railway station 
to ship them to the rear. 

The soldiers and officers who go with these activi- 
ties are billeted, that is, assigned to different fami- 
lies throughout the town. This is something, 
however, to which Europeans are accustomed, and 
it generally entails no other inconvenience than the 
giving up of a bed-room to a certain ntmiber of 
officers or soldiers. Frequently, it means gain to 
the family concerned, particularly in the case of 
officers, because there are many things which they 
want and for which they always pay. 

The presence of troops stimulates trade of som.e 
character, but it is not a stimulation of which the 
people may be sure, because once the headquarters 
is moved forward or back to another town, the 
stimulation moves to that town. 

The inhabitants of these towns very often get a 
touch of war, as enemy aeroplanes are always 



WHAT INVASION MEANS TO FRANCE 65 

looking for towns which are the center of miHtary 
activity. The Grand Place, particularly if filled with 
motor-trucks, and the railway station are always 
attractive targets for aeroplane bombs. As it is 
difficult to hit such relatively small objects from 
heights the enemy aeroplanes are compelled to keep, 
very often the bombs drop on or close to houses 
near these localities. 

Sometimes the enemy's line approaches near 
enough to permit his big guns to fire into the town. 
Due to the long range of modern heavy guns, the 
infantry line can be driven back a considerable dis- 
tance and still be so far away that the inhabitants 
of the town in question do not knov/ this has hap- 
pened until some day or some night an enemy shell 

explodes in the town. This occurred near B 

in October, 19 14. The first shell arrived one night, 
a few minutes before twelve o'clock, and with true 
German accuracy struck the church tower, on top 
of which, incidentally, had been military observers 
for a number of days. 

Once a town is within range, it is subjected to 
bombardment, sometimes for a short while every 
day, sometimes once in a while every few days. 
While one shell cannot do very much damage, and 
even a considerable number of shells dropped in a 
town of twenty to thirty thousand inhabitants 
does not cause anything like the destruction which 
would be commonly expected, some of them do kill 



66 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

and wound people here and there. The uncertainty 
as to where the shells are going to land always 
causes a number of people to leave the town each 
day. Should the shelling stop for a few days, some 
of these refugees will come back. The longer it 
continues, the more there are who go away and stay 
away. However, a considerable number always 
remain, and when matters become really bad, live 
in their cellars. 

The people living just off, or just on, the outer 
edge of the battlefield, of course, come more 
directly in contact with the army. All their 
houses are used to billet troops, not only reinforce- 
ments coming up, but also the men who are resting 
from their tour of duty in the trenches. Some 
of their farms are taken as ammunition supply 
dep6ts and their barns filled with ammunition of 
all kinds; others are taken as field ambulances to 
which during the night the wounded are brought 
from the battlefield and from which during the day 
they are sent to the evacuation hospitals. Some 
of the wounded die in these field ambulances, and 
are buried in a small cemetery, usually in an 
orchard or garden near the house. 

Defensive positions on which to fall back in 
case of defeat are constructed across the fields. 
Gun-pits are dug in orchards and gardens. Com- 
municating trenches start back of hedges, or on 
one side of a garden wall and run through them. 



WHAT INVASION MEANS TO FRANCE 67 
Sometimes houses enter into the scheme of defense 
and have to be abandoned by their owners in order 
that they may be made ready. Occasionally 
buildings obstruct the field of fire to the front of a 
position prepared for defense; that is, if left stand- 
ing they would furnish cover for an enemy attacking 
the position. In these cases, they are blown up 
by the engineers. Trees are cut down to be used 
in making the trenches and the obstructions in 
front of them. These requisitions, and the de- 
struction of more or less property, are hard on 
the people concerned, particularl}^ when done by 
troops of their own army or that of their allies. 
However, it is inevitable. 

Just as the people of the towns near the battle- 
field may find themselves the object of unwelcome 
attention on the part of the enemy's aeroplanes or 
artillery, so may those living in the houses or farms 
on the edge of the battlefield. They may not even 
realize that they are within artillery range, until 
suddenly, some day or night, a large shell bursts 
near or on their house. 

At the beginning of the war, some of the more 
ignorant peasants were not entirely sure either of 
the British uniform or that of the Germans. In 
consequence, they sometimes mistook British for 
German troops, which frightened them very much 
until they discovered their error. Even now, 
some peasants are not always sure of friend or foe. 



68 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

A case is known where some British officers in a 
motor-car wanted to see, near a small village just 
on the edge of the battlefield, the holes made by 
some shells from one of the big German mortars. 
They stopped in front of a house and asked a group 
of peasants where the holes were. The peasants 
gave directions which were not very clear, so one 
of the British officers who could speak French asked 
a man if he would please get into the motor and 
show them the way. The man hesitated for some 
time while his wife urged him not to go. Finally 
he yielded, got into the motor and showed the 
officers the holes which had been made very early 
that morning. He then walked off. In about 
ten minutes, his wife cr^ang and wringing her 
hands came up to the officers and demanded to 
know what they had done with her husband. It 
transpired that when the peasant got in the motor, 
his wife was sure the occupants were Germans and 
that she would never see her husband again. 

The closer to the infantry firing line, the more 
people and property suft'er. Most country houses 
in France are built close to the roads. As the roads 
on the battlefield are frequently shelled, these 
houses suffer from the same fire. Just as houses 
on the outer edge of the artillery fire zone are 
turned into field ambulances, the houses on the 
outer edge of the infantry zone are turned into 
dressing stations. The destruction of property 



WHAT INVASION MEANS TO FRANCE 69 

by the preparation of defensive positions is natu- 
rally more extensive on the battlefield proper than 
farther to the rear. 

Many houses are used by artillery officers as 
observation points. At the beginning of the war 
houses were used as shelters for troops in reserve. 
As a consequence, it has become quite a common 
practice for the artillery of both sides to fire on 
most of the houses in the front half of the battlefield. 
In spite of all this, a few of the people living in 
safer parts of the battlefield persist in remaining. 
Occasionally, men will be seen ploughing within 
easy range, with shells bursting perhaps seven or 
eight hundred yards away. One case is known of 
an old woman who remained in a farm-house just 
on the edge of the infantry zone. She had a cow 
left which she kept in a brick stable. She herself 
lived in the cellar of the house; but no matter how 
hot the fire, she came up every day to milk her cow. 
Though advised again and again by officers to 
leave, she would not. When last heard of, she 
was still safe, and so was the cow. 

The inhabitants, of coiurse, cannot remain in 
the center of the battlefield, where are the two 
infantry trenches and the district immediately 
back of them. In this district all the houses are 
entirely destroyed, or badly damaged, and fre- 
quently used as part of the scheme of defense. 
They are likely to be fired upon both by infantry 



70 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

and artillery at any time, and often are, for long 
periods. In the present trench warfare, they are 
frequently undermined by one side or the other 
and blown up. 

Before the main bodies of the two armies came 
in contact, there was considerable fighting between 
advance guards. In these fights, the troops of 
the two sides frequently passed backward and 
forward over the same ground. Some of the 
inhabitants remained during the preliminary fights 
and, as a consequence, sometimes had German 
troops for a few days, and then British or French 
the next few days, or vice versa. When the two 
main bodies finally met, however, and serious 
fighting began, they had to abandon their homes 
and became refugees, going to the rear. 

The towns and villages just on the edge of the 
infantry zone suffer greatly from artillery fire. The 
people who remain, while never safe from artillery 
fire, are comparatively secure from infantry fire 
so long as they remain indoors. They live, mostly, 
in their cellars where they find the best protection 
from all kinds of fire. The small villages imme- 
diately on the battle line, in some instances with 
the trenches of the two armies rimning right 
through them, are so dangerous and so badly torn 
up that none of the inhabitants can possibly 
remain. 

Wherever the Germans have taken possession, 



WHAT INVASION MEANS TO FRANCE 71 

some of the French inhabitants have left, but many 
have remained. As a rule, when the Germans have 
approached, the mayors of the towns have posted 
notices telling the people to remain quietly indoors, 
to turn in their firearms, to make no hostile 
demonstrations, and, above all, to make no use 
of firearms, as the laws of war are very strict and 
severe punishment inevitably follows their violation. 

The tales told by the people who have remained 
in towns occupied by the Germans are of two 
characters: one is of brutal treatment, the other 
of cold but fair treatment; the latter is the tale 
of the majority. 

From all these things it easily can be seen that 
the people of France are fundamentally concerned 
in everything having to do with the prosecution 
of the war, in everything relating to the prime 
questions — When will peace be made? and. What 
kind of peace will it be? Since modern war, if 
it is to be waged successfully, demands that the 
manhood of the nations engaged be put under 
arms, the time has passed when war cannot funda- 
mentally concern every man, woman, and child of 
the countries involved. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE EXPERIENCES OF A FRENCH WOMAN AND 
HER DAUGHTER^ 

April, 1 91 5. 

AT the intersection of two long, straight, white 
macadamed roads, with trees on both sides, 
connecting four large country towns to the east of 
Lille in northern France, stands a fair-sized, two- 
story brick building, on which hangs the sign: 
" Estaminet (Country Inn) de la ." 

The owner, Madame — , in her sixty-fifth year, 
is a widow with one daughter and one son. The 
daughter lives with her; the son, an invalid, lives at 
Lille. Her only other surviving relative is a 
nephew, who, like all the young men of France, is 
a soldier in the army. 

Madame remembers very well the war of 1870. 
While the present war has worried her a great 
deal, up to the present she has not suffered from 
it. She is full of anxiety, however, because just 
as she was returning from Lille, whither she went 
to visit her invalid son who cannot be moved, the 
Germans were starting to attack that city. 

While wondering whether the approach of the 
Germans to Lille signifies fighting in her district, 

1 This is the story of the experiences of a French inn- keeper and her 
daughter, as told by them to the author in the town in which they had 
taken refuge, which was less than three miles from the edge of the 
battlefield. 

72 



EXPERIENCES OF A FRENCH WOMAN 73 

she is looking out of the windovv^ along the road 
to the west, and sees a cloud of dust through which 
soon, she distinguishes French cavalry. 

On reaching the crossroads, the main body 
halts and dismounts, while patrols continue down 
the different roads. A battery of artillery comes 
up and is drawn off into a field. The guns are 
put in position concealed behind a low hedge and 
a line of trees. Some officers come to the estaminet 
and ask her if she has seen or heard of any Germans 
in the vicinity. She answers, "No, but that the 
day before while she was there the Germans were 
attacking Lille." 

Soon rifle shots are heard. Men come galloping 
up to the inn. The officers go out. Some cavalry- 
men on foot with rifles in hand lie down in the 
ditch along the crossroads, while mounted men 
with the horses of the dismounted troopers get 
behind the estaminet and the neighboring farm- 
houses. The battery opens fire, and the projectiles 
can be seen bursting on the road to the east. 

Presently the sound of rifle fire is heard which 
swells in volume, and is foUov/ed by a number of 
thuds against the brick wall of the building. There 
is a tinkle and thud as a bullet comes through the 
window and strikes the rear wall of the room. 

The cavalry soldiers are now firing rapidly. 
Madame can see a number of figures rise in the field 
several hundred yards to the east and run toward 
the French, throwing themselves down again in a 



74 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

little while. Then she notices more and more 
men to the right and left of the first group who 
are doing the same thing. Some run into a bam. 
The batteries immediately shell the bam and set 
it on fire. 

A slightly wounded French officer is helped into 
the inn and asks for water while a hospital corps 
man dresses his wound. Madame questions: 

"Are the Germans going to get here?" 

The officer replies, "Probably, because we have 
in front of us a superior force of German infantry, 
and we will have to retire in a little while." 

"But what am I going to do when they arrive?" 
asks Madame, "Take me and my daughter with 
you." 

"Oh, you had better stay here and take care of 
your property, which probably will not be damaged 
if you treat the Germans well on their arrival, and 
do what they tell you do do." 

It is getting darker rapidly, and soon night falls. 
The firing still goes on, and from the flashes, 
Madame sees that the enemy is circling around to 
the right and left. 

Soon the battery ceases firing. Later groups of 
three or four cavalrymen leave the ditch and run 
behind the house for their horses. Going to the 
back door, Madame sees them mount and gallop 
away to the west. Then for a space all is silent; 
but soon Madame hears whispering in the darkness 
and the sounds of many people moving around 



n 





Mi^'^'^i^^ 



m^s^- 



I 




RUINS OF FRENCH HOUSES ON THE BATTLEFIELD OF THE MARNE 



EXPERIENCES OF A FRENCH WOMAN 75 

outside the house. Directly there is a loud pound- 
ing on the door, followed by a command to open 
it and to be quick about -it. Madame, taking the 
little lamp which she had kept lighted under 
the counter so that it would not show through the 
windows, opens the door. 

In the road are a number of German infantrymen 
with their rifles in a position of readiness. An 
oflicer asks: "Are there any Frenchmen in your 
house? Be careful to give me a truthful answer, 
because if you don't, it will go hard with you." 

"No sir. There were, but they have all left." 

"Where did they go?" 

"Off in the darkness to the west." 

"How many were they?" 

"I don't know." 

"What were they, cavalry? infantry?" 

"Oh, they were cavalry." 

"How many guns with them?" 

"I don't know." 

"How many did you see?" 

"Oh, several, but I was too excited to count 
them." 

"All right, get supper ready for three people 
immediately, and be sure you give us the best 
things you have!" 

Madame and her daughter hastily prepare supper 
for three and bring out the best wine from their 
cellar. 

In a little while, three officers enter and, removing 
7 



76 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

their arms and helmets, sit down at the table. At 
the same time, about twenty soldiers come into the 
room in which is the bar and proceed to make them- 
selves at home, helping themselves to what food, 
liquors, and tobacco they can find. 

After supper, the officers tell Madame that they 
are going to sleep there that night. Having a 
vivid recollection of the destruction of the neigh- 
boring brick barn by the French artillery, and fear- 
ing that the artillery in its new position might shell 
the estaminet, Madame already had told her daugh- 
ter to take some mattresses, blankets, and every- 
thing they might need to the cellar. 

She gives the officers the beds in the second story 
of the estaminet. She and her daughter retire to 
the cellar to sleep, while the twenty soldiers estab- 
lish themselves on the floor of the bar-room. 

At five o'clock the next morning, Madame and 
her daughter are awakened by a soldier calling to 
them to prepare breakfast for the officers. After 
breakfast, the officers and soldiers make ready to 
leave. One of the officers thanks Madame for her 
hospitality and gives her several francs. 

As they depart, a large force of German cavalry 
arrives. Several staff officers come into the esta- 
minet, and inform Madame that they are going to 
live there and that they have their own servants 
to take care of them. 

Soon German infantry pass down the road going 



EXPERIENCES OF A FRENCH WOMAN -]-] 

west. Then there is the sound of artillery fire, 
followed by infantry fire. 

Going to a back window Madame discerns sudden 
flashes of light, followed by little clouds of smoke 
in the field a short distance in back of her house. 
She then notices the same action to the right and 
left. A German officer comes to the window. 
After watching for a moment, he says : "The Brit- 
ish are out there. Those are their shells." 

Returning to the front room, Madame finds a 
number of soldiers busily engaged in fastening a 
telephone to the wall, and stringing wires through 
the windows and along the road to the east. While 
watching them there is a loud explosion, followed by 
a cloud of smoke and dust from a house about fifty 
feet down the road. Through the wall toward the 
British there is a great jagged hole. The family 
whose home it was are running out of the door and 
down the road to the east. 

Madame and her daughter rush about their 
house, gather together their most precious posses- 
sions and take them to the cellar, expecting any 
moment a loud explosion when a hole would be 
knocked in the wall of their home. 

A long day slowly passes. Madame and her 
daughter spend their time looking out of the window 
whenever they dare. They watch the soldiers and 
officers busily engaged in the room where the tele- 
phone has been established, go to the bar-room 



78 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

to estimate the value of the things the soldiers had 
taken without paying for them, or hide in the cellar 
when the firing increases in force and they are 
afraid the house may be struck. 

At about three o'clock, during a lull in the firing, 
a whirring noise is heard overhead. Some soldiers 
in the street commence to fire their rifles straight 
up into the air. Madame again runs to a window, 
this time to discover an aeroplane hovering 
above the crossroads. Then there is a flash, an 
explosion, and a small cloud of dust in the road 
about twenty feet away. Two of the soldiers in 
the street fall to the ground. One lies quite still; 
the other rolls from side to side, as he presses his 
hand to his stomach. Some hospital corps men 
pick him up and carry him down the road to a 
farmhouse, where a field ambulance has been 
established. 

Having heard the sound of broken glass in the 
second story, Madame starts to see what damage 
the pieces of the aeroplane bomb may have done. 
She is hardly more than half way up the stairs 
when a loud explosion shakes the whole house and 
is followed by the noise of falling brick, while frag- 
ments of masonry and a cloud of dust fill the stair- 
way. Madame, panic-stricken, nms to the cellar. 
When she comes up again, a soldier informs her 
that a British shell has struck the back of the 
house and wrecked one of the rooms. 



EXPERIENCES OF A FRENCH WOMAN 79 

With the coming of night, the gun-fire increases 
in intensity. From a back window long Hnes of 
flashes can be seen. There are brilHant explosions 
here and there — some in the air, some close to the 
ground, some near, some a long way off. Activity 
in the office in the front room increases. Orderlies 
and officers come and go. They speak quickly in 
hurried low tones. 

At about eleven o'clock, two soldiers appear at 
the door helping a wounded officer into the room. 
The officer's helmet is gone. His head hangs for- 
ward and bobs around. The two men lay him on 
the table. His left hand is pressed tightly to his 
side, while through his fingers, over them, and 
down his gray uniform, blood oozes. A doctor and 
two hospital corps men arrive with a stretcher 
almost immediately. The doctor cuts away the 
officer's clothing, but the sight of the wound is 
too much for Madame, so she again returns to 
her cellar. 

Through all the night Madame and her daughter 
go to and fro from the cellar to the main room, 
from which the wounded officer had been removed. 
On the table is a large pool of blood, which drips 
off into a similar pool on the floor. 

Toward morning, the firing dies out; and, 
shortly after daybreak, it stops. Everything being 
quiet, Madame and her daughter sleep fitfully in 
the cellar until about three o'clock in the afternoon 



8o WHY PREPAREDNESS 

when they are aroused by a soldier who tells 
them that the troops are going and that an 
officer above wants to speak to them. Madame 
does his bidding, and finds that the telephone as 
well as all the office equipment has been removed, 
that all the soldiers and all the officers, with the 
exception of two, have gone. One of the officers 
thanks her for having treated him and his soldiers 
so well. 

Madame is glad to see them depart, but in her 
mind's eye she has a vivid picture of the cigars, 
the cigarettes, the matches, the cognac, the beer 
and other liquors, to say nothing of numerous 
chickens and a large pile of hay in the back yard, all 
of which have disappeared without payment. 
The more she thinks about it, the angrier she 
becomes, until, finally, she breaks out: "Who is 
going to pay for all the things which your soldiers 
have taken?" The officer replies: "Have they 
taken much?" Then Madame becomes voluble, 
and with the assistance of her daughter, both 
talking at the same time, gives a detailed enumera- 
tion of their losses. The officer is silent for a 
moment, then asks for a written list. This is 
hastily made out, interspersed with much talking 
on the part of Madame and her daughter. After 
looking the list over carefully, the officer takes 
a printed slip from his despatch case whereon he 
writes Madame's name, Marks 150 — and his own 



EXPERIENCES OF A FRENCH WOMAN 8i 

signature. This he hands to her — it is a bond 
by which the German government undertakes to 
pay 150 marks for suppHes received. The officer 
bids her good bye once more and than writes on the 
door, in German: "Good people, respect them." 

Madame and her daughter go over the house to 
inventory their damages. In the second story in 
one of the rooms there is a large jagged hole through 
the back wall. All over the room are bits of brick 
and pieces of furniture, while the walls farthest away 
from the hole look as if they had had the small-pox, 
so pitted are they by bullets and by shrapnel. 

With the coming of darkness, the two women, 
fearing to light the lamps, close the door and the 
windows carefully and return to their cellar. 

At nine o'clock there is a great pounding on the 
door, followed by a command to open it at once. 
This time Madame finds a patrol of about fifteen 
German soldiers, who demand something to eat 
and drink immediately. She complies, and the 
patrol stays until eleven o'clock, smoking and 
resting, when they depart without paying for 
what they have taken. 

Two hours later, another loud banging brings 
the two trembling women to the door again, where 
they find a second German patrol. They do not 
enter, but merely demand to know the direction 
in which the German troops have gone. 

The women return once more to their cellar and 



82 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

try to sleep, but at three o'clock a loud banging 
is heard again. On opening the door, they find a 
third patrol of a sergeant and sixteen soldiers, 
who enter the house and not only demand some- 
thing to eat and drink, but announce their intention 
to remain. The sergeant is quite suspicious. He 
stations two men at the back door, two at the 
front, others on each side of the house, while with 
two other men he goes through the house from top 
to bottom. His manner also is very rough and 
abrupt. The daughter becomes exasperated and 
says: "All the other German officers and soldiers 
who have been here saw no reason to suspect us, 
why should you act in such a brutal manner?" 
The sergeant looks very much surprised and says 
nothing. However, from then on he is more 
gentle in his manner toward them. 

After having had something to eat and to 
drink, the members of the patrol, with the exception 
of one man left outside the house on guard, wrap 
themselves in their blankets, lie down on the floor 
and go to sleep. At about ten o'clock in the 
morning they wake up, and having partaken of 
some bread and coffee, depart. 

The two women, torn with anxiety, search the 
road to the west to see if there is any sign of the 
Allies whom they hope will come, and then look 
eastward in an effort to discover any sign of the 
Germans returning. 



EXPERIENCES OF A FRENCH WOMAN 83 

At about noon, down the road to the west, they 
discern a few figures, and back of them a long, low 
cloud of dust. As the figures approach, they 
recognize the British infantry. Soon British troops 
are found everywhere around the crossroads. A 
number of officers with their servants enter the inn, 
and tell Madame that they intend to stay there. 
She and her daughter are delighted to see them, 
and do everything they can to make them com- 
fortable. 

Six guns are placed in position in a field not far 
from the estaminet; another battery of six guns is 
placed nearby. This worries Madame and her 
daughter. Soon they are still more worried, because 
to the east again is heard the sound of rifle fire, 
which, as before, gradually increases in volume. 
Then the two batteries near the house open fire. 
German shells commence to drop near the batteries, 
and then wounded British soldiers, some singly, 
some helping others, drift down the road from the 
east and pass on to the west. Some stop to rest 
near the estaminet, and Madame and her daughter 
refresh them with drink. The German shells 
aimed at the batteries drop so close, however, that 
the wounded soon move on. Later, the shells 
commence hitting the road, but to the east of the 
house. Then the wotmded stop coming. 

Throughout the afternoon the fighting goes on. 
At sunset it dies down a little, only to begin again 



84 ' WHY PREPAREDNESS 

with increased fury at about eight o'clock. More 
British infantry go by, heading toward the east. 
Madame and her daughter try to get some rest in 
their cellar, but the noise of the fighting, particularly 
of the guns near them, and of the bursting shells 
which are trying to find the guns, coupled with 
their anxiety, keeps them awake, and constantly 
they go up to the first floor to see what is happening. 

With daylight, the noise of the firing dies down 
considerably, but increases again later in the 
morning. For three days and three nights, the 
fighting continues. During this time each night 
the British guns are moved farther back, while 
more infantry is sent up to the infantry firing line. 
Late each night, strings of wounded, some walking 
but many being carried on stretchers, go by to a 
dressing station established on the road in a house 
several hundred yards to the west of the estaminet . 

In the evening of the third night, the French 
interpreter, who is with the British staff, tells 
Madame that they are going to leave. During 
the three days, Madame has watched with increas- 
ing apprehension the steady movement of the 
batteries to the rear, and noted the sound of the 
infantry fire as it drew closer and closer. The 
annoimcement of the departure of the staff worries 
her so much that she begs the interpreter to ask 
the staff what she should do. She wishes to go 
with them, as she and her daughter are worn out 



EXPERIENCES OF A FRENCH WOMAN 85 

physically and have no courage left. The inter- 
preter goes to the officers, and returns in a few 
minutes, saying: "Madame, they say that if 
you have had the courage to withstand what you 
have up to to-night, you had better remain in the 
cellar of your house. In this way you can keep 
an eye on your property, and you will be reasonably 
safe." 

The staff then leaves after paying for everything 
by giving signed bonds payable by mail at a 
British base in France. 

Madame and her daughter do not sleep at all. 
The British artillery, which had stopped firing 
during the early part of the night, has started again, 
and Madame and her daughter can see by the 
flashes that it has been moved still farther back. 
In the morning they notice that the dressing 
station has also been moved, but cannot see where. 
Shortly after, the thud of rifle bullets as they strike 
the brick front of the house again compel Madame 
and her daughter to run to the cellar, where they 
remain. 

In the early part of the afternoon, after another 
heavy explosion, followed by a loud crash and 
clouds of dust, some of the small pieces of brick 
and mortar fall into the cellar. Madame and her 
daughter in terror rush up the stairs, only to find 
the whole back part of their house in ruins, the 
effect of a shell from a British battery. 



86 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

They run across an open field. The sound of 
shells is heard overhead and also the occasional 
sszpe of an infantry bullet as it speeds past them. 
They reach a farmhouse about 400 yards away 
and pound frantically on the door. The old 
man and his wife who live there let them in, and 
the four go to the cellar. Here they spend the rest 
of the day and the following night, listening with 
anxiety to the apparently never-ending artillery, 
rifle and machine-gun fire. 

After daylight, the firing having almost com- 
pletely ceased, Madame and her daughter walk 
to the estaminet. It is in ruins, for the most part 
fallen into the cellar. Some of the walls are still 
standing half way up to the second story. In the 
ruins they recover a few clothes. 

The firing having started up again, they instantly 
return to the farmhouse where they had passed the 
night. As they enter, a shell knocks off a chimney 
at the other end. The two old people, Madame, and 
her daughter decide to leave immediately. They 
put food and a few clothes in a push cart and start 

for M , a good-sized town, twenty miles away, 

where Madame has some friends. 

Pushing the cart before them, they go down a 
long straight road. They are soon where they no 
longer hear, even occasionally, infantry bullets 
whistling through the air or their thud as they hit 
something; but bursting shells sometimes hit in 



EXPERIENCES OF A FRENCH WOMAN 87 

the field nearby to one side, sometimes a long way 
off to the right or left, and occasionally, to their 
terror, drop some distance ahead of them. 

After what seems an endless stretch of long gray 
road with trees on both sides, and a lifetime of 
pushing the cart, they finally can tell by the lessen- 
ing noise of the firing and the fact that they no 
longer see the shells bursting ahead, to the right or 
to the left but only behind them, that they are off 
the battlefield and safe. 

At eight o'clock in the evening, they reach M 

and go to the keeper of an estaminet from whom for 
years Madame has bought many of her supplies. 
Although he already has a number of refugees in 
his house, he takes them in. 



To-day, the deserted ruins of the estaminet stand 
at the crossroads very much as the two women 
left them. A few yards to the west is a barbed 
wire entanglement, and just back of it, a line of 
earth in front of a ditch filled with British infantry. 
A little to the east is another barbed wire entangle- 
ment and, just back of it, a line of earth in front 
of a ditch filled with German infantry. 

Here and there, on the ground, around the ruins 
of the estaminet, and between the two trenches, are 
scattered a number of dead bodies — some British, 
some German, the results of attacks made by the 
British and Germans which have failed. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE AND BELGIUM 

May, IQ15. 

PROBABLY the most noticeable characteristic 
of the great majority of the British people is 
their ignorance of what really has happened up to 
the present, so far as their country is concerned in 
this war. The class which furnishes the officers 
for the regular army and navy, and naturally the 
higher officials of the government, who are in the 
minority, are, of course, thoroughly conversant 
with the situation. But the mass of the people 
believe that this war thus far has been a succession 
of victories for the British. 

When the war broke out, the British regular army 
serving in Great Britain was mostly embodied in 
what was called the Expeditionary Force — a force 
to be put immediately on the continent of Europe 
for the prosecution of the war. Like ours, the 
British regular aiTny consisted of professional long- 
service soldiers led by professional officers. 

The first part of this force arrived near Mons, 
in Belgium, just in time to be struck heavily by the 
Germans, and after considerable loss was forced to 
retreat in the face of superior numbers. From 
then on a retreat was continued which, in spite of 
rear-guard actions in which the British troops 



THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN 89 

displayed great determination, degenerated here and 
there into a rout in which all organization was lost 
and men abandoned their arms. This retreat con- 
tinued until the British army was to the east of and 
slightly south of Paris. 

Innimierable accounts of the heroic incidents of 
this retreat have been given to the British pubhc 
through the press, frequently greatly magnified, 
until the prevalent opinion seems to be that it con- 
sisted of British victories, of which the British army 
was unaj^le to take advantage because of the failure 
of the French to do their part. The fact that prior 
to the arrival of the British troops on the scene the 
French were engaged with the Germans from 
Belgium to the southern portion of Alsace, and that 
they had advanced into Alsace, and also into Lor- 
raine, either is not generally known or ignored. 

There is also the same ignorance with respect to 
the fact that while the British were fighting at 
Mons and south of Mons, the French were engaged 
along a line through Charleroi and Neufchateau, 
in Belgium, and thence to the Lorraine border, in 
front of Metz, and so on down to upper Alsace; 
in other words, while the British were fighting along 
a few miles in southern Belgium, the French were 
fighting along a line two hundred and fifty miles 
in length. 

The English, too, are generally ignorant of the 
fact that in the latter part of August, the pressure 



90 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

which the Germans were exerting against the Brit- 
ish was greatly reheved by French troops coming 
from the west and attacking the German right 
flank. 

In the battle of the Marne, which was won pri- 
marily by the attack delivered on the German right 
flank by the 6th French Army, the British troops 
fought well, as the regulars of Great Britain and the 
United States always do. They did not, however, 
as public opinion in Great Britain seems to be, 
win the battle of the Marne. They were part of the 
main line of the Allies, and probably had on hand 
less than 40,000 as against the 800,000 to one 
million effectives of the French. In the advance 
to the line of the Aisne, after the battle of the 
Marne, the British did their share, but no more. 

In the general flanking movement initiated in the 
beginning of the fall, for the purpose of turning the 
German right flank and cutting their lines of com- 
munication and thus forcing them out of France, 
the British troops, now greatly reinforced, were 
moved to the north and deployed from St. Omer in 
the direction of Lille. One of the objects of this 
flanking movement being to connect with the Bel- 
gians in and around Antwerp, a division of British 
infantry and one of cavalry were landed at Ostend 
and Zeebrugge. A British naval division, made up 
mostly of what corresponds to our naval reserve in 
the United States, was put in Antwerp. 




BRITISH INFANTRY ABOUT TO GO INTO ACTION NEAR BETHUNE 
The men are watching German shells burst in the fields in front of them 




//. J. R. 

BRITISH -l.y-INCH GUN IN ACTION IN FLANDERS ON A RAINY DAY 



THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN 91 

The general conception of the scheme was excel- 
lent. The preparedness and promptness of the 
Germans and the lack of sufficient troops on the 
part of the British resulted in its complete failure. 
Antwerp was taken by the Germans. The divisions 
of infantry and cavalry landed at Zeebrugge had to 
retreat toward Ypres to save themselves. About 
the same time, the British advance from St. Omer 
to Lille not only was stopped but, to a certain extent, 
shoved back, and the Allies found themselves 
attacked along a line running instead of to Antwerp 
along the Yser to Nieuport and the sea. These 
attacks grew heavier and heavier as the Germans 
brought up more troops. Everywhere the British 
troops lost ground; everywhere their losses were 
heavy. 

Had the Germans been able to keep up their 
attacks, there seems to be but little doubt that they 
would have forced back the line a long distance, or 
even broken through it. At this time, however, 
the Russian offensive in Poland had reached such 
an advanced stage that it no longer could be neg- 
lected, and the Germans were obliged to transfer 
large numbers of their troops from the line of the 
Yser, the region around Ypres, and the district 
south to the Polish frontier. 

The facts that the French held a large part of the 
line at the Yser, that they not only backed up the 
Belgian troops but sent cavalry and artillery to 



92 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

the assistance of the British during these heavy 
attacks, and that after these attacks had ceased 
they took over a part of the line formerly occupied 
by the British, are also generally unknown. 

After more than two months of what amounted to 
inactivity so far as damaging the Germans was con- 
cerned, the British, in the early part of March, 
attacked them. The newspapers reported that this 
attack was a tremendous success, in view of the 
fact that the village of Neuve Chapelle and a few 
thousand yards of German trenches had been cap- 
tured. The country at large spoke, and still speaks, 
of the wonderful victory of Neuve Chapelle. 

This was not a simple attack on a certain portion 
of the German line, but a general offensive of the 
British, with the idea of breaking through the Ger- 
man line, advancing on or near Lille, and thus 
cutting some of the main lines of communication 
of the German army in France. Had this suc- 
ceeded, a large portion of the German positions in 
France would have been precarious, if not unten- 
able. Neuve Chapelle was chosen as the point at 
which the main effort to pierce the German line 
would be made. A large number of guns were 
concentrated. The infantry all along the line was 
to make a general attack, which was to be partic- 
ularly heavy at Neuve Chapelle. The cavalry, 
which had drawn lots to see which brigade would 
lead, was drawn up in rear ready to go through the 



THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN 93 

hole which the artillery and the infantry should 
make for it. The concentrated fire of the artil- 
lery dislodged the Germans from their trenches 
at this point. The infantry rushed forward to the 
attack and seized the trenches almost immediately 
to their front, but were unable to get any farther, 
hence no hole was made through the German line. 
The British attack along the rest of the line broke 
down, as the German resistance was too strong. 
The British losses were nearly 13,000 so their 
attempt at a general offensive failed with con- 
siderable loss. Their artillery fire was not properly 
coordinated with their infantry advance, with the 
result that they have been accused of killing and 
wounding numbers of their own infantry. Their 
general officers in command of the higher units 
do not seem to have coordinated their efforts; in 
other words, the faults were displayed which seem 
inevitable in any army in which the general officers 
are not given the opportunity in peace time to 
handle large bodies of troops in manoeuvres. 

Up to the end of March, 19 15, the small British 
army had lost to the Germans sixteen guns, 520 
officers, and 20,307 men prisoners. In summing 
up, it would appear that the hiding of the truth 
from the British public has resulted in a foolish 
optimism not justified by the events. 

After nine months of war, the British are still on 
the defensive. But for this their small regular 



94 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

army is in no way to blame. In view of the unfa- 
vorable conditions under which the regular army 
existed in peace time, and in view of the demands, 
frequently out of proportion to its strength, which 
have been made upon it since the beginning of the 
war, it has acquitted itself even better than could 
have been expected by those who know the truth 
of Great Britain's lack of preparation for war. 
Although the British have been at war for nine 
months, they have not one real victory on land. 
The British people, however, because of the exag- 
geration in the press of minor successes and heroic 
incidents, believe that their arms have had a suc- 
cession of victories, and that the German army 
already is practically on its knees. 



CHAPTER X 

THE BRITISH LAND FORCES 

May, 191 S. 

WHEN the war broke out, Great Britain had 
available in England for service part of her 
regular army, the territorial forces, and the officers' 
training corps. In addition, she had in India a 
large number of native troops and 75,000 white 
regulars. In such places as Egypt, Malta, Gib- 
raltar, Hong-Kong, and South Africa she had con- 
siderably smaller forces of white regulars ; in various 
colonies there were native troops of different 
classes; while in her white colonies, such as Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa she had 
white militia forces, more or less of the character 
of our National Guard. 

The greater part of her regulars at home were 
organized into what was called the Expeditionary 
Force, which consisted of six infantry divisions 
and one cavalry division, with the necessary 
artillery and auxiliary troops making a total of 
about 176,000 men and 486 guns. 

To bring up the regular army at home to its war 
strength, there were about 138,000 regular reserv- 
ists; that is, men who had served anywhere from 
three to seven years, or even longer, in the regular 
army. In addition, there was a special reserve 

95 



96 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

made up of 62,000 men. This special reserve con- 
sisted of men who had undergone partial training. 
The special reserve is a descendant of the former 
British militia; in other words, it consists of men 
who have had about as much training as our 
National Guard. 

The regular army was a small professional army, 
made up of men who voluntarily enlisted. It was 
officered by professional officers, who were undoubt- 
edly brave and kept themselves in good physical 
condition but who did not possess the professional 
education of the continental officers. Above all, 
the higher grades had lacked the opportunity of 
handling large bodies of troops which the general 
officers on the continent have had. As in our 
army, many of the men served long terms of years; 
they had made soldiering their life job. 

The territorials came from the old British volun- 
teer organizations, which, in the past, were entirely 
separate from the militia organizations. Lord 
Haldane finding these volunteer forces irregularly 
organized and administered, and not sufficiently 
under the control of the central government, suc- 
ceeded in reorganizing them as territorials directly 
under the government administration, and by the 
army regulations part of the army. 

Like our National Guard, they are citizen soldiers 
who cannot be used outside the borders of the 
country, except by their own consent. They are. 



THE BRITISH LAND FORCES 97 

however, more under national control than is our 
National Guard, and probably, on the whole, re- 
ceive more training. A certain number of their 
officers are regular officers. They are organized 
into fourteen divisions. Like all partially trained 
troops, they lack that cohesion and discipline which 
can be obtained only by continuous service extend- 
ing over some period of time, and which alone can 
give that united stamina and will necessary for 
success on the battlefield. 

The Officers' Training Corps consists of school 
and university battalions, which, under the super- 
vision of the general staff of the army, undergo a 
certain amount of training as subaltern officers. 
While this system of training reserve officers leaves 
a great deal to be desired, it is far superior to the 
old system of appointing green men as subaltern 
officers. 

When the war broke out, the six infantry divisions 
and the one cavalry division of the expeditionary 
force were hurried to France. As fast as terri- 
torials could be sent to Gibraltar, Malta, India, 
etc., white regulars were brought to Europe and 
organized into the Seventh and Eighth divisions, 
which were also sent to France. At the same time, 
two divisions of the Indian army, three-fourths of 
which are native troops and one-fourth white regu- 
lars, were brought to France, thus raising the force 
in France to ten infantry divisions. With the 



98 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

exception of a few territorial battalions which were 
brought over, this was the British force up to the 
end of 1 9 14. Since then, a Canadian division and 
a number of territorial divisions have been brought 
over. As so many territorials had to be sent to 
replace regulars in colonial garrisons, the proba- 
bilities are that not more than nine or ten terri- 
torial divisions, if that many, are in France. 

As soon as the war broke out, the military author- 
ities, realizing that they did not have anything like 
the number of troops to prosecute the war to a 
successful issue, started to raise Kitchener's new 
army of a million men. While there is talk of his 
army now being much greater than this, there is 
considerable doubt as to its truth. Up to quite 
recently, none of this new' army had left Great 
Britain, for the simple reason that the military 
authorities knew it was not yet sufficiently trained 
and equipped. 

Coincident with the raising of this new army, 
individuals and groups of individuals started raising 
a volunteer force intended primarily for home 
defense. These home defense battalions filled up 
very quickly, until the war department created a 
great commotion by sending circulars to them which 
showed the possibility of their being sent out of the 
country. This apparently was not at all satis- 
factory to the majority of the volunteers. Many 
said it was not legal, some even talked of hiring 




INFANTRY ON THE MARCH 




INFANTRY WAGONS ON THE MARCH 

KITCHENER'S NEW ARMY 



THE BRITISH LAND FORCES 99 

counsel and making a test case. However, the 
government knew from previous experience what it 
was about. At the time of the Napoleonic wars, 
the government could demand certain service from 
the militia which it could not demand from the 
large volunteer forces which had been raised at this 
time. Not only were these volunteer forces under 
no obligation to the government, but men serving 
in them were exempt from service in the militia, 
which furnished drafts to the army in the field. 
As a consequence, thousands of men, to escape the 
possibility of military service abroad, went into the 
volunteers. Incidentally, the government fre- 
quently found these volunteer forces to be highly 
insubordinate, even on questions of home defense. 
It undoubtedly had this experience in mind when 
it proceeded to make it uncomfortable for the new 
volunteer forces raised since the beginning of the 
war. The controversy has finally been settled by 
the volunteers agreeing to refuse to take any man 
who comes within the requirements of military 
service. Therefore, the volunteers now consist 
mostly of older men, and they are supposed to 
number about 600,000 men. There is little doubt 
that the majority of them are patriotic citizens, 
and individually men of considerable bravery. In 
battle, however, they probably would be about as 
much good as the Belgian Civil Guard turned out 
to be, when Belgium was invaded. Men who are 



100 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

grandfathers and fathers of grown famihes and 
mostly important members of the community are 
entirely too individualistic to become suddenly in 
the face of an enemy anything more than a private 
whose death or continued existence is a matter of 
relatively small importance in comparison with the 
accomplishment of a military end. 

Thus, after nine months of war and a great expen- 
diture of money and energy, Great Britain finds 
herself with about twenty odd divisions, embracing 
400,000 men, in the main theatre of war in France. 
Of these, eight are regular divisions. However, due 
to their casualties, they now contain a number of 
green men. Two are Indian divisions, which, on 
the whole, in their performance in the face of the 
enemy, are not equal to the white divisions. The 
balance are territorials and Canadians who, though 
enthusiastic, patriotic, and undoubtedly individu- 
ally brave, are not equal to trained troops because 
of their lack of training and discipline. This is not 
a sufficient force to fight the aggressive, determined 
campaign which is necessary, if the war is to be 
brought to the conclusion the British people wish. 

The whole trouble appears to have been that the 
people of Great Britain, like those in the United 
States, insist on waiting until war breaks out before 
raising an army, because they think that at the last 
moment they can raise forces, without difficulty, 
which will be the equal of trained continental 



THE BRITISH LAND FORCES lOi 

troops. Th^y never have had too much respect 
for the latter, because they are conscripts. Then, 
too, both peoples have been taught their military 
history with the defeats left out or minimized and 
the victories exaggerated. They forget two things: 
that far from all conscripts being unwilling, the 
great majority of them are actuated just as much 
by patriotism as the volunteer, and therefore are 
just as willing to go; and that such troops as they 
may raise hastily at the beginning of a war cannot 
on the battlefield approach the performance of 
their regular army made up, on the whole, of the 
most adventurous part of their population who 
have spent years as soldiers. 

This ignorance has resulted in a persistent refusal 
to have in time of peace a regular army of sufficient 
size to meet the country's need on the outbreak of 
war. In peace time, the army is regarded solely 
from a political point of view, which generally 
means cutting it down or depriving it of something, 
so as to point to a decrease in the expenditures made 
by whatever party happens to be in power. 

Although none too large, the British regular army 
was reduced after the Napoleonic wars. At this 
time, just as before the present war, the peace party 
became more and more powerful, and everywhere 
was heard the cry that the days of big wars had 
passed and the era of peace and brotherhood of men 
had commenced. To such an extent was the 



102 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

neglect of the army carried that the Duke of Welling- 
ton called attention to it in practically an open letter. 
However, no more heed was paid to him than was 
given to Lord Robert's appeal prior to the present 
war. The consequence was that the Crimean War 
found the country unprepared, and this unpre- 
paredness, as usual, led to unnecessary and useless 
sufferings and loss of life. In spite of this lesson, 
the army was reduced after the Crimean campaign. 
After the Indian mutiny, it again was reduced. 
In spite of Lord Haldane's beneficial reorganization 
of the volimteers into the territorial forces, he cut 
down the regular army at a time when the trained 
soldiers of the country considered that it was greatly 
in need of an increase. 

From the beginning of this war, the regular army 
has, if an3rthing, done more than reasonably could 
have been expected from it. Too much has been 
asked of its small numbers. Had the first expedi- 
tionary force been composed of a sufficient number 
of trained troops, the Germans probably could 
have been held in Belgium. During the flanking 
movement, in October, 191 5, had the British force 
consisted of sufficient trained troops, Lille probably 
could have been occupied, with the consequent 
cutting off of some of the main German lines of 
communication. Failing this, at least the Allied 
line in France might have been linked with the 
Belgians in Antw^erp, thus saving that city and the 



THE BRITISH LAND FORCES 103 

Belgian coast from the German occupation. The 
valuable aid to the maritime policy which the posses- 
sion of this port and of the Belgian coast has been 
to the Germans is sufficient proof of how much was 
lost by the failure to extend the flanking movement 
to Antwerp. The Germans not only secured 
Antwerp and the coast, but kept Lille; they almost 
threw the British and Belgians out of Belgium, put 
them on the defensive by vigorous attacks, and 
probably would have broken their line had it not 
been for the impossibility of longer neglecting the 
Russian advance in the east. 

More trained men would have meant that, with 
the spring, the British could have assumed a 
vigorous offensive, instead of which, at the present 
time, they are on the defensive. 

Once more, this war is demonstrating what so 
often has been demonstrated in the past military 
history both of the British and of the American 
people — 'that a policy which neglects preparation 
for war in time of peace, which is deaf to or ridicules 
the warnings of trained soldiers, a policy which 
waits until war has arrived before getting ready 
and then relies on the patriotic citizens springing 
to arms, inevitably fails. 



CHAPTER XI 

kitchener's new army 

May, IQ15. 

THROUGH a combination of circumstances, 
the writer happened to be on the road from 
Aldershot to Winchester when a division of Kitch- 
ener's new army marched over it. 

The first indication of the approach of the head 
of the coKimn was the excitement in a small town 
where several billeting officers had marked on the 
doors with chalk the number of men and officers 
who were to spend the night in each house. 

Some said the division was out on a combined 
march and billeting practice; that is, at the end of 
the march, instead of camping, the men and 
officers are assigned to different houses where they 
pass the night. Others said that the division was 
on its way to Southampton to embark for France. 

The advance guard of the division was 
encountered on the Aldershot road a short distance 
beyond the town. First came a company of 
cyclists. A little behind them was a battalion 
of infantry, four companies, of something under 
1,000 men. The battalion was followed by a 
battery of field artillery of four guns of the regula- 
tion British i8-pounder type. Then came signal 
troops, which in the British army do not form a 

104 



KITCHENER'S NEW ARMY 105 

separate corps as in the United States army but 
belong to the engineers. Following them were 
some engineers, and then a company of the royal 
army medical corps with its ambulances. Behind 
all were the wagon train belonging to the infantry 
and the extra caissons belonging to the field artillery. 

About three-quarters of a mile farther down the 
road, the head of the main body was encountered. 
A division consisting of twelve battalions of 
infantry, each about 1,000 men, and thirty- 
six field guns with a few heavier guns, engineer 
troops, signal troops, royal army medical corps 
troops, and all the wagons and carriages which 
are necessary for ammunition and supplies, occupies 
about twelve miles of road. 

First came a battalion of infantry, each company 
followed by a couple of pack mules carrying 
ammunition. After the battalion came a long 
column of carts for supplies. Two others followed 
the first battalion. Next came two batteries of 
field artillery of four guns each, followed by signal 
troops with their poles and reels of wire, and 
engineer troops with some pontoons — boats used 
for building bridges. Next came royal army 
medical corps troops with ambulances, and after 
them infantry ammunition carts, the artillery 
reserve caissons, and back of all, a long wagon train. 
All these, with the advance guard, constituted one 
of the three brigades of the division. Almost 



io6 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

immediately behind this brigade came the second 
brigade and following it a battery of two 4.7 guns. 

The head of the third brigade was encountered 
going into a small town where it was to be billeted 
for the night. The companies were being marched 
down streets indicated by staff officers. After 
forming lines in these streets, their officers parcelled 
them out to the different houses, in accordance 
with the indications written in chalk on the doors, 
such as: So many men, such a company, such a 
battalion. Headquarters of the brigade was being 
established in a good-sized inn. The signal men of 
the engineers were busily engaged putting field 
telephones in different rooms, stringing the wires 
out of the windows and down the street. The horse 
transport, which filled up all one side of most of the 
streets, was gradually being stowed away in 
buildings having accommodations for wagons and 
horses. 

The miles of troops and train on the march 
forming the first two brigades, and the third 
brigade going into billet, afforded a very interesting 
opportunity to see something of Kitchener's new 
army. 

Two things were particularly noticeable: first, no 
cavalry was seen; second, many of the battalions 
were preceded by music of some kind, one of them 
having a fife and drum corps. Evidently the 
British army has learned again what the French and 




FIELD ARTILLERY OX THE MARCH 




SIGNAL SECTION OF ENGINEERS ON THE MARCH 
KITCHENER'S NEW ARMY 



KITCHENER'S NEW ARMY 107 

others never have forgotten — that music in the field 
makes a great difference in the spirit of the troops. 
The men and officers were all well clothed in the 
regulation British field-service uniform, which is 
almost the same color as the American. They 
were well and completely equipped. All equipment 
was new and apparently of the very best material. 
The infantry had leather belts supported by leather 
shoulder-belts, and with leather cartridge boxes 
quite similar to the German, instead of the web 
belts with a web pouch for every two cartridge 
clips which the regular British troops use. They 
had the same rifles as the British regulars, which 
up to the present has not been true of most, if not 
all, of the territorial battalions. The knapsack 
was the regulation British knapsack. Like all 
British infantry troops, their pack did not include 
a blanket. They wore the regulation olive drab 
cap, similar to that which our troops wear in 
garrison. The campaign in France has shown this 
cap to be a very poor head-cover, as it neither 
gives sufficient protection from the sun nor from 
the rain. Then, too, as the cloth on the top is 
stretched tight, it reflects the sun in such a way 
that these caps are easily distinguishable at long 
distances. For this reason, many of the officers 
and troops in France now wear soft covered caps. 
All the infantry soldiers had the British regulation 
entrenching tool. 
9 



io8 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

The artillery had good horses which, from their 
appearance, had been well taken care of. The 
harnesses and saddlery were new and apparently 
of the best materials and make. 

The transport wagons were mostly drawn by 
mules, undoubtedly from the United States. They 
were good-looking animals, and, like the artillery 
horses, had been well cared for. Like the artillery, 
the harnesses of all transport was new and all of 
good material and make. 

The infantry companies were not up to full 
strength. The men varied in age. Many were 
young, apparently between nineteen and twenty, 
while a great number were at least forty and over. 
They varied greatly in height, which, after all, 
makes no difference. However, it was noticeable 
how many very short men there were. On the 
whole, all seemed cheerful and very willing to 
bandy remarks with onlookers. 

The head of the column when first seen had come 
about twelve miles. It was quite evident that the 
men in it were very tired. However, of all the 
troops seen, only one man had fallen out. He was 
flat on his back along the side of the road. Their 
rate of march had been a slow one, as, if the infor- 
mation given as to the hour at which they left 
Aldershot was correct, the head of the column had 
marched eleven miles in five and one-half hours. 
They marched as British infantry always do — 



KITCHENER'vS NEW ARMY 109 

keeping their places in the column of fours, keep- 
ing step, and with that swinging motion of the 
shoulders which gives the whole column the appear- 
ance of swaying in unison from side to side. This 
swaying motion is a peculiarity of the British 
infantry, which makes them recognizable even at a 
distance. The British method of marching is in 
marked contrast to that of the French infantry- 
men, who, like our own men, are not required to 
keep step nor to keep more than approximately 
in their places. The French infantry have a 
record for getting over the ground, which would 
indicate that their method is by far the better one. 

As the coliunn marched, there were the checks 
followed by the opening out and closing up again, 
which it is so difficult to avoid in marching large 
bodies of troops, and which are always such a 
marked feature of the march of green troops. In 
the batteries and wagon trains, the lead teams were 
not keeping proper distance, with the result that 
they constantly had to be turned out on the road 
to prevent bumping into the carriage or gun ahead. 

Here and there among the noncommissioned 
officers were men whose campaign badges showed 
that they had seen service before; but the great 
majority were undoubtedly as new as the men 
around them. 

The company officers all carried knapsacks, even 
the mounted captains. Among the officers, there 



no WHY PREPAREDNESS 

was also a sprinkling of older men whose campaign 
badges showed that they, too, had seen previous 
service. The great mass of the company officers, 
however, looked what they are said to be — healthy 
young university students and school teachers 
without experience or military training. 

The division looked very well on the whole, con- 
sidering that it was made up almost entirely of 
green men and officers, probably none with more 
than six or seven months' training, and new horses 
and mules. It could be easily seen that a vast 
amount of work had been performed and a con- 
siderable sum of money spent to get such a division 
together. If this division is typical of all the divis- 
ions in Kitchener's new army, probably no nation 
could do better than the British have done in the 
same time; many nations, especially those lacking 
the great financial resources of Great Britain, 
probably could not do so well in the same length 
of time. The troops, however, showed plainly 
that they were green troops. As their officers also, 
for the most part were green, it is surprising that 
they did not appear more so. 

In watching them, mile after mile, it was impossi- 
ble to keep from comparing them unfavorably with 
the new units seen in France, made up of veteran 
officers, veteran noncommissioned officers, and 
many veteran soldiers, to which the young men 
recently called to the colors have been assigned 



KITCHENER'S NEW ARMY in 

only after five or six months' rigorous training in 
a d.ep6t under trained officers and noncommissioned 
officers. 

That the men of Kitchener's new army undoubt- 
edly are brave, that they, for the most part, have 
good physique, that they are cheerful, and that 
they are well equipped, is beyond question entirely 
true. But that they are well trained for battle, 
that they have the discipline of the whole which 
battle conditions demand, that the officers have the 
confidence in themselves or the men the confidence 
in their officers which must be had by troops in 
order to withstand modern attacks and above all 
successfully make modern attacks, is seriously to 
be doubted. However far they may have pro- 
gressed along these lines, they certainly have not 
progressed so far as the French conscripts who, 
after six months of arduous individual training in a 
dep6t, are used to fill up the depleted ranks of an 
organization of veterans. 



CHAPTER XII 

CONSCRIPTION NEEDED IN GREAT BRITAIN 

May, 1915. 

ONCE war is declared, the great need of a 
combatant nation is men. To put enough 
men in the field to overcome the enemy's army is 
at once a prime necessity. In addition, the fighting 
force must be kept up to its proper strength — that 
is, new men must replace those taken prisoners, the 
killed, the wounded, and the sick. 

That Great Britain has needed men badly from 
the beginning has been shown by the fact that 
almost immediately after the war had commenced 
she started the organization of Kitchener's new 
army of a million or more men. That the British 
still need men is evidenced by the continuance of 
the recruiting campaign, by the statements of 
political and military leaders, and the constant 
hints of the need of compulsory service. One of 
the best indications of the urgent need of men is 
that the requirement as to height has been con- 
siderably decreased and the age limit considerably 
extended. 

An examination of the campaign up to date 
shows that the British army has played a minor 
part; it shows the Germans still on the offensive. 
Therefore, although the war is in its ninth month, 

112 



CONSCRIPTION NEEDED IN BRITAIN 113 

Great Britain has not yet fulfilled the initial require- 
ments of putting a sufficient force in the field to 
put the enemy on the defensive. 

Up to the present, with the possible exception of 
one division of Kitchener's new army, the force 
placed in France has consisted of regulars, terri- 
torials, Canadians, and one Indian army corps. 
The rest of Kitchener's new army has not been put 
in the field, probably primarily for the reason that 
as yet it has not been sufficiently well trained and 
equipped. 

In considering Great Britain's need of men, it is 
not enough to think only of the campaign in France, 
as there are six other lesser campaigns in which she 
is engaged: The Dardanelles, Egypt, the Persian 
Gulf, German East Africa, German South- West 
Africa, and the Cameroons. 

While she has drawn on her native Indian and 
colonial white troops for all these campaigns, she 
also has been under the necessity of keeping large 
garrisons in India, Malta, and such places as 
Gibraltar and Hong-Kong. Where she has taken 
regulars from these garrisons for service in France, 
she has had to substitute territorials, with the 
result that only part of the fourteen territorial 
divisions have been available for service in France. 

The casualties in France frequently average from 
1,000 to 2,000 per day; even on dull days, when 
firing is practically quiet except for occasional 



114 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

artillery fire and sniping, there are several hundred 
casualties. In attacks such as the attempted gen- 
eral advance called the capture of Neuve Chapelle, 
losses run as high as 13,000 in a few days. All 
these men must be replaced. When the war 
started, there were regular reserves for the regular 
army, but the bringing of the regular army up to 
its war strength used nearly all of these. The 
remainder and also the special reserves had been 
used, some time back, in making good casualties. 
This means that for some time the regular army 
either has had to take green men to fill up the ranks 
or to draft men from the territorials or Kitchener's 
new army. Such drafts are only partially trained, 
and, of course, decrease the strength of the units 
from which they are taken. 

At the beginning of the war, the territorials were, 
roughly, fifteen per cent below strength, so that 
these partially trained troops had to go into the 
field with fifteen per cent of their strength prac- 
tically green. Since then some of these battalions 
have suffered casualties, which have had to be filled 
up by drafts from Kitchener's new army or by green 
men, both methods being objectionable. 

When Lord Kitchener's new army is finally put 
in the field, it will have a daily casualty list, so 
that the demands for men to fill up casualties due 
to field service will be still greater than they are at 
present; in other words, Great Britain not only 



CONSCRIPTION NEEDED IN BRITAIN 115 

needs more men to-day, but as the war goes on she 
will need as many as she does now, and even more 
because of the bigger force operating. 

Undoubtedly, the world never has seen such a 
campaign to obtain recruits as is being carried on 
and has been carried on in Great Britain during 
the past nine months. Everywhere colored posters 
advertise for men. Some are merely printed; some 
have pictures of soldiers leaving for the front; 
others have pictures of soldiers in action. Each 
is supposed to have some theme that will appeal 
to the patriotism, to the sporting instincts, or to 
the sense of duty of the men of Great Britain. 
Every taxicab has advertisements for men, as well 
as most of the big buildings. Even the Trafalgar 
Monument is placarded with Nelson's signal to his 
fleet at the opening of that action: "England 
expects that every man this day will do his duty." 

Members of Parliament and other leaders of the 
people make public speeches telling them to enlist. 
Ministers preach sermons for the same purpose. 
Special campaigns are organized in which military 
bands parade about the streets and finally stop 
at some central point where a wounded soldier 
or one who has been decorated for heroism will 
make an appeal to the men present. The news- 
papers are full of advertisements for men, and full 
of advertisements of people who want servants, 
but who specify that no one of military age and good 



Il6 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

health need apply. Many have discharged servants 
of military age who have refused to enlist. The 
government has made indirect efforts to force the 
operatives in certain trades to join the army. 
Recently, an effort was made to get all grocers to 
compel their clerks to enlist. The government 
also tried to put railway clerks in such a position 
that they would have the choice either to enlist 
or to hunt another situation. 

Special battalions with such names as the 
"Sportsmen," "Foot-ballers," etc., have been raised 
with the expectation that the name will appeal 
to a particular class. While all these means have 
been effectual to a certain extent, some very largely 
and others hardly at all, on the whole the campaign 
has not furnished, and is not furnishing, enough 
men. The foot-ballers' battalion, while practically 
full at the present time, embodies only 123 pro- 
fessional foot-ball players. One of the main reasons 
for this is that the clubs who own the professional 
foot-ballers, in much the same manner as our base- 
ball clubs own their players, discourage their men 
from enlisting. 

Some of the towns in Great Britain, apparently 
forgetting the war, have advertised for men of 
military age to fill vacancies in their police forces. 
Even the government itself has not been guiltless, 
for it has discouraged in many ways the enlistment 
of the young men it employs, and in some of its 



CONSCRIPTION NEEDED IN BRITAIN 117 

branches has even made attractive offers for new 
men, which naturally have been taken. 

In some instances, women are responsible for 
men not going. Many, thinking only of them- 
selves, consider more often the possibility of losing 
a husband or a son than the need of their country. 
Many of the advertisements and posters for 
recruits are direct appeals to the women of Great 
Britain to put themselves aside and heed their 
country's need first. 

Many men see no reason why they should sacri- 
fice their business interests by going, when their 
rivals remain behind and profit by their absence. 
Many men with wives and children dependent upon 
them see no reason why they should leave their 
families, when there are still plenty of bachelors 
of military age who have not enlisted. AlsO; many 
married men do not feel they should go and possibly 
cause their families suffering, when less patriotic 
and more selfish married men remain at home. 

While thousands do not want to go and are 
glad to escape going, there are thousands of others 
who are having a very hard time to decide what to 
do. They feel called by duty to their country, and 
at the same time they feel that their country has 
not yet made that call decided enough for them to 
sacrifice their personal interests. They feel, also, 
and rightly, that the present system does not insure 
the just distribution of the business of fighting for 



ii8 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

the country ; that it demands the most of those who 
are the most wilHng and who have the highest 
sense of duty and patriotism, and not only demands 
the least of those who are the most selfish and who 
have the least patriotism but rewards them for 
their attitude. 

When it is desired to put only a very small army 
in the field, the voluntary system is all right, 
because enough men of adventurous disposition 
exist in a nation to send out an army of the proper 
size and to keep it filled up. But when a war is 
to be fought with a determined nation such as 
Germany, which puts all its strength in the field, 
the adventurous men of a nation are not sufficiently 
numerous. While a certain number can be obtained 
by appeals to patriotism and sense of duty, the time 
is soon reached when even such means fail to 
procure the required quota. What is worse, the 
volunteer system does not, at its best, produce the 
steady flow of men needed to make good losses. 
Furthermore, when men arrive a few one day, a 
few another, it is very difficult to train them. The 
older ones either are retarded by later arrivals, or 
the later arrivals are rushed through their pre- 
liminary work to catch up with the others. 

In a system of conscription, all men of a certain 
age report for training at the same time. By 
this means, the authorities immediately know how 
many men they have; they also can proceed with 



CONSCRIPTION NEEDED IN BRITAIN 119 

their instruction in a regular manner. By conscrip- 
tion, the duty of serving one's country is equally 
distributed among all. By conscription, the 
country decides when men are needed, and does 
not put individuals in the position now occupied 
by many Britishers, who, divided between a sense 
of duty which leads them to desire to serve their 
country and a sense of duty to their business and 
families, which makes them want to stay at home, 
do not know what to do. Neither does conscription 
impose service on older men who already have 
served the country, while it allows young men who 
never have served a day to refuse to do so. 

No places could furnish'more convincing examples 
of the lack of justice of such a system as that 
obtaining in Great Britain than do the field ambu- 
lances just on the edge of the battlefield when the 
wounded are being brought in. To-day in the 
British field ambulances are found wounded men 
of forty, who, after having served in the regular 
army a long term of years, during which time they 
fought in India and Africa, had settled down in 
civil life, have married and have had children, but 
who have returned to the service with this war, 
while thousands of young men who never have 
served their country a day are still going to football 
games and playing golf in Great Britain. 

One case in particular is recalled of a man who 
looked older than his age, and whose shin bone had 



120 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

been badly smashed in several places by shrapnel. 
As he was put in an ambulance, he started to cry. 
The surgeon said: " Don't cry, I know it hurts, but 
they will fix you up all right when you get back 
to the hospital." The man replied: "It is not 
the pain, sir, but I have a wife and four children, 
and I make my living in a factory where I use 
my right leg. I know I will never be able to use it 
again, and what about my family?" That man 
had served in the regular army twelve years; he 
had fought in four campaigns, and had been 
wounded before. 

A careful examination of the present situation 
can lead only to the conclusion that the voluntary 
system has failed Great Britain in the present 
crisis. It is not the first time in her military 
history that it has failed. In the wars of Napoleon, 
she was unable to bring her armed forces up to the 
authorized number of two hundred and fifty 
thousand men, this in spite of every effort — such 
as diminishing the requirement as to height, 
increasing the age limit, the payment of bounties, 
and other encouragements. In 1813, the army 
was still 25,000 men short. 

The successful ending of a war with such a 
vigorous, determined enemy as Germany can be 
brought about only, if brought about at all, by 
making the maximum effort possible. In propor- 
tion to her resources, Great Britain is not making 



CONSCRIPTION NEEDED IN BRITAIN 121 

an effort in any way comparable with that being 
made by France. In France, at the present time, 
there are left only 180,000 men of military age who 
are not in the armed forces, and the only reason 
these 180,000 have not been included is that they 
are absolutely physically unfit. 

It is not surprising that here and there, in France, 
criticism is heard of the meagre part taken by 
Great Britain. They cannot be blamed for asking 
why at least Kitchener's army is not sent over. 
The answer is simple for those who know : it is not 
sent because it is not ready to participate in a 
vigorous campaign; it is not ready because Great 
Britain, like America, always refuses to get ready 
for war in time of peace. She prefers to wait until 
war commences, take the great risk of being beaten 
before really ready to start, to suffer unnecessary 
casualties because of the inevitable prolongation 
of the war, and to run up a large debt for future 
generations to pay. 



CHAPTER XIII 

SUMMARY OF THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN TO THE END 
OF MAY, 1915^ 

May, 1 91 5. 

TO understand the campaign in the western 
theatre of war, it is necessary to consider the 
whole mihtary problem which confronted Ger- 
many at the beginning of the conflict. 

Due to the relative geographical situation of her- 
self and of her enemies, Germany found it necessary 
to fight on two fronts, these fronts being back to 
back and the width of the German Empire apart. 
To attack the enemy on both fronts at once would 
have required a greater force than she possessed, 
besides being contrary to the fundamental stra- 
tegical principle which demands that when the 
armies of the enemy are separated, the maximimi 
force possible should be used against each in turn, 
thus giving the greatest chance of victory over first 
one and then the other. 

It is not known exactly at the present time, but 
as far as can be learned from such figures as were 
available at the outbreak of the war, the number of 
trained men which Germany and Austria-Hungary 
together were able to put into the field at the begin- 
ning of the war was only 70,000 less than the 
number of trained men which Russia, Belgium, 

* See map facing page 142. 

122 



THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN 123 

Great Britain, and France combined could put into 
the field. 

In examining the situation in order to decide on 
which front to deliver her first attack, Germany 
found that while Russia possessed more trained men 
than France, she had them scattered from the Cau- 
casus to eastern Poland. Her troops were not as 
efficient as the French troops. Her Polish frontier, 
with East Prussia to the north of it and Galicia to 
the south of it, offered exceptional opportunities 
for attacks on the flanks of any movement made on 
the shortest line to Berlin. The concentration of 
the Austro-Hungarian army in Galicia, in front of 
the Carpathians, would offer such a threat to any 
Russian advance on Germany through Poland that 
it would be extremely difficult for such an advance to 
be made until the Austro-Hungarian army had been 
disposed of, or at least driven well back and put on 
the defensive. This, of course, would neutralize a 
large number of Russian troops from the beginning. 

A Russian advance through East Prussia would 
mean that a force so operating would be separated 
from the main Russian army moving against the 
Austrians and, therefore, without support, would 
be exposed to defeat while trying to advance by 
itself through the difficult country of East Prussia; 
even should it succeed, it would be held up for some 
time by the fortified line of the Vistula, from Dan- 
zig to Thorn. In addition, it was known that the 
10 



124 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

Russians had not yet completed the strategical rail- 
ways for which France had loaned them money, so 
that in the event of war Russia might make a rapid 
concentration along the Austro-German border. 

All this meant that the Russian mobilization 
necessarily must be comparatively slow, and that 
even after the mobilization, some time must elapse 
before her advance could seriously threaten Berlin, 
even should it prove successful both in Galicia and 
East Prussia. 

In examining the western theatre of war, it was 
found that France had a large and efficient army, 
with well-prepared plans of mobilization, and the 
railways necessary therefor, while the greater part 
of her German frontier was so fortified that the 
mobilization could be completed close to the front 
and an offensive blow struck almost immediately. 
Therefore, it appeared necessary to attempt to 
defeat France first, while holding Russia, and then 
to turn on the latter. 

A well-understood strategical principle is that the 
way to bring a country to its knees is to defeat its 
army. The capture of a capital may have, and 
generally does have, a great moral effect, but cannot 
have a decisive effect as long as the enemy's army 
is intact. The first objective of all armies in the 
field, therefore, is not the enemy's capital but the 
enemy's army, which is to be destroyed. 

The fundamental German principle is to attack 



THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN 125 

from the first with the maximum possible violence. 
In such an attack, all forces are so deployed that 
they may all come into action along a long line at 
the same time. This not only has the advantage 
of bringing the maximum force to bear immediately, 
but also, due to the length of the deployment, offers 
an excellent chance to outflank the enemy, particu- 
larly if that enemy does not use this same method 
and has fewer men. 

In general, the French system is to develop the 
enemy; that is, to find where he is, how strong he is 
in different places, and what he is doing at those 
places, by means of partial attacks, while remaining 
on the defensive along a line it has been decided to 
occupy. At the same time, a large general reserve 
is kept so that when a weak point in the enemy's 
line is found, whether it be on a flank or somewhere 
along the center, a decisive attack can be made on 
this weak point with the general reserve. 

The eastern frontier of France, or the Franco- 
German frontier, is well defended by a line of forts. 
While practically similar defenses were planned for 
the Belgian frontier, they never have been brought 
up to date because the military authorities, unable 
to get the necessary money from the government, 
decided it was better to finish one sector completely 
rather than to have both only partially finished. 
For this purpose they naturally picked out the sector 
nearest the German border. 



126 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

For the Germans to attack the French only by 
crossing their common frontier would mean that 
they would have to overcome a line of powerful 
forts before they could engage in any really decisive 
campaign. If that could be done at all, it would 
be only with the expenditure of considerable time, 
and time would be of the greatest value. Also, 
the length of the Franco-German border was not 
sufficient to permit of the maximum deployment 
of the German troops so that all of them could be 
brought into action simultaneously, in accordance 
with the German principle of striking a hard blow 
with the maximum effort from the first. To make 
this initial deployment, she would have to advance 
not only against the Franco-German border but 
through Luxemburg and Belgium. Such an ad- 
vance by her center and right offered the additional 
advantages of turning the flank of the French 
fortified line and of striking the French in that part 
of their country least prepared for defense. It was 
true that Belgium might resist, but the Belgian army 
was not considered to be very efficient; and even 
should the forts of Liege and Namur hold out, they 
could be invested and isolated, while the main 
German armies operating in this region passed 
between or to the south of them. This plan would 
likewise necessitate that a covering force be left 
in Belgium to keep the Belgians operating from 
Antwerp, or whatever part of the country might 



THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN 127 

be left to them, from cutting the German Hnes of 
communication running into France. Germany 
regarded the Belgian invasion and campaign, 
however, as minor considerations in view of the 
time gained and the fact that all the German 
forces could be deployed so as to strike the French 
simultaneously, thus affording an opportunity to 
to turn the French left flank. 

When the war broke out, this was the plan 
followed. The first engagements were those in 
which the right of the German army captured 
Liege and Namur and drove the remnants of the 
Belgian army back on Antwerp and Ghent. A 
covering force was left to keep them there, while 
the main body of the German right wing moved 
south to attack the French and British, who had 
taken up a position in southern Belgium. 

At the same time, the French and German cen- 
ters came into contact in the Ardennes in southern 
Belgium, along the Luxemburg border, and in 
Lorraine near Thionville, while the German left 
and French right faced each other just across one 
side or the other of the border in Lorraine and 
Alsace. In this latter region, there had been several 
advances on the part of the French with the primary 
object of holding as many German troops as possi- 
ble in this district, so that they could not be trans- 
ferred to the German right or center. All this led 
to what might be called the first general engage- 



128 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

ment of the war, which took place in the third week 
of August, 191 5. The fighting was general from 
the districts of Mons, where were the British, 
through Charleroi and Neufch^teau, in Belgium, 
Thionville in Lorraine, and approximately along 
the Franco-German border to upper Alsace. 

During this engagement, the French center took 
the offensive with the object of cutting off the Ger- 
man right, north of the Meuse, from the rest of 
their line. Had this movement succeeded, the 
right of the Germans, while being held by the Brit- 
ish and French in front, would have been attacked 
by the Belgians on the right flank and the French 
center on their left flank. However, the offensive 
of the French center failed. Even with this failure, 
had the British and French troops on the left held 
their portion of the line, there might have been 
some opportunity of linking the Allied left with 
the Belgians and stopping any farther German 
advance. But the British and the French on the 
left did not hold. This, coupled with the persistent 
and determined attacks of the Germans all along 
the Allied center and left, compelled a general 
retreat. The rapidity of the German advance 
necessitated this retreat being kept up until some 
line could be reached where the Allies might have a 
prospect of holding the Germans without the danger 
of their left being turned. The turning of this 
flank would have meant that the Germans had cut 



THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN 129 

the Allied army off from Paris and that they might 
eventually succeed in forcing the whole Allied army 
back on the fortified zone on the eastern frontier, 
thus cutting it off from the greater part of the coun- 
try, and, consequently, from all its supplies, and 
putting it in grave danger of being shut in in the 
same way, only on a much larger scale, that Bazaine 
was shut up in Metz in 1870. 

During the retreat, there were some local suc- 
cesses on the part of the French, and one effort 
made by them from Amiens on Peronne to out- 
flank the German right. While it failed to attain 
its object, this flank attack, coupled with a check 
which the French gave the Prussian guard and the 
loth Army Corps at Guise, probably saved the 
British army in France from complete destruction. 

The line chosen and occupied for the final stand 
was one running roughly due west from a point 
a little to the south of the center of Paris. This 
line had its right flank protected by the fortified 
zone near the Franco- German border and its left 
flank protected by the fortifications of Paris. To 
the north of Paris was being gathered and strength- 
ened the new French army which had made the 
unsuccessful attempt from Amiens toward Peronne 
to outflank the Germans during their advance. 
Most of the reenforcements for this new army had 
been withdrawn from Alsace and the region of 
Belfort. The Germans mistook this withdrawal 



130 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

to be a part of the general retreat, in which the 
French army then was engaged. The British army, 
which had retreated just to the west of Paris, was 
brought around it and put on the left of the main 
line, that is, just east of Paris. 

On the 5th of September, General Joffre issued 
his now famous message, in which he said that 
the army had retreated far enough, that now was 
the time to advance, and that if they were unable 
to advance, at least they could die where they were. 

From orders found on the dead, it has been 
learned that the Germans expected to continue 
driving the French southward, apparently in much 
the same manner in which they had driven them to 
the position just indicated. 

General von Kluck, who had command of the 
right German army, in his advance left flanking 
detachments in various towns such as Amiens and 
Montdidier. Due to the wideness of his turning 
movement in the advance south, he had, when 
north of Paris, to close in to the east to prevent a 
gap developing between his army and the rest of 
the German army. It should be borne in mind that 
undoubtedly the French army was still the primary 
objective of the Germans, and not Paris. As long 
as the French troops on the extreme left and the 
British retreated to the west of Paris or on Paris, 
they were naturally followed by von Kluck, until 
he found that farther movement in this direction 



THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN 131 

would separate him from the main German army 
on his left. When he closed in and moved south 
to attack, with the rest of the German army, the 
Allies along their main line, he left approximately 
one hundred thousand men along a generally north 
and south line from Meaux northward. This was 
a flank guard to protect the German right flank 
from any flank attacks which might be made from 
Paris or to the north of Paris. 

In moving his main force south of the Marne so 
as to attack along the same line with the other 
German armies, he left a gap between the right 
of his main force and the left of the flank guard 
occupying a line north from Meaux. In this gap 
he put cavalry and artillery. When the battle 
commenced, this cavalry and artillery was the part 
of the German line attacked by the British. The 
engagement was general all along the line of the 
Allied and German armies. The Germans had 
some success in the center. The new French 6th 
Army attacked von Kluck's flank guard of one 
hundred thousand men in an endeavor to outflank 
the main German army. Von Kluck summoned 
from the north the flanking detachments which he 
had left in the different towns. These troops 
coming from the north would have struck the left 
or northern flank of the new French army with 
perhaps serious results had it not been that they 
were met along an approximately east and west 



132 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

line by troops of a new army and troops from the 
army of Paris. At the same time, von Kluck 
brought troops from the south of the Marne to 
the north of it to aid in this action on the flank. 
As a consequence, for the time being, he met with 
considerable success. However, in bringing up 
troops from the south of the Marne, he increased 
the gap which the cavalry and artillery had to hold. 
At the same time the German army on his left, 
which had lagged behind in the last days of the 
advance, was attacked and driven back by the 
French army of General Foch. This threatened the 
left of that part of von Kluck's army south of the 
Marne, while the pressure of the British and French 
troops on the cavalry and artillery in the gap 
became so strong that their right also was 
threatened. They, therefore, were withdrawn north 
of the Marne. Thus the right flank of the German 
army in the center became exposed, particularly 
as this army had succeeded in shoving back the 
French army to its front. The French promptly 
took advantage of the opportunity and vigorously 
attacked this flank of the center German army, 
with the result that it was compelled to retreat. 

Then commenced the withdrawal of one German 
army after another, from the right to the left, due 
to their being held in front by the French and 
in danger of being flanked by the withdrawal of 
the army on their right; also, the extreme left 



THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN 133 

German army had its left flank threatened by an 
attack made on it by the French troops along the 
fortified zone near the Franco-German border. 

As the Germans retired, they took up a position 
just north of the Aisne, then across it to the neigh- 
borhood of Reims, and then along a line just north 
of the Camp of Chalons, across the Argonne and 
the Woevre, to the position held by their troops in- 
front of Verdun. From here the line ran diagonally 
to a position south of that portion of the Franco- 
German border nearest Metz, and then approxi- 
mately along the border to upper Alsace and the 
position held by the French there during the battle 
of the Marne. 

The Allies followed up the Germans, and com- 
menced attacking them in their new position which, 
from its strength in field fortification, was probably, 
at least partially, prepared beforehand. The 
engagements along this new line are generally 
spoken of as the battle of the Aisne. Fighting 
has continued along this same line from that 
time to the present. 

About the middle of September, the French 
initiated a flanking movement with the object 
of turning the German right flank. Such a move- 
ment offered a number of attractions. In the first 
place, it was only natural that the German morale 
should have suffered by their defeat on the Marne, 
particularly after such a long-continued victorious 



134 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

advance. If they could be compelled by a flanking 
movement, such as that made during the battle of 
the Marne, to retreat again, not only would they 
be pushed farther out of France but their morale 
would suffer seriously because of such a continuance 
of their retreat. 

The principal German lines of communication 
came down on their extreme right flank and 
therefore were very vulnerable to a flank attack. 
The Belgian army still held Antwerp and from there 
could threaten the German lines of communication 
passing through Belgium. The French flanking 
movement, if continued, ultimately would join 
with the Belgians in front of Antwerp, thus uniting 
the Allies and threatening still more the German 
lines of communication and flank. Such uniting 
of the two forces was particularly desirable from a 
British point of view, because the Germans would 
be shut off from any possibility of reaching the 
sea-coast. Also, the British army, if moved from 
the neighborhood of Soissons to the north and 
allowed to participate in the flanking movement, 
would be closer to that part of the sea-coast nearest 
to Great Britain and thus more easily supplied and 
maintained. Not the least advantage of this 
flanking movement would be that it would prevent 
the left flank of the Allies from being turned and 
the possibility of their again having to take a choice 
of retreating or perhaps being cut off from Paris. 



THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN 135 

The 2nd French Army initiated the flanking 
movement. It was met by the Germans, however, 
and pushed back somewhat from the position it 
originally attempted to take. The loth French 
Army came in on its left in the region of Arras, 
but also was met by the Germans and pushed 
back somewhat. 

The British army was removed from its position 
in the line near Soissons and sent around by train 
to the region of St. Omer, where it detrained; its 
objective was through Lille to the east. 

In the beginning of October, the Germans 
apparently saw the object of this flanking move- 
ment, for they commenced to attack Antwerp and 
at the same time sent considerable bodies of 
cavalry to the west of Lille. 

The British sent a royal navy division to reinforce 
the Belgians at Antwerp, and later landed a 
division of infantry with one of cavalry at Zeebrugge 
and Ostend. These two divisions with six thousand 
French sailors got as far as Ghent. By this time, 
however, Antwerp had fallen. The Germans 
promptly advanced from Antwerp. The French, 
British, and Belgian forces in the neighborhood of 
Ghent were compelled to retreat rapidly toward 
the Franco- Belgian border. 

The German forces in front of Lille consisted 
primarily of cavalry and artillery supported by 
some infantry, with the consequence that in this 



136 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

part of the line the Germans were not as yet pre- 
pared to meet the advance of the British army and 
the French troops also in that district. In spite 
of this, the Germans did not hesitate to press on to 
the coast and to attack, on October 16-19, the 
Belgians and French who held the line from the 
coast southward in the direction of Ypres. This 
prompt action on the part of the Germans, although 
undertaken at the risk of having a hole broken 
through their line in the neighborhood of Lille, 
gave them possession of practically all the Belgian 
sea- coast. 

Shortly before this the British had driven back 
the German cavalry in front of Lille and had pro- 
gressed to within a short distance of that place. 
They were met, however, by the main German 
forces which attacked them and compelled them to 
fall back somewhat. About the same time, the 
British and French succeeded in putting enough 
troops in front of Ypres to complete the line which 
now extended from the Gise to the sea. 

The Germans brought up more troops, and, while 
attacking more or less the whole of the line, made 
their heaviest onslaughts during the latter part 
of October and up to the loth of November in the 
region in front of Ypres and some distance to the 
south. Here they succeeded in pushing the line 
back somewhat along a good part of the front. 

By this time, the last Russian offensive move- 



THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN 137 

ment had practically reached the Polish-German 
border. Some Russian cavalry even had crossed 
into Silesia. The abrupt cessation of the German 
attacks in the neighborhood of Ypres which, while 
causing the Germans heavy loss, were at the same 
time slowly gaining ground, and the prompt and 
vigorous renewal of the German offensive in Poland, 
starting about the 13th of November, leaves but 
little doubt that it was primarily the Russian 
diversion which stopped the German advance 
through Ypres. 

During the period of this flanking movement, 
two attempts were made — one on the part of the 
Germans and the other on the part of the French — 
to break each other's line in that section of the 
theatre of war not having to do with the flanking 
movement. The German movement was made in 
the latter part of September, and was a push 
forward south of Verdun in the neighborhood of 
St. Mihiel, where they succeeded in crossing the 
Meuse and establishing themselves on the west 
bank. This position they have held ever since. 
The French movement was an attempted advance 
about the same time in the Champagne district, 
which did not meet with success. It is not yet 
known whether either one or both of these move- 
ments was a serious attempt to break the enemy's 
line, or merely movements to keep troops from 
being sent to take part in the flanking movement 
then going on. 



138 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

With the cessation of the German attacks, both 
sides settled down in their trenches along the 591 
miles of line running from the sea north of Nieuport 
to upper Alsace, near the Swiss border. Here, in 
general, they have remained up to the present. 

The Belgians were exhausted and badly in need 
of reorganization; in fact, they had been withdrawn 
from the line altogether and their places taken 
by French troops about October, 19 14. Since 
then, they have taken over a part of the line 
between Ypres and Nieuport; French troops are 
on both their flanks. The British army, which was 
practically entirely made up of what was left of 
the regulars, had suffered heavy losses and was 
badly in need of reinforcement. The regiments 
since have been brought up to their full strength 
and the army corps reinforced by a number of 
territorial divisions. Due to this reinforcement, 
they again have taken over that part of the line 
which, because of their heavy losses, they turned 
over to the French after the battle of Ypres. The 
French settled down immediately to attack the 
German entrenched positions by methods employed 
in siege warfare. In this way, they have made 
appreciable gains in a number of localities. 

The Germans, busy in Russia, have been content 
to remain on the general defensive in the western 
theatre of war. However, they have not hesitated, 
from time to time, to make local attacks. One 



THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN 139 

of these attacks was made in the region of Soissons, 
which resulted in the French being pushed south 
of the Aisne. Like the French, they also have 
engaged in siege warfare. The French have made 
two local attacks, one in the Champagne district 
and the other near P6ronne; both, at first apparently 
successful, resulted in no great gain. 

In the early part of March, the British made 
what was intended to be a general attack along 
their line with Lille as the objective. This attack, 
however, broke down with heavy loss and resulted 
only in a gain of one village and several thousand 
yards of trench. Recently the British and French 
line north of Ypres has been driven back somewhat 
by a German attack. 

Now that the spring has arrived and that the 
bad condition of the ground can no longer be given 
as an excuse for lack of movement, the question 
in the western theatre of war is, Will an offensive 
be attempted? It seems generally to be believed 
that the Allies are content with holding the Germans 
in the expectation of gradually wearing them down 
without having to assume a general offensive and 
suffer the enormous losses which inevitably would 
result. 

In summing up the campaign in the western 

theatre to date, it is found that Germany failed 

in her primary object of quickly and decisively 

defeating the French army and with it the small 

11 



140 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

British one. The AlHes on their part failed to 
drive the Germans out of France by their direct 
attacks along the line of the Aisne and on to 
Verdun. Their flank attack failed to cause the 
Germans to retreat from their position along the 
Aisne and failed in its object of joining the Belgians 
in front of Antwerp. 

The Germans captured Antwerp and drove the 
Allies almost entirely out of Belgium, thus gaining 
practically all the Belgian sea-coast. They com- 
pelled the Allies to abandon their offensive for 
the defensive along all the northern part of their 
flanking movement, the Germans starting an 
offensive which had for its object the northern 
French coast with the ports nearest England. 
This new German offensive failed probably 
primarily because of the necessity to stop the 
Russian advance in the eastern theatre of war. 

The German forward movement at Soissons, the 
British recently attempted advance, and the two 
attempted French advances of recent date, all show 
the possibility of breaking the present intrenched 
lines occupied by the two hostile armies in the 
western theatre of war. To do this, however, 
involves considerable loss. To hold and enlarge 
a hole in the line made by this method would 
necessitate much greater loss. The fact that 
throughout the winter the Germans, because of 
their offensive in Russia, have remained on the 



THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN 141 

defensive in the western theatre of war, but have 
lost practically no territory, and that with the 
beginning of the spring they are still strong enough 
to resume the offensive, at least in one part of the 
line, would seem to indicate that a continuation 
of the present method of using siege warfare to 
gain ground here and there along the line will 
necessitate a considerable period of time to bring 
about any decisive result, if it ever does. The 
present situation in the western theatre of war 
indicates that a determined, aggressive offensive 
all along the line kept up regardless of loss, in the 
same way that General Grant fought his campaign 
from the Wilderness on, is necessary if a decisive 
result is to be produced within the next few months. 



Sp?-^'-^f;:5v;.'! 




MAP SHOWING 

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE 
WESTERN THEATRE OE WAR 

AUGUST, 1914-MAY. 191'. 



To Accompany 
"WHY PREPAREDNESS" 



Captain Henry J. Reilly 



T 



'HE campaign in the western theatre of war from August, 1914 to 
May.igis, may be divided into five general periods: 



First General Period — AugKsl i-August 22, igi^ 

(a) First line of conflict and preliminary battles. 

(b) The advance of the Gennan right flank through Belgium, resulting 
in the Belgian army being forced back on Antwerp, 

Second General Period — August 22-September 10, 1914 

The advance of the Gennans southward into France, ending in their 
defeat at the battle of the Mame. 

Third General Period — September n-September 30, 1914 

The advance of the Alhes northward from the Mame, stopped by 
the Germans at the battle of the Aisne. 

Fc^rth General Period - Oetober^No^embcr. rpr^ 

The attempt of the Allies to outflank the Germans; the faU of Antwerp; 
and the failure of the German onve on Calais, marking the end of the 
German offensive in the West. 

Fifth Gcmral Period - December >9i4~May. ntr; 

Period of trench warfare from the North Sea to Switzerland. 



KEY 



First General Pcrim 

(a) First line of contact of the German and Allied troops. 

(b) Position of the German and Allied troops at the end of the 
German advance through Belgium. 

Second General Period 

P 't'n of the Ge^^^ and Allied troops at the battle of the 

Ti*„' n»l<rian DOsit>°" in front of Antwerp remains practically 
The ^'''P^'^V.^„ tiie second phase (b) of the first general period 

Third Genera ' ^^ ^j,;^ ^ ^ j, ^ jj, „f ^^ 

I Position of the W" 
Aisne, 



iiisne. period the line from Verdun southeast through 

During *!"^ ? ;„s remains practically the same as during the 

Vosges MO""', rne. The Belgian position in front of Antwerp 
battle ot tne jvi» ,. . . 

remains prf '"^j 
finst eeneral period; 
■al P'-'""' 



movement 



battle °f '^"^J-j^Iy the same as in the second phase (b) of the 

first gener: ' 

Fourth Giner ^^ conflict during the flanking 
Approxminte ^j ^^^ ^. 

following the "' 

^ vn/ P^'r'^ 

T '■ f r.-rmaii-in'' '^tffinches: both annieson thedefensive. 
, LineoftJtrm^ 

, J neinsn troops. 

British and <jen 
• . ^^., Gernia" troops. 
1 ?f,' troop'p''S'"°"' ""^ marked as British or Belgian are French 

and German to^^^' 



' Internati 



I fortifi^"^ area. 
3nal boundafy ij^^ 



PART II 

SWIvSS PREPAREDNESvS FOR WAR 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE MILITARY PREPAREDNESS OF THE SWISS 

June, 1 91 5. 

SWITZERLAND is an island of peace entirely 
surrounded by war. The natural lines of 
advance of any German army in an attack on Italy 
would be by way of Switzerland; the same would 
be true of an attack by Italy against Germany. 
Should Austria-Hungary and France try to get at 
one another, Switzerland would be in the line of 
advance. Just as Belgium by its geographical 
position offers a natural line of advance for a Ger- 
man movement around the French left flank, or 
vice versa, so Switzerland offers one for a German 
movement around the French right flank, or a 
French movement around the German left flank. 
For many years Switzerland has recognized the 
fact that in times of great stress, when the future 
of whole peoples may depend upon the outcome of 
war, armed force is the only means of maintaining, 
inviolate, territory, even though neutral, which 
offers strategic advantage to one or the other or 
both of the belligerents. As a consequence, Swit- 
zerland has a militia army raised, maintained, and 
trained by means of compulsory universal military 
service. Every Swiss citizen becomes liable to 
military service in his twentieth year and remains 

I4S 



146 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

liable for a period of twenty-eight years. During 
his first year of training, the citizen takes the 
recruit's course; this lasts for forty-five days in the 
infantry, fifty-five days in the field artillery, and 
eighty days in the cavalry. When he completes 
satisfactorily this recruit course, he is assigned to 
the elite, or active, army. An infantryman remains 
in the elite twelve years, during which time he is 
called out for sixteen days' service every alternate 
year. An artilleryman remains in the elite twelve 
years, during which time he is called out every 
alternate year for eighteen days. Cavalrymen 
remain in the elite eleven years and are called out 
every year for ten days. On finishing the service 
in the elite, men pass to the landwehr, where they 
remain until the end of their twenty-eighth year 
of service. During this time, if in the infantry, 
they are called out every fourth year for five days, 
and, if in the artillery, six days. Thus the total 
period for a private of infantry is only one hundred 
and twenty-five days during his first thirteen years 
of service. When not undergoing training, the 
Swiss soldier draws no pay; in fact, he is really a 
civilian. He retains in his possession, however, 
his clothing, arms, and equipment, and must each 
year go through a course in target practice. All 
able-bodied Swiss citizens who are not exempt from 
service but who escape the regular training, due to 
the impossibility of including the numbers who 



SWISS PREPAREDNESS 147 

come of age each year, are embodied in the land- 
sturm. The age Hmit for this category of troops 
is from seventeen to fifty inclusive. Volunteers 
under seventeen and over fifty years of age may 
join' the lands turm. Recognizing the fact that 
military service is a proper charge against citizen- 
ship, the Swiss government collects an annual tax 
from all citizens who, for any reason, are exempted 
from service in the elite or landwehr. 

When the war broke out, the Swiss immediately 
recognized the possibility of their neutrality being 
violated by one or more of the belligerents. As a 
consequence, they mobilized a considerable portion 
of their troops at once along the French, the Ger- 
man, and the Austro- Hungarian borders. When 
Italy entered the war, they mobilized along the 
Italian border. They likewise built trenches and 
gun pits along all these frontiers. As the plans for 
all these mobilizations and field fortifications had 
been worked out carefully in time of peace, there 
was no delay, confusion, nor waste of money, as is 
inevitably the case when preparation for war is 
left until the last moment. 

In time of peace, there is no general officer in 
command of the Swiss army, the highest rank 
being that of colonel. When mobilization was 
decided upon, the Federal Council elected Colonel 
Ulrich Wille, general and commander-in-chief. 

General Wille has had a long, honorable career 



148 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

as one of the permanent corps of ojflficer-instnictors 
maintained at all times by the S\^dss. He started as 
an artillery officer. For a number of years he served 
in the German army, as many officers of Switzerland 
and other cotmtries frequently do. This does not 
mean that he actually was an officer in the German 
army, but that, due to the courtesy of the Ger- 
man government, he was allowed to serve with 
a German regiment. Later he became chief of 
cavalry in the Swiss army, then the commander 
of an infantry division, and finally the commander 
of the second army corps. Because of his experi- 
ence in all branches of the army, his long service, 
and his well-known ability, the officers and men 
have the utmost confidence in him. 

In an interview which the General was kind 
enough to give the author, he emphasized the facts 
that the war had amply demonstrated the necessity 
of universal service as the f oimdation of any military 
system; and that confidence of the men in them- 
selves, in their superiors, their subordinates, and 
their comrades is of fmidamental importance, and 
can be achieved only by sufficient training and 
discipline. 

The General told how the Canton of Berne was 
responsible for the beginning of the present system. 
During the time of Frederick the Great, the ruler 
of the canton decided that all citizens should do 
certain military service each year. He, therefore. 




t#^ 



,|»H*»*- 



wwfWmm T tpt 



***itm^ 





SWISS INFANTRY ON THE MARCH 



SWISS PREPAREDNESS 149 

wrote Frederick asking him to send him one of his 
generals in order that the citizen soldiery might 
be trained properly. After investigating matters, 
the general reported to the ruler that he could do 
nothing. Upon being asked the reason, he replied: 
"Why, your men only have to serve one day a year, 
how can I teach them anything in that length of 
time?" General Wille laughed heartily when he 
had finished telling the story, and then said: — 
"However, that was the beginning of the present 
system and is just one step ahead of what you have 
done. in America, because, while you recognize the 
right of the State to compel service in time of war, 
you have not yet given the citizen the chance to be 
a good soldier in war by making him train in peace." 
He then added: "It is impossible to put too 
much emphasis on the necessity of confidence 
and the fact that such confidence can come only 
from adequate training and, above all, from disci- 
pline. This confidence must exist from top to bot- 
tom, and from bottom to top. The leaders must 
know that their subordinates have such confidence 
in them, in themselves, and in their men, that if 
a mistake is made, the feeling of confidence will so 
operate against the slightest tendency to confusion 
or panic that everything will right itself; this 
because of the determination which officers and 
soldiers possessing such confidence inevitably show, 
no matter what may be the battle conditions they 



150 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

are called upon to face. The best guns, the best 
rifles, the best equipment, and the best of every- 
thing else are of no value unless accompanied by an 
expert knowledge of how to use them and, above 
all, by a discipline which will insure their being 
used effectively in the midst of, and in spite of, the 
greatest danger. Training can only come with 
time. This is even more true of discipline. Good 
officers are of the utmost importance. It is simply 
impossible to make them quickly. The right sort are 
the result of long years of arduous training and work. 
"The United States in the possession of West 
Point has a splendid institution which is turning 
out the right kind of officers. When the time comes 
that America decides really to prepare, this insti- 
tution should be enlarged so that a sufficient number 
of officers can be graduated from it. In addition 
to officers, a large number of good noncommis- 
sioned officers is absolutely necessary. Like the 
officers, these cannot be obtained quickly. To be 
a good noncommissioned officer, a man must have 
had long training and have demonstrated his ability 
to handle men. This and all other wars have 
demonstrated the supreme importance of discipline. 
Due to the extended front occupied, the greater 
length of time in which a soldier is engaged in any 
one action, and the gi'eater moral effect of modern 
projectiles, discipline is even of more importance 
than ever. 



SWISS PREPAREDNESS 151 

"The chief drawback to the Swiss system is that 
the length of service is not sufficient to give the 
discipline which should be had. The whole mili- 
tary history of Switzerland consists of a continued 
increase in the length of service required. The 
present mobilization has given the first opportunity 
for a general and thorough tryout of the current 
system. It has shown that still further increase in 
the length of service should be made. Some per- 
sons, in arguing against this, state that Germany 
has decreased the period of service from time to 
time. The answer to this is that Germany's posi- 
tion compels the possession of a large army. Be- 
cause of the expense of maintaining such an army, 
the length of service has to be as short as possible 
consistent with the minimum training necessary. 
The results produced are good because of the con- 
fidence and ability of the corps of officers and non- 
commissioned officers. This confidence and ability 
have been produced by long, arduous, and continuous 
training over a period of many years. The officers 
also can be allowed considerable initiative because 
their superiors know they are well trained. Where 
officers are not so well trained, they cannot be 
allowed this initiative because, due to their igno- 
rance, they are apt to go in the wrong direction. 
As a consequence of the possession of this excellent 
corps of officers and noncommissioned officers, the 
German soldier during his time of service gets an 



152 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

intensified training and discipline which could not 
be possible tinder other conditions." 

The General closed the interview by stating that 
it was a great mistake to think that an efficient 
army can be built up quickly, no matter how great 
the material resources or how excellent the indi- 
viduals who might make up the personnel. He 
stated that this was equally true in time of peace, 
and that nothing but a preparation extending over 
a period of years would be of value, because an effi- 
cient army is the result of gradual development 
covering a long period of time. 



PART III 

THE CENTRAL POWERS AT WAR 



CHAPTER XV 

THE GERMAN ARMY 

July, 1 91 5. 

THE German army of to-day really owes its 
beginning to the Prussian king, Frederick the 
Great. Frederick insisted upon absolute discipline 
in the Prussian army, insuring a performance of 
duty superior to the instinct of self-preservation; 
a great perfection in drill, giving great flexibility 
and manoeuvring power on the battlefield; and a 
strict fire discipline, enabling his troops to deliver 
a rapid and accurate fire unequalled by his enemies. 
Frederick's system was an excellent one, not only 
from a military point of view but from an 
economic one as well. With a population of 
six million, he maintained an army of two hundred 
thousand, of whom forty thousand were cavalry, 
at an annual cost of $7,500,000. This same rigid 
system of economy has been continued to the pres- 
ent day, with the result that probably, more than 
any other nation, Germany gets value received for 
every mark spent on the army. 

Between the time of the death of Frederick and 
the appearance of Napoleon, the Prussian army, 
while outwardly maintaining the high state of 
excellence of Frederick's day, really degenerated 
because it relied on outward forms rather than on 

12 iSS 



156 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

underlying principles. Consequently, the Prus- 
sians failed to keep up to date, and were badly 
beaten in 1806 by Napoleon at Jena and Auerstadt. 
One of the peace terms imposed by Napoleon was a 
limitation of the number of men Prussia could keep 
under armis at any one time. Scharnhorst evaded 
the purpose of this restriction by having men serve 
for a comparatively short time and then turned 
them back into civil life, in order to make way for 
others v/ho Vv'^ere trained similarly. Thanks to this, 
Prussia had sufficient troops available to play a 
prominent part on the last battlefields of Napoleon. 
As she wivshed to be treated as an equal by the 
Great Powers, she had to maintain a military estab- 
lishment beyond her means considering her com- 
paratively limited territory, smiall population, and 
insignificant financial resources. But both the 
Prussian people and the Prussian king realized the 
necessity for this, if Prussia was to hold her own 
against her neighbors. They, therefore, adopted 
the system of universal military service put in force 
at that time and which, with minor modifications, 
has remained in force up to the present. The 
foundation of the system is simply that, with a few 
exceptions, every man when reaching a certain age 
spends a fixed length of time actively serving in the 
standing army. After this, he passes to civil life, 
but is available for military purposes first for a 
period of years as a reservist to bring the standing 



THE GERMAN ARMY 157 

army to its full strength in case of war, then as a 
member of the landwehr, and finally of the land- 
sturm. 

Prussia first showed the value of this system in 
1866 when she decisively defeated Austria in less 
than six weeks of war. She convinced the world 
of its excellence when she quickly and disastrously 
defeated the French in the war of 1870-71. The 
prime result of this last war was to convince the other 
German states of the necessity not only of adopting 
the Prussian system but of building up with Prussia 
a national German army. Provisions for this were 
included in the Constitution of the German Empire, 
which became law in 1871. While the main prin- 
ciples for governing this army were laid down in the 
Constitution, the completion of the organization 
was further provided for in military conventions 
between Prussia and Bavaria, Prussia and Saxony, 
and Prussia and Wurtemberg. The Constitution, 
made available for military purposes every Ger- 
man male between the ages of seventeen and fifty. 
His active service, hov/ever, began with his twenty- 
first year and extended to the beginning of his 
twenty-eighth year. Three years of this time were 
to be spent actually with the colors, and then four 
in the active reserve, the reserve being used to 
bring the regular army to v/ar strength. After this 
he passed into the landwehr where he remained for 
five years, and then into the landsturm where he 



158 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

remained until no longer available for service. In 
peace tinie the Emperor was given almost supreme 
control, with the exception of the right of Bavaria 
to retain her own military organization and admin- 
istration, the right of Saxony to have her own 
ministry of war, and several minor stipulations 
made by some of the other states. The Emperor, 
however, had the right to inspect all troops, thus 
insuring unifoniiity of training, organization, and 
equipment. In time of war the Emperor was 
supreme. This system still obtains, except that 
at present the service in the infantry and some 
other branches is for two years, which is followed 
by five and one-half years in the active reserve, 
five years in the first bmi of the landwehr, six 
years in the second Invi, and then service in the 
Jandstiirni. 

After the Franco-Pnissian War, the strength of 
the army was approximately one per cent of the 
population of fort}'-one million in that the anny 
numbered 410,000 men. Up to 1913 this propor- 
tion was retained, as at that time the peace 
strength of the army was 650.000 and the popula- 
tion numbered sixty-five million. The law of 1913 
increased the peace strength to 870,000. 

The peace organization of the Gennan army 
when the war broke out was O69 battalions of 
infantry, 550 squadrons of cavalry, 633 batteries 
of field artillery. 55 battalions of gamson artillery. 



THE GERMAN ARMY 159 

44 battalions of engineers, 31 battalions of com- 
munication troops, and 26 battalions of train troops. 
Since the beginning of the war the trained land- 
wehr has been used for four purposes: at the com- 
mencement, to bring the active units up to war 
strength; for every active infantry regiment to 
make a reserve infantry regiment; as time goes on, 
to help in forming landwehr snacl depot units, which 
are organized from time to time and sent to the 
front; and, to make good losses .suffered by units 
at the front. A considerable part of the trained 
lands turm has been organized into battalions, 
which are named after the towns or districts from 
which they come. These battalions are used to 
guard railways, other lines of communication, prison 
camps, and, in fact, to do all the military work 
which must be done in the rear of the army. They 
are sometimes used at the front. All the men 
of the untrained lands turm, which included those 
who had no service in peace due to the large 
population, have had to report for examination 
as to fitness for military service. So far only 
those up to the age of thirty-seven have been 
taken. They are sent to the depdts, where they 
receive a very vigorous training at the hands of 
trained officers and noncommissioned officers. 
They are used as needed to make good losses at 
the front, and with the landwehr to make up the 
new units organized from time to time. 



l6o WHY PREPAREDNESS 

At the outbreak of the war, large numbers of 
young men not old enough to be called, and others 
not called immediately, volimteered for service. Up 
to the present, more than 2,000,000 of them have 
been accepted. These men are sent to the depots 
for military training and are used in the same man- 
ner as the untrained lands turm. The heavy m.arch- 
ing and fighting is always done, no matter where 
it may occur, by veteran units made up of the most 
active, determined men. 

When the war started, Germany had in the regu- 
lar service ample officers for the active army and 
for higher grades of the new units, which she since 
has created. In addition, she had a large number 
of reserve officers, and a considerable number of 
regular officers on the retired list but subject to 
service any time the government might see fit. 
Throughout the coimtry there also were many 
wholly retired regular officers, all of whom promptly 
returned to the service. Since the war has been 
going on, Germany has trained and is training large 
numbers of subordinate officers at different places 
throughout the country. These are, for the most 
part, men who have done service in peace time or 
were doing it when the war broke out. Without 
any exception they are men who already not only 
have served at the front and therefore have had 
considerable military experience, but who have 
distinguished themselves in battle. 




M 



\v 



J 



GERMAN FIELD ARTILLERY CHANGING POSITION IN FRONT 
OF BREST LITOVSK 



:rJ^^- 




TYPICAL GERMAN INFANTRY RESERVISTS 



THE GERMAN ARMY i6i 

All the troops used so far consist of men abso- 
lutely physically fit; that is, without the slightest 
physical defect. Besides, a large number of men, 
who have some slight physical defect which might 
interfere with their ability to undertake long, hard 
marches but who otherwise are in good condition, 
have been taken and organized into special units. 
These special units are used in the construction 
of trenches and field fortifications of all kinds, 
but not for fighting. 

The first thing which strikes foreigners entering 
Germany, particularly after leaving France, is the 
large number of men seen everywhere. The railway 
stations and trains are crowded with men in uni- 
form. The streets of the cities are full of men in 
uniform. While most of the latter are men under- 
going training, many are at home on a short fur- 
lough. Besides the large number of uniformed 
men, many civilians always are in evidence. A 
few of the latter are older men who have done a 
certain amount of service since the war commenced, 
and who then were permitted to return to civil life; 
others are young men who are considered to be of 
more value to the state engaged in other work than 
that of fighting; while still others are men within 
the limit of military service but not yet called. 
At frequent intervals, detachments of men bound 
for the front may be seen. Though these consist 
of men who have not yet fought, they are not made 



1 62 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

up of boys and old men. Every article of their 
equipment and their clothing is brand new. Daily 
in the streets of Berlin and along the railway, 
when one is traveling, long columns of new wagons 
and other military equipments always new, may 
be seen. In Germany to-day there is every sign 
that the point is far from being reached when the 
military authorities will suffer either from the lack 
of men or material. 

The German system makes the people the army, 
and the army the people. It has been copied in its 
underlying principles by every nation of any 
consequence, with the exception of Great Britain 
and the United States. In the Orient, Japan 
has adopted it. In Latin America most of the 
countries have it on paper; but Argentine, Chile, 
Peru, and Bolivia rigidly enforce it, with the 
consequence that they have excellent armies. 
This means that the world has accepted the fact 
that all citizens or subjects of a country not only 
must serve in time of war but must be trained in 
time of peace so that their service in war will be of 
some value. Only Great Britain and the United 
States cling to the obsolete idea of a small profes- 
sional army distinct from the people as the one 
and only means of defense. The regular armies 
of these two nations are needed to garrison overseas 
possessions, to furnish the backbone of the first 
line, and to afford the instructors for training the 



THE GERMAN ARMY 163 

citizens of these countries; but such armies as the 
British and American regulars cannot furnish the 
numbers needed to resist successfully the attack 
of a whole nation in arms. In warfare between 
modern powers, nothing but a whole nation trained 
to arms can do that. 



CHAPTER XVI 

THE GERMAN ARMY IN THE WAR 

July, 1 91 5. 

AMONG Americans the prevalent idea of the 
- German army is that it obtains its successes 
because of a rigid, machine-hke organization which 
deprives the individual officer and man of all 
initiative and in no way considers him as an 
individual. This idea is a mistaken one. The 
only thing rigid about the German army is the 
insistence that neither officer nor soldier, no matter 
what his excuse, shall be permitted to fail to do his 
duty toward his country, either in time of peace 
or war. Initiative among the officers is encouraged 
to a much greater extent than is the case in our 
regular army or that of Great Britain. Certain 
standards of excellence are set for every unit, from 
the company up. The commanders of these units 
are allowed great liberty in the methods adopted 
to bring their commands to the required standard. 
The yearly inspections and manoeuvres determine 
whether or not these standards have been reached, 
and the future of the officer in command of each 
unit largely depends upon the showing made by 
his command at these inspections and manoeuvres; 
those who show the greatest ability are the ones 
who go ahead the fastest. The men who are good 

164 



THE GERMAN ARMY IN THE WAR 165 

practical soldiers must show themselves to be 
students, and the students also must show them- 
selves to be good practical soldiers; in other words, 
theory alone or practice alone will not advance an 
officer — he must be a good officer both theoretically 
and practically. Officers are encouraged to discuss 
thoroughly, both in speech and in writing, all 
tactics, regulations, and other matters having to do 
with the handling, organizing, arming, and equip- 
ping of troops both in peace and in war time. The 
efficiency of the officers helps keep the morale 
both of the enlisted men and the civilian at home 
on a high plane because all know when a German 
soldier lays down his life he has not wasted it in 
some futile attempt due to a lack of training or 
to the ignorance of his officers. 

The high standard required is shown by the 
regulations of the German army. As the officers 
thoroughly understand the underlying principles 
which govern everything, and have been practiced 
in quickly deciding what to do in each case, the 
regulations only lay down broad general principles, 
leaving the minor details to be worked out in each 
instance by the officer. Our regulations and those 
of the British are given too much to laying every- 
thing down to the last detail and with considerable 
rigidity. V/hile this is probably not needed for 
our regular officers, because they are sufficiently 
well educated from a military point of view, it is 



1 66 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

necessary for our National Guard officers and for 
the more or less green officers who would come 
into the service at any time we may raise volunteer 
forces. Even with our regular officers, this is more 
necessary than it is in Germany, because we seldom 
have manoeuvres, and when we do, the small size 
of our regular army prevents the assemblage of 
sufficient number of troops to give the essential 
practice. 

The Germans have made a scientific study of 
war in that they have tried to get at the truth 
regardless of national pride or prejudice. This is 
well illustrated, among other things, in their frank 
recognition of the fact that during battle there 
are many skulkers, and that the only way to 
overcome this straggling on the battlefield is to 
have battle police who promptly arrest and send 
back to the firing line those men who have allowed 
fear to overcome their sense of duty. The British 
at first were inclined to take this as a proof of lack 
of fighting stamina on the part of the Germans. 
Later, finding the same necessity, they, too, 
organized the battle police. The Germans, how- 
ever, had learned the necessity from a frank 
study of their previous wars and were prepared 
from the first. 

At the beginning of the war, much was heard 
from British sources about the Germans using 
obsolete infantry tactics, in that they attacked 



THE GERMAN ARMY IN THE WAR 167 

in what was erroneously called mass formation. 
As a matter of fact, the attacks were made by 
successive lines, each one in single rank with little 
or no interval between men in the same rank, or 
some similar formation. The British started the 
war believing in a firing line made up of individuals 
with considerable intervals between them. Since, 
they practically have adopted the German method. 
The reason for this difference of opinion at the 
beginning of the war was that the Germans, 
having carefully studied the conditions under 
which modern infantry must fight, soon saw that 
a single firing line with wide intervals between 
men did not have sufficient fire-power because of 
the comparatively small ntimber of rifles occupying 
any given front. The best answer to fire is more 
fire. Therefore, the strongest firing line is the 
one containing the greatest number of rifles which 
actually can be used at the same time. It is 
true that such a line offers a better target than a 
line with a few men on it, but the fire from it is 
so much greater that the few men occupying the 
other line are overwhelmed by this fire and cannot 
take advantage of the better target. The only 
object in making an attack is to overcome the 
enemy. To do this, two things are essential: a 
firing line with sufficient fire-power to keep down 
the fire of the enemy; and sufficient men in lines 
back of the firing line to make good losses and to 



1 68 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

insure the attack arriving at the enemy's position 
with enough men left ahve and unwounded to 
drive him out. The first of these is accompHshed 
by the heavy firing Hne; the second, by successive 
Hnes back of the firing Hne. The Germans in 
reasoning this out, kept before them, as the object 
to be attained, the overthrowing of the enemy. 
While they knew that such tactics would necessi- 
tate loss, they considered this loss of secondary 
importance in comparison with the defeating of the 
enemy. 

Due to the complaints of the British public 
during the Boer War and the constant demand 
that battles be fought without losses, the British 
army tried to adopt tactics primarily founded on 
the desire to avoid losses. They, therefore, adopted 
very open extended order. As a consequence, 
while their attacks did not offer good targets to 
the enemy, they were so weak in fire-power they 
could not get anywhere. For this reason the Boer 
War was full of incidents in which British firing 
lines were stopped at five and six hundred yards; 
in other words, their attempt to give the Boer 
a poor target resulted in such excessive extension 
and lack of support that they could not hold down 
the Boer fire and thus advance themselves. Suc- 
cessful attacks cannot be made without loss. 
Napoleon's dictum that one cannot make an omelet 
without breaking eggs holds just as good to-day 



THE GERMAN ARMY IN THE WAR 169 

as it did in his time. Then, too, an action brought 
to a quick close, even though the losses be reason- 
ably heavy, is more saving of life in the end than 
one dragged out over a considerable period of time 
with comparatively small losses every day through- 
out this period. 

The German army is taught to take the offensive. 
The objective picked out is always the enemy's 
field army and never a locality ; this, for the reason 
that once the field army is destroyed, all localities 
and towns fall an easy prey to the invader. On the 
other hand, if a locality or town is seized and the 
enemy's field army is still in existence and has 
liberty of action, the invader is in a difficult situa- 
tion, because he must try to hold what he has taken 
and at the same time defeat this army. In general, 
it may be said that the underlying German prin- 
ciples are to take the offensive first; to strike from 
the beginning with the greatest violence possible; 
and to keep it up until the enemy is defeated. 
This is done by occupying a wide front from the 
first, thus bringing the maximum force to bear from 
the beginning and threatening the enemy's flanks 
at the same time. 

The military problem faced by Germany at the 
beginning of the war was a difficult one. She had 
a powerful enemy not only in front of her but 
behind her. True, she occupies a central position, 
and due to the excellent organization of her army 



170 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

and her railways, she can move more rapidly in 
any direction than can any of her enemies. A 
strategical situation, in which one force occupies 
a central position, from which it can move rapidly 
as a whole against any one of the several parts into 
which the enemy is divided and thus overwhelm 
them one after another before they can concentrate, 
is considered an excellent one. This is only true, 
however, when there is no great discrepancy 
between the total strength of the two forces con- 
cerned, and also when the force which is split into 
several parts is practically entirely to the front of 
the concentrated force and not both in front and 
in back of it, as has been the case with Germany's 
enemies since the beginning of the war. Neverthe- 
less, the only chance for Germany in her difficult 
situation has been the application of this same 
principle of holding all but one enemy as best she 
can, while concentrating everything on that one 
in an attempt to defeat him decisively. 

Russia needed more time to mobilize than France ; 
also, Russia could make no general direct advance 
into the heart of Germany until the pressure which 
the Austrians would bring on the southern flank 
of any such advance had been disposed of. There- 
fore, the Germans decided to attack France first, 
crushing it, if possible, and thus be free to give 
their undivided attention to the defeating of 
Russia. The battle of the Marne prevented the 



f r/f '-■-'•"-'- 



^^ ^^ 




'■■^^^m 



GERMAN INFANTRY TAKING POSSESSION OF BURNING 
CITADEL OF BREST LITOVSK 




A GERMAN 15-CM. HOWITZER 



I 



THE GERMAN ARMY IN THE WAR 171 

crushing of France and left it still in the field as an 
active enemy to be dealt with. This was followed 
by the French and British attempt to turn the 
German right flank and to join with the Belgians 
in Antwerp. Had they succeeded, the Germans 
would have been driven out of France, and perhaps 
Belgium, or at best would have found their position 
much more difficult to maintain. The Germans 
everywhere stopped the flanking movement, cap- 
tured Antwerp, and put the Allies on the defensive 
in northern France and southwestern Belgium. 
Thus they recovered the initiative lost by the 
battle of the Marne. They probably would have 
broken the Allied line had they been able to continue 
their attacks. However, in the meanwhile, the 
Russians, by steadily defeating and pushing back 
the Austrians toward the Carpathians, had reached 
a position where they could advance from western 
Poland directly into Germany. Therefore, just 
at the time when Germany most needed freedom 
of action in the west in order to dispose effectually 
of her enemies there, the Russian successes com- 
pelled her to transfer her chief effort from the 
western to the eastern theatre of war. 

This was the French and British opportunity. 
Had they been able to assume immediately a 
vigorous general offensive, the situation for Ger- 
many might have become very critical. As they 
were not able to do so, Germany had a free hand 

13 



172 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

to move against the Russians, which she did most 
vigorously, driving them back to a position just 
in front of Warsaw. The French and British 
virtually announced that they needed the winter 
to prepare for the general offensive which undoubt- 
edly would come with the spring. This meant 
that if Germany could defeat Russia decisively 
before spring, she would be free to turn her full 
strength to the west to meet the French and 
British. If Russia could not be disposed of by 
spring, and the French and British made their 
general offensive, then again Germany's position 
might become very critical. 

When early spring came, not only were the 
Russians not decisively defeated in Poland, but 
they were still advancing in Galicia. The British 
attempted a general offensive at Neuve Chapelle, 
with the purpose of breaking through the German 
lines, thus, of course, compelling considerable 
sections of that line to the right and left of the 
hole made to fall back. While some ground was 
gained, the hole was not punched through the 
German line, so that the offensive was a failure. 

Later the French started an offensive to the north 
of Arras, which at first was successful in that 
considerable ground was gained. However, this 
offensive also failed to break an opening through 
the German line and thus render the German 
position untenable. 



THE GERMAN ARMY IN THE WAR 173 

Italy was persuaded to come into the war so 
that Germany and Austria had a new enemy to 
face. Her entry has not materially affected the 
situation, because up to the present she has been 
unable to make any gain of importance against 
the troops left on the defensive by the Austro- 
Hungarians. Had the attempted British offensive, 
the French offensive to the north of Arras, and 
the entry of Italy necessitated the withdrawal of 
a considerable number of troops from the Russian 
front, something would have been accomplished 
from the Allies' view point, though the effect would 
have been small in comparison with a vigorous 
general offensive, which so far has failed to materi- 
alize. Such local successes as have been had are 
of comparatively little value, as they leave just 
as many lines of German trench to be overcome 
as before they took place. Thus Germany has 
been free to concentrate on and vigorously attack 
Russia. Existing military conditions, therefore, 
show that Germany is not only not on the defensive 
but is on the offensive with the choice of initiative, 
and decisively defeating one of her strongest 
enemies. 

While the Allies attempt no real general offensive, 
but wait for their great economic preponderance 
to overcome Germany, there is strong indication 
at this time that Germany's active, aggressive 
armies are overcoming her enemies. Wars are 



174 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

won on battlefields, not in the counting houses 
or workshops. Economic resources are necessary, 
to be sure, but are secondary to military strength 
and detemiination. Once war is declared, a well- 
armed enemy can be beaten only by plain, down- 
right, hard, determined fighting. There never has 
been nor ever will be an AUadin's lamp or phil- 
osopher's stone which ^^*ill win a war. 



CHAPTER XVII 

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ARMY AS A FACTOR IN 
THE PRESENT WAR 

September, 1915. 

FROM the beginning of the war the Austro- 
Hungarian army has had a difficult role to 
play. Until approximately the middle of Novem- 
ber, 19 14, when the Germans changed from the 
offensive to the defensive in the western theatre 
of war and transferred the bulk of their troops to 
the eastern, or Russian, front, the Austro-Hunga- 
rians had to bear the brunt of the attacks of the 
greater part of the Russian army. 

True, the Russians attempted to conquer East 
Prussia, but these attempts were not made by the 
bulk of the Russian army and were absolutely 
subordinate to the movements going on in southern 
Poland and Galicia. Grand Duke Nicholas mobil- 
ized the greater part of his army along the western 
border of Russia proper — that is, just east of 
the Bug River and the Galician border — for the 
reason that before any advance through central 
Poland into Germany could be attempted, the 
Austro-Hungarians, whose possession of Galicia 
put them on the southern flank of such an advance, 
had to be pushed back or decisively beaten. 

As long as the Austro-Hungarians could hold 
back such an advance, the Germans were safe 

175 



176 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

from any serious Russian invasion except in East 
Prussia. The German campaign in France and 
the Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia, therefore, 
depended largely on the success the Russians 
would have in this eastern theatre of war. 

While the Austro-Hungarians started with a 
slight success in southern Poland, the weight 
of the Russian numbers and their superior 
leadership told in the end, with the result that 
the Austro-Hungarians were driven back, losing 
large numbers of prisoners and guns. Matters 
finally became so bad that the Germans were com- 
pelled to abandon their offensive in the west and 
to transfer all available troops to the Russian 
theatre of war. 

While this materially bettered conditions, the 
Russians almost invariably replied to German 
attacks by an attack on the Austro-Hungarians. 
In general, it may be said that while the Germans 
gained ground in Poland, the Russians gained in 
Galicia; also, during the winter the Austro-Hun- 
garians were defeated and driven out of Serbia. 

By the end of spring, the Russians were seriously 
threatening Hungary, and the indications were that 
Italy was about to attack with the army she had 
been bringing carefully up to date since the com- 
mencement of the war. Thus, just at the time 
when the Russian pressure was being most felt, 
the necessity arose not only of keeping along the 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ARMY 177 

Italian border the troops and artillery stationed 
there in case of an emergenc}^ but of strengthening 
them. 

This period was the most critical of the war for 
Austria-Hungary. However, early in May, the 
Germans and Austro-Hungarians began their attack 
on the Russians along the Dunajec River in western 
Galicia, which broke through the Russian line and 
was the beginning of the series of successes resulting 
in the occupancy by these forces of all of Poland 
and the reoccupancy of the greater part of Galicia. 
This advance, coupled with Italy's failure to pene- 
trate any part of the Austro-Hungarian line, ef- 
fected great improvement in the Austro-Hungarian 
morale. 

Like the majority of European troops, the indi- 
vidual officers and men of the Austro-Hungarian 
army are brave; in fact, the impatient bravery of 
many of the higher officers has' contributed largely 
to many of their defeats. In the beginning of the 
war, cavalry leaders especially made continual 
headlong attacks on the Russians without sufficient 
reconnaissance wherever they met them, resulting, 
again and again, in severe cutting up of consid- 
erable bodies of cavalry by superior Russian forces. 

The unwillingness of the general in command of 
the expedition into Serbia to wait until arrange- 
ments could be completed for continuing the ad- 
vance, despite the protestations of all his staff, was 



178 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

a large factor in his defeat. During the advance 
into southern Poland the latter part of Jtme, 
Archduke Joseph Ferdinand refused to ^vait for 
von Mackensen on his right, but pushed ahead 
alone, with the consequence that the Russians con- 
centrated on him at Krasnik, repulsed him, and 
took 15,000 prisoners. 

The Austro-Hungarian army also has suffered 
from the fact that ^^dth the exception of their artil- 
lery, the peace-time training, particularly of the 
higher officers, is neither as rigid nor as thorough 
as that which obtains in German}^ and France. 
However, since the beginning of the war, many 
general officers have been retired or put on duty 
in the interior of the count r3^ This, coupled 
with the promotion to higher grades of j'-ounger 
men who have demonstrated b}^ actual service in 
the field their fitness to command, has raised the 
standard of the troops. The training and leader- 
ship of troops not only are bettered under such 
circumstances but also their morale, due to the 
increased confidence which superior training and 
leadership invariably bring. 

With the possible exception of the Czechs here 
and there, the troops, in spite of racial jealousies 
and many differences of language, have proved 
loyal to the empire. Two battalions of the twenty- 
eighth infantry, made up of Czechs, bolted from 
their trenches in an attempt to reach the Russian 




AUSTRIAN INFANTRY ON THE MARCH IN POLAND 




AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN FIELD PIECE READY TO FIRE IN FRONT 
OF IVANGOROD 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ARMY 179 

trench opposite, and surrender. While many got 
there, more were shot by the German and Austro- 
Hungarian troops on their right and left. 

The twenty-eighth infantry, as a consequence, 
was stricken from the army list in disgrace. Since 
this episode such Czechs as are in the army have 
been distributed among other races. Their dis- 
loyalty has generated a strong feeling against them 
throughout Austria-Hungary, especially in the 
army. 

Due to heavy losses, particularly in prisoners, 
during the early part of the war, Austria-Hungary 
called the older reservists to the colors more 
promptly than most of the other nations engaged. 
Therefore, when the tide turned and the losses 
became much less, the barracks throughout the 
country soon were overcrowded with men under- 
going training. New battalions then were organ- 
ized and sent to join the various regiments at the 
front. Because of this, many of the infantry 
regiments now have seven and eight battalions of 
a thousand men each, instead of four, the 
prescribed number. 

Contact with the Germans and the mixing of 
units of the two armies in the same group have 
had considerable influence on the Austro-Hun- 
garian army. This intermingling of German and 
Austro-Hungarian troops only takes place on a 
large scale. Generally, the units serving together 



i8o WHY PREPAREDNESS 

are divisions, army corps, or armies; for instance, 
the army operating in front of Ivangorod was 
made up of the Twelfth Austro-Hungarian Army 
Corps under the Hungarian general, von Kovos, 
and three German divisions; von Mackensen's 
group of armies when moving north from southern 
Poland consisted of an Austro-Hungarian army 
and a German army. To its left was an Austro- 
Hungarian army under command of the Archduke 
Joseph Ferdinand. General Count von Conrad, 
the Austro-Hungarian chief-of -staff, retained com- 
plete control of all Austro-Hungarian troops. In 
joint movements the Germans invariably consulted 
him. If the German general staff determined the 
movements to be undertaken by both armies, as 
seems to have been the case, they were always 
very careful to deal directly with von Conrad. 
The consequence was that orders for the Austro- 
Htmgarian troops came through the regular chan- 
nels just as if the Germans had nothing to do 
with them. Every effort apparently was being 
made both by the German and Austro-Hungarian 
high command to prevent jealousy or discord from 
interfering in any way with the demands of the 
situation from a purely military point of view. 

Undoubtedly the Austro-Hungarian officers are 
somewhat jealous of the Germans, but the feeling 
is carefully repressed by their own superiors. On 
the other hand, there is an evident desire among 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ARMY i8l 

all Austro-Hungarians to emulate the Germans 
and support them in every way, due to a number 
of reasons: the Austro-Hungarians wish to make 
up to the Germans for their failure to lend them 
vigorous support during the Morocco crisis; they 
wish to show the Germans that they, too, are 
capable of accomplishments on the battlefield; 
they wish to be considered efficient by the Germans, 
for the Himgarians, in particular, admire the 
Germans and their methods. 

The Kaiser and his generals give the fullest meas- 
ure of credit to the Austro-Hungarians for any 
successes they may have achieved and see that those 
who distinguish themselves receive appropriate 
decorations. A stranger visiting these armies in 
the field finds every evidence there of complete 
harmony. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

COMMUNICATIONS OF AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN-GERMAN 
ARMIES IN RUSSIAN POLAND 

September, IQI5- 

THE German and Austro-Hungarian advance 
into Poland and Russia has occasioned much 
discussion as to the possibiHties of supplying such 
large bodies of troops such a distance from their 
base. The question became a particularly vital 
one when the Russians destroyed the railway 
lines and later removed or destroyed everything 
which might furnish food, material, or shelter to 
the invader. 

While the number of railroads in Courland and 
Poland are few compared with those in Germany, 
the map shows a number of main lines running 
generally in a southwesterly and northeasterly 
direction. When war was declared there were six 
main lines from Germany and Austria-Hungary 
proper to the position now occupied by the battle 
line through Courland, Lithuania, and Galicia. 

The Austro-Hungarians, by building a compara- 
tively short stretch of railroad from Rzeszow, 
near Tarnow, in Galicia, to Lublin, in Poland, 
opened a seventh through line. These lines being 
roughly parallel and rimning to different parts of 
the central empires, give, when in order, excellent 
facilities for the supply of the various armies. 

182 



COMMUNICATIONS IN POLAND 183 

As the Russians retired, they did the best they 
could to demohsh most of these roads. They de- 
stroyed all the bridges and most of the culverts, 
smashed most of the semaphores and in many places 
the switches also, and blasted apart the ends of the 
rails. Almost invariably they wrecked the water 
tov/ers and burned the stations; they sawed off or 
chopped down the telegraph poles and cut the wires. 
However, the roadbed and ties were practically 
undamaged. 

As the armies of the Central Powers advanced, 
their railway and pioneer battalions followed, and 
rebuilt the roads.^ Labor was plentiful, as there 
were thousands of Russian prisoners who could be 
used and in many places hundreds of peasants 
eager to earn a little money. The rails were 
promptly replaced, as were the switches and sema- 
phores. New water towers, consisting of steel 
tanks mounted on piling, were promptly erected. 
All but the largest bridges and all the culverts were 
replaced b> trestle work without much delay, as 
everywhere in the country traversed there are 
large forests. Work of replacing the big bridges 
was commenced immediately. Here piling was 
put in to support timber trestles, which, in turn, 
support steel girders. 

This railway reconstruction work showed evidence 

^The German army has battalions specially trained to reconstruct 
and handle railways, called Eisenbahn battalions. They have proved of 
the greatest use during the war. 



1 84 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

of careful preparation beforehand, as all kinds of 
necessary material was constantly arriving from 
Germany and Austria-Hungary. The telegraph 
troops soon had the telegraph lines repaired. 
In many cases the sawed-off poles simply were 
fastened to their stumps, showing that thorough 
destruction of a line necessitates burning the poles. 

The result was that, except where a line crossed 
a river, such as the Vistula or the Bug, opera- 
tion was soon resumed. At such crossings trans- 
shipment had to be made by wagon. Wagon 
bridges were completed in from five to six days. 

The main east-and-west wagon roads in Poland 
are excellent macadam roads; the remaining are 
similar to the typical American road — dusty in 
summer and quite muddy in the spring and fall. 
When the weather is dry, as is frequently the case 
for considerable periods, troops, light artillery, 
and wagons can move across country. In many 
cases at points where the Russians had destroyed 
road bridges, this was done to save even the time 
necessary to build a pontoon bridge. While the 
armies apparently were plentifully supplied with 
pontoons, little time was lost in replacing bridges 
built of them by more permanent timber trestle 
ones. 

To supplement the railroads, the Germans have 
ntimerous motor- trucks, each of which pulls a 
trailer practically of the same size as the truck. 




RAILWAY BRIDGE OVER THE VISTULA AT IVANGOROD AS THE 
RUSSIANS LEFT IT 




H. J. R 

GERMAN RESERVISTS ON THEIR WAY TO THE FRONT IN POLAND 



COMMUNICATIONS IN POLAND 185 

They are kept supplied with all needed articles 
and repairs by traveling railway motor-depots, 
consisting of a train of tank and freight cars. As 
the army advances they move forward also. The 
Austro-Hungarians have comparatively few motor- 
trucks. 

Both the Germans and Austro-Hungarians have 
immense numbers of horse wagons. The German 
wagons, which are larger and more solid, are 
drawn by powerful horses. The Austro-Hungarian 
wagons, of the type used by the Galician peasants, 
are very light but quite strong, and are drawn by 
two Galician horses, virtually ponies. On reason- 
ably good roads the German wagon gives best 
service, but the Galician wagon is superior for very 
muddy roads and cross-country travel, as it does 
not upset nor break so easily and can be lifted out 
of a hole more readily. 

The German trains each have fifty wagons; the 
Austro-Hungarian trains, one hundred. As is the 
case with everything German, their wagon trains 
are in perfect order, and all the men are in uniform. 
The Austro-Hungarian trains are very picturesque, 
as the drivers wear civilian clothing, frequently 
the Hungarian peasant costume; they are very 
much addicted to red trousers. The members of 
one of these trains generally come from the same 
village and are under the immediate charge of one 
of their headmen. These trains are met every- 



1 86 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

where, going and coming along the roads, or drawn 
up in some field, the wagons in long parallel rows 
and the horses turned loose in a herd to graze. 

Evidence is apparent everywhere that the army 
is amply supplied with food, ammunition, and all 
the many other requisites necessary to keep a mod- 
ern army going. The Central Powers expected a 
much more stubborn resistance at Brest Litovsk. 
Consequently, when the place fell, there were huge 
piles of ammunition at the various crossroads back 
of the original line occupied by the attackers. 
When the troops moved on in pursuit of the 
Russians, ample ammunition was brought up by 
the trains and left in large piles for some time 
before being picked up and taken to the front. 
The more one examines the communications of 
the armies of the Central Powers operating in 
Russia, the more evident it becomes that Germany 
and Austria are not suffering in any way from lack 
of material or inability to get supplies to the 
troops at the front. 



CHAPTER XIX 

THE RUSSIANS AS SEEN FROM THE AUSTRO- 
HUNGARIAN SIDE 

September, 1915. 

THE Russian prisoner of war is one of the most 
familiar sights in Austria-Hungary, including 
even the Austrian Tyrol. At many of the stations 
groups of Russian prisoners with a few landsturm 
guards are seen either waiting for a train or getting 
on or off one, while interested crowds, of civilians 
stand about. 

Frequently these prisoners are used in numerous 
capacities to do the work of the men who have 
been mobilized. Wherever railway construction 
is going on, and there seems to be a great deal 
of it in various parts of the empire, large groups 
of Russian prisoners are to be found working 
leisurely under comparatively few guards. 

From the train windows here and there the 
traveler catches glimpses of prison camps, prac- 
tically always of the same type — long rows of 
wooden huts surrounded by several rows of high 
barbed wire fences, with landsturm sentinels pacing 
up and down outside, v/hile groups of big men in 
Russian uniforms lounge about in the sunniest 
spots of the enclosure. 

The Russian prisoners are also utilized in large 
numbers in Poland to help rebuild the railways, 
14 187 



1 88 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

principally for that part of the work done by the 
unskilled labor. This work proceeds at a good 
many points at the same time. On the big bridges, 
working together may be seen large parties of 
men — Germans, Austro-Hungarians, Russians, 
each in the uniform of his army. 

In captured fortresses, such as Ivangorod and 
Brest Litovsk, an immense amount of work had 
to be done to straighten out the disorder occa- 
sioned by the partially successful attempts of the 
Russians to destroy them. In one place, artillery 
ammunition is scattered about, either where the 
Russians left it or where the first German or 
Austro-Hungarian troops dragged it out to save 
it from being burned, as both of these fortresses 
were on fire when captured. In another place, 
infantry ammunition is scattered about, or various 
other supplies cover the ground. For all this 
cleaning up work large numbers of Russian 
prisoners are used. 

A captured field position or a battlefield always 
is littered with rifles of both armies, captured 
guns of all kinds, as well as varieties of all the 
articles that go to make up the equipment of an 
army. These are carefully collected, sorted, and 
shipped to the different arsenals and factories, to 
be put in good order for use again if necessary. 
Most of this work is done by Russian prisoners. 
The ups and downs of fortune certainly are illus- 



GLIMPSES OF THE RUSSIANS 189 

trated by a group of prisoners, under guard of 
their enemy, piling up and preparing for shipment 
the rifles they used but a short time previous in 
battle against that same enemy. 

Both the German and Austro-Hungarian armies 
have what are called landsturm working battalions 
made up of men of military age who have some 
slight physical defect, which does not interfere 
with their doing ordinary work but which would 
impair their efficiency as soldiers. These battalions 
are used for such work as the building of roads in 
rear of the army. 

Generally where they are at work Russian 
prisoners also are seen. The prisoners, when 
asked the work they were permitted to do by 
their regulations, replied that Nicholai Nicho- 
laievitch had told them that, if captured, they 
could work on anything but trenches or fortifica- 
tions. 

With few exceptions, a distinguishing feature 
was the size of the prisoners. They were mostly 
a fine looking lot of men, well clothed in good 
serviceable uniforms. They seemed to take life 
pretty much as they found it and were not worry- 
ing. In most cases they appeared to be on the 
best of terms with their captors. The Austro- 
Hungarians say they are extremely good natured, 
but very indolent. 

In going to the front by rail, one of the familiar 



190 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

sights is "Ivan," as the Austro-Hungarians call the 
Russian soldier, being brought to the rear in the 
same box cars which just had taken fresh troops 
to the front. 

As the battle line is approached, groups of 
recently-captured men are met on the road, being 
taken to the rear. As is always the case with 
men just taken prisoners, they are weary and dirty. 

When Brest Litovsk was captured, the prisoners, 
of whom there were only about eight hundred, 
were concentrated in the large inner court of the 
citadel. In the center of this court is a small 
park full of trees, and everywhere under these 
trees were the Russians, mostly asleep, for after 
an action, men are always worn out. Guarding 
them stood Germans and Austro-Hungarian sen- 
tinels, still in heavy marching order, while outside 
and around all were the tall brick inner walls of 
the citadel, with smoke pouring out of the win- 
dows of the barracks as it burned. 

One of the older prisoners, a good looking, 
intelligent man, on being questioned, said that 
this was his third war, as he had fought through 
the Boxer campaign in China in 1900 and the 
Russo-Japanese war of 1904. Until May he was 
very confident that the Russians were going to 
win, but since he had become discouraged, as it 
was too much like the Russo-Japanese war — a 
fight followed by a retreat, and then a fight and 




//. ./, H. 

RUSSIAN PRISONERS LEAVING THE CITADEL OF 
BREST LITOVSK 




H. J. R 

RUSSIAN SOLDIERS CAPTURED AT IVANGOROD 



GLIMPSES OF THE RUSSIANS 191 

another retreat, and so on. He closed the inter- 
view by asking if it were true that the prisoners 
were to be shot by the Germans, as the Russian 
officers had told them. 

The opinion of the soldiers of an army of their 
enemy is always interesting. Invariably soldiers 
have a higher opinion of their enemy than have 
the inhabitants of an invaded country. The 
Austro-Hungarian soldiers and officers always speak 
well of the Russians, except the cossacks, who, 
they say, are not much account at fighting but 
exceh in destroying property. The other troops 
they believe to be brave and persistent fighters. 
They think the officers good material but do not 
consider that they are sufficiently well educated 
professionally. They believe that there is a recent 
shortage of officers, as the number captured is 
invariably below the proportion to the number of 
men; for instance, at Brest Litovsk, of the eight 
hundred Russians captured, there was only one 
officer. They also maintain that recently the 
Russians have commissioned many of their non- 
commissioned officers, as a considerable proportion 
of the officers captured can hardly read and write. 

In referring to the large number captured, the 
Austro- Hungarians say that the rimiors that many 
of the Russian soldiers hold up their hands with- 
out proper resistance was unfounded. They claim 
that frequently they made large captures, due to 



192 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

the fact that all the officers were either killed or 
wounded, and the men, lacking initiative, did not 
know what to do, and consequently were cut off 
before they could make up their minds. 

Many of the Austro-Hungarian officers have 
served both on the Russian and Italian fronts. 
They make a very interesting comparison between 
Russian and Italian attacks. The Italians, they 
say, come on with great enthusiasm and speed, 
but if the attack is not immediately successful, 
they retire. On the other hand, the Russian 
attack is not nearly as impressive to watch 
approach, as it is much slower, but it is much 
harder to resist because always persisted in. 

The inhabitants left in the various villages, 
which virtually were all destroyed by the Russians 
as they retreated, generally reported that the 
Russians were somewhat lacking in officers as 
well as artillery ammunition; that many of the 
soldiers were discouraged and deliberately remained 
behind during a retreat so as to be captured. 



CHAPTER XX 

WHAT INVASION HAS MEANT TO THE POLES 

September, 1915. 

THE Poles, because of their inability to protect 
themselves from their surrounding enemies, 
first lost the outlying portions of their kingdom, 
formerly one of the largest in Europe, and then 
had the remnant of their country divided among 
Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Due to this, the 
present war found the Poles in the armies of three 
different nations and, what was infinitely worse, 
fighting against one another. Then, too, because 
of the strategical position of Poland, the country 
promptly became one of the main theatres of war 
and remained so for a year. Thus the Poles have 
had to fight on both sides in a war from which 
it is to be doubted if they can gain much benefit, 
no matter which side wins, while their women 
and children have had to suffer all the hardships 
which inevitably come to the inhabitants of an 
invaded country, as the combatants have fought 
intermittently backward and forward across the 
country. 

In all wars considerable private property has 
been destroyed, much of it necessarily but some 
wantonly. Probably in no war has the destruc- 
tion been so great as in the present one. This is 

193 



194 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

primarily because of the great length of modern 
battlefields, due to the number of men engaged 
and their great depth, due to the long range of 
modern field artillery. Aeroplanes and airships, 
too, have caused damage in localities out of reach 
of the guns, although this has been comparatively 
slight. 

In crossing southern Poland, from the west to 
the Vistula, practically no private property was 
destroyed other than that incident to fighting. 
Large towns, such as Kieltse and Radom are 
untouched except in such particulars as the removal 
by the Russians of all copper from the brewery 
in Radom. Incidentally,, within a week of the 
German-Austro-Hungarian entry, they had the 
brewery in operation supplying beer to the troops 
along the Vistula fifty kilometers away. 

The fighting along the Vistula was responsible 
for the destruction of a great deal of private 
property, as the villages here are more numerous 
than in the country farther to the west. Most 
Polish houses, being built of timber and having 
thatched roofs, catch fire readily, and as they are 
generally quite close together a few shells dropped 
into a village almost invariably means complete 
destruction by fire. 

Masonry buildings, such as those found along 
the French front, while of little value from the 
point of view of protection from artillery fire, can 



lyj 



''^'^' 



INVASION OF POLAND 195 

rarely be set on fire; they must be knocked down, 
which takes a large number of shells. 

On the Russian front, after a fight commences 
villages burst into flame and send columns of black 
smoke high into the heavens. At night the 
spectacle is impressive, as the flames of the burn- 
ing villages, the flashes from guns and bursting 
projectiles, the glowing tracers of the artillery 
shells, and the star bombs with their trail of light 
ending in an intense white glare, pierce the dark- 
ness in every direction. 

When the Russians found they could not hold 
the line of the Vistula and would have to retreat 
toward the Bug, they decided to destroy all private 
property which might be of any assistance to the 
invader. Nova Alexandria was the first place of 
any size to be burned. From the Austro-Hungarian 
positions along the edge of the forest on the west 
bank of the Vistula, cossacks could be seen going 
from house to house setting them on fire. In a 
few hours a dense column of smoke and flame, 
visible for miles, marked the position of Nova 
Alexandria. 

As Ivangorod is a fortress pure and simple and 
not built around a town, no private property was 
destroyed. 

From the Vistula to the Bug, a distance ap- 
proximately of eighty miles, the Russians burned 
the greater part of the villages. Here and there 



196 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

individual houses escaped, and some of the smaller 
towns entirely, due to the fact that the places con- 
cerned were considerably off the route of the re- 
treating troops. In other instances the Germans 
and Austro-Hungarians pushed the Russian rear 
guards so hard they had no time to apply the torch. 

The one reasonably durable feature of the average 
Polish farm or village house is its large, tall brick 
chimney. The track of the Russian retreat is 
marked by these chimneys discolored by flame and 
smoke and surrounded by ashes. Sometimes they 
are found singly, sometimes in groups, but more 
often in long, irregular lines on either side of the 
road marking what once was a village street. 

The inhabitants who are left invariably report 
that the burning was done not by the regular 
troops but by cossacks, who, they say, carry 
inflammable gasoline torches. That many of the 
best houses of a small town are frequently left 
undamaged is explained by the fact that their 
owners succeeded in bribing the cossacks not to 
fire them. 

The Jews, of whom there is considerable number 
in all the towns, claim that the cossacks deem it 
great fun to burn them out. Brest Litovsk, a town 
of about 65,000 inhabitants, with the possible 
exception of twenty of the best houses, was com- 
pletely burned by the Russians before they evacu- 
ated the neighboring fortress of the same name. 



INVASION OF POLAND 197 

A few days previous they had compelled all the 
people to leave for other towns farther east in 
Russia. When the Germans and Austro-Hunga- 
rians entered, the only living things found in the 
smoking ruins were hundreds of cats and a stray 
dog or two. 

General Kovos, the Hungarian in command of 
the Twelfth Army Corps, when questioned as to 
the effect such destruction might have on the cam- 
paign, replied that under modern conditions none, 
other than inconvenience to the invader. The 
reasons he gave were that as far as food was con- 
cerned, modern rail transportation facilities were 
so excellent it made no difference, as supplies from 
any part either of the German or Austro-Hungarian 
empire could be, and were being, brought to the 
front in a comparatively short time. Even were 
most of the food supplies not removed, it would 
be necessary to bring most of the subsistence of 
the army from the central empires when operating 
with such large masses of troops in a country 
as sparsely settled as Poland. As to shelter for 
the troops during the winter, it also made little 
difference, as even during the preceding winter, 
when operating in a country where, for the most 
part, the villages and towns had not been destroyed, 
they were so few and far between as to be of little 
use for this purpose. 

The destruction wrought by the Russians, there- 



198 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

fore, would not entail on the great majority of the 
men and officers any greater hardships than they 
had endured the preceding winter. 

The relations of the Poles with the German and 
Austro-Himgarian invaders were based on two 
facts: the first, and by far more important, was 
that with few exceptions the civilians did not indulge 
in such practices as cutting telegraph lines or firing 
on soldiers from housetops and out of windows; 
hence the invader seldom had to resort to the pun- 
ishments prescribed in the military law for war 
treason. The second fact was that while many 
Poles probably hope for self-government and, 
therefore, are not anxious to help either the Ger- 
mans or Austro-Hungarians, they prefer either of 
these, and particularly the Austro-Hungarians, to 
the Russians. 

As the forces of the Central Powers advanced, 
they divided Poland between them for purposes of 
administration. Up to the Vistula, the railway line 
running from the southwest corner of Poland, 
where Silesia and Galicia meet, to Warsaw, was 
the line of demarcation. The section to the north 
was administered by Germany, to the south by 
Austria-Hungary. From the Vistula to the Bug, 
it is probable that a line from Warsaw to Brest 
Litovsk was chosen. Both these cities are under 
German control. 

The Austro-Hungarians immediately brought 



INVASION OF POLAND 199 

their civil officials and put them in charge of the 
civil administration. The troops of the active army 
keep moving forward as the front advances. The 
troops left behind for garrison purposes are always 
lands turm. While occasionally some of these older 
men are obliged to participate in an action, as a 
rule they lead quiet lives, guarding railways and 
bridges and garrisoning points far from the enemy's 
fire. Instead of having to risk their lives, most of 
them are adding about ten years to their existence, 
due to plenty of out-door exercise, simple but good 
food, and the regular habits which garrison life in 
a small town or village forces on a soldier. 

The attitude of the Russians toward the civilian 
population varied. Up to the Vistula, they left 
most of the habitations and the population unmo- 
lested, with the exception of the men of military 
age, whom they took with them in their retreat. 
East of the Vistula, they compelled all the people 
to evacuate to the east as they retreated. West of 
the Vistula, towns such as Radom remained practi- 
cally unmolested. 

Prominent colored posters stuck on all conspic- 
uous places telling the inhabitants of the rules 
which the invaders would enforce, were one of the 
most noticeable indications of a change of govern- 
ment, outside of the soldiers of the Central Powers. 
These notices were generally printed in at least 
two languages — Polish and German; the more 



200 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

important, in three — Polish, German, and Russian. 

Practically every telegraph pole bore promi- 
nently a notice in Polish, Russian, French, and 
German, warning the civil population that any one 
caught cutting or otherwise destroying the tele- 
graph line would be shot. Among other notices 
was one prohibiting the keeping of carrier pigeons 
and stating that since the occupation many had 
been seen leaving town eastward bound. Another 
regulated food prices and prescribed the rate of 
exchange between rubles, marks, and crowns. 
Another regulated and severely restricted prosti- 
tution. In fact, everything was carefully regulated 
which might cause trouble of any kind or give 
opportunities to the unscrupulous inclined to profit 
at the expense of their neighbors. 

A police force was established among the citizens 
of the town, working under the direction of the 
Austro-Hungarian field gendarmerie, which per- 
forms the provost duty in that army. 

Conditions in Kieltse, so far as could be noted, 
were similar to those existing in Radom. The 
cafes and shops were doing a thriving business. 
The cafes as well as the hotels unearthed the wine 
they had had to hide until the Russians departed. 
The shops still bore signs in Russian, except that 
here and there the more enterprising owners were 
putting up ones in German. The schools were 
open, apparently with the usual attendance. 



INVASION OF POLAND 201 

Every afternoon a Hungarian military band gave 
a concert in the park. These were always well 
attended, not only by officers and soldiers of the 
invading armies but by the population en masse 
in their best clothes, especially the women. 

It was said that among the civilian men there 
were undoubtedly a number of Russian officers 
left behind as spies, as not only in Poland but in 
Galicia the Austro-Hungarians had found this to 
be a regular Russian practice. If captured, of 
course, it meant the death penalty. . 

In that part of Poland where the Russians had 
compelled the inhabitants to evacuate and where 
they had burned most of their dwellings, the prob- 
lem of administration was simpler in that there 
were fewer people, but more difficult in that the 
few would have to be taken care of when the winter 
set in. 

While the Russians endeavored to clear out all 
the people, many slipped into the nearest woods, 
of which there are many in Poland, and hid until 
the invader arrived. Others, having been con- 
centrated in such places as Kobryn, east of Brest 
Litovsk, had to be abandoned by the Russian troops 
when pressed too hard by the troops of the Central 
Powers. 

While those compelled to evacuate lost their 
homes because the Russians burned them, with 
few exceptions they did not lose their personal 



202 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

belongings and live stock, for, as a rule, the 
evacuation was not accomplished at the last 
moment, but a day or two ahead of the retreat of 
the troops. 

Therefore, when they were overtaken by the 
troops of the Central Powers, the}^ nearly always 
had all their possessions with them. In every 
case the field gendarmerie would take charge of 
them and return them to what was left of their 
homes. 

Long trains of wagons loaded with household 
goods of every description were a familiar sight in 
Poland. Coming down one side of the road as 
troops and trains moved up the other, could be 
seen children of every age, old men and women, 
accompanied by the yotmg and middle-aged, driving 
cattle, horses, and frequently large flocks of geese. 
On arriving at their village, or what is left of it, 
their own headmen took charge. The first act 
generally was to hold a thanksgiving service in 
the church. Then they set about restoring some 
semblance of order. 

Man}^ have erected temporary shelter and 
although the crops for the most part are undam- 
aged, indications are that before the winter is over, 
many of these people will be in need both of food 
and shelter. 

As the invaders advanced across Poland, they 
filled in all Russian trenches but left their own 





POLISH REFUGEES 




RUINS OF NOVA ALEXANDRIA AFTER THE COSSACKS HAD 
BURNED IT 



INVASION OP POLAND 203 

standing, thus having Hne after Hne ready for 
themselves in case of retreat but leaving nothing 
for the RuSvSians. 

In this work the inhabitants were employed,* 
including many Polish peasant women, who are 
glad to take advantage of the opportunity to earn 
a little money. Thousands of men are at work 
repairing the railroads and roads, for which they 
receive pay. 

On the whole, the people do not seem to fear the 
invaders. The Jews openly expressed their pref- 
erence for them. 

In practically all the towns entered, committees 
of citizens informed the German and Austro- 
Hungarian officers in command that during the 
Russian regime they had secretly organized military 
bodies. They offered the services of these organiza- 
tions to fight Russia, provided arms, ammunition, 
and uniforms were supplied. This led to the 
formation of a Polish legion. Three brigades are 
now fighting with the Austro-Hungarians against 
Russia, while a fourth is in process of organization. 



15 



CHAPTER XXI. 

SUMMARY OF THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN TO THE END 
OF AUGUST, 1915^ 

September, IQ15. 

FROM the beginning of the war until about the 
middle of November, 19 14, the main German 
campaign was earned on in Belgium and France. 
During this time, a Russian invasion of East 
Prussia was driven back by Hindenburg, and an 
Austrian advance into Poland was driven back by 
the Russians, who, at the same time, advanced 
through Galicia to the foot of the Carpathians and 
almost to Cracow, thus isolating Przemysl. The 
Germans replied by advancing through central 
Poland to the line of the Vistula, with the result 
that the Russians had to withdraw troops from 
Galicia, thus allowing the relief of Przemysl. 
However, the Russians soon succeeded in driving 
back both the Germans and the Austrians. They 
even crossed the German-Polish frontier between 
Kaliss and Cracow and again reached the Car- 
pathians. This Russian advance compelled the 
Germans to stop their attacks in southern Belgium 
and northern France and to transfer all available 
troops and guns to the Russian front. Their 
subsequent attacks carried them to a short distance 
in front of Warsaw, beyond which they were unable 

1 See map facing page 212, 

204 



SUMMARY OP THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 205 

to advance. While this was going on, an Austrian 
campaign in Serbia had ended with complete 
disaster and their expulsion from Serbia. 

Thus, the beginning of 191 5 found both sides 
resting on the defensive in France, with the Germans 
on the offensive against Russia in Poland and 
the Austro-Hungarians on the defensive in Galicia 
against the Russians. France and England virtu- 
ally having announced that they would not be 
ready to take a real offensive until spring, the 
Central Powers had until spring to dispose of the 
Russian menace or else be attacked at the same 
time both in the eastern and western theatres of 
war, for them a very dangerous situation. 

While this was going on, the British on March 10, 
started a general attack near Neuve Chapelle, 
which was directed at Lille, and was intended to 
be the beginning of the spring offensive. Had 
this proved successful, and had Lille been taken, 
the situation for the German line in France would 
have been so serious as undoubtedly to have 
compelled the withdrawal of German troops from 
the Russian front. However, while local successes 
were gained, the attack as a general offensive was 
a complete failure, with the result that Germany 
was not bothered in her Russian campaign. 

On March 21, Przemysl fell, and the Russians 
started a general attack along the Carpathians, 
which throughout April slowly and steadily gained 



206 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

ground, putting them in many places on the 
Hungarian side of the crest. Late in April and 
early in May, Hindenburg made his raid into 
Livonia, seizing Libau and a considerable part of 
the country to the east. Though this movement 
probably had among other objects the lessening 
of the Russian pressure in the Carpathians by 
compelling the withdrawal of troops to Livonia, 
the Russians continued their steady successful 
pressure in the Carpathians. 

The beginning of May was for the Central 
Powers the darkest point to date in the war, for 
not only had they failed to dispose of Russia during 
the winter but they had not even stopped her steady 
progress in her campaign against Hungary; also 
there were signs that the French were about to 
start a heavy offensive in the region of Arras, and 
that Italy was about to join the Allies. 

Had the French and British at this time been 
able to take a general offensive and maintain it 
with the same persistency displayed by the Russians 
since the beginning of the w^ar, and had Italy come 
in at the same time instead of waiting for several 
weeks, the situation for the Central Powers would 
have been extremely dangerous. However, the 
British did practically nothing, while the French 
waited imtil the second week of May before starting 
heavy attacks in the Arras region, which, while 
locally successful, never reached the point where 



SUMMARY OF THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 207 

they could be said to have affected the general 
conduct of the campaign in both theatres of war. 
The Italians waited until the third week of May 
before declaring war, and did not really start their 
campaign until June. 

In the meantime the Germans initiated a heavy 
local attack in the region of Ypres, which was 
mistaken by many to be a sign of the resumption 
of the German attempt against Calais. This 
probably was the impression they wished to produce 
in order to withdraw as much as possible the 
attention of the Allies from the preparations which 
were being made in western Galicia. When these 
preparations were completed in the first few days 
of May, the troops of the Central Powers, under 
General von Mackensen broke completely through 
all the Russian trenches along this part of the line. 
This was done on such a wide front that the Russian 
troops, both to the north and south of the break, 
were compelled to fall back to avoid being taken 
in flank and, perhaps, even in rear. The Central 
Powers continued pushing their advance, regardless 
of resistance, practically straight east imtil Przemysl 
was retaken and Lemberg was reoccupied. This 
forced the Russians almost out of Galicia. While 
this was going on, the French continued their 
attacks in the Arras region, with local successes 
but still unable to influence the general conduct of 
the war. 



2o8 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

While the Russians in Poland to the north of 
the break in their line, had to retire, they in general 
held on to their position in central Poland. This 
resulted in the Russian line in central Poland 
still following a general north-and-south direction, 
while in southern Poland it turned and ran along 
an east-and-west line to a point near the Bug, 
where it again turned south along a line that took 
it east of Lemberg. The forcing of the Russians 
almost out of Gahcia by the eastward drive of 
the Central Powers might be considered the end 
of the first stage of the Russian retreat. During 
the second stage the Germans attacked from the 
north, driving the Russians back on a general line 
from Grodno to Novo Georgievsk, the two northern 
fortresses of the Polish quadrilateral. At the same 
time they attacked from the west driving them 
back upon Warsaw and Ivangorod, the two western 
fortresses of the same quadrilateral. 

Abandoning their advance to the east and leaving 
the Austro-Hungarians on the defensive in eastern 
Galicia, the Austrian Archduke Joseph Ferdinand 
and General von Mackensen advanced to the north 
against that part of the Russian line which ran east 
and west through south Poland between the Vistula 
and the Bug. Thus from the north, the west, and 
the south, the Russians were being forced back on 
the fortresses of Grodno, Novo Georgievsk, Ivan- 
gorod and Brest Litovsk, which make up the 
Polish quadrilateral. 



SUMMARY OF THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 209 

It always has been recognized that the defense 
of Poland was a difficult problem, due to its having 
enemy territory on three sides. For this reason 
the fortresses of the Polish quadrilateral were 
built. They were intended to delay any quick 
advance which might be attempted at the beginning 
of a war, so as to permit of proper completion of 
Russian mobilization. They were to furnish a 
strong position from which Russian armies might 
advance into enemy territory. They were to give 
a retiring Russian army a strong position to fall 
back upon. Should the worst come and the 
Russian field army be driven into Russia proper, 
these fortresses by holding out would keep im- 
portant rail and river centers from being used by 
the enemy, and would necessitate the detachment 
from the enemy's field army of considerable 
bodies of troops to besiege them. In other words, 
they would seriously hamper the enemy's advance, 
and should the Russian advance be renewed, 
would materially aid it. 

In the third stage, the Germans continued their 
advance in Livonia toward Riga and occupied 
Mitau; while in Poland they pressed against the 
quadrilateral, with the result that they broke 
through on the east where they crossed the Vistula, 
on the south where they broke the Lublin- Cholm 
railway line and occupied Lublin, and on the north 
where they crossed the Narew. On August 4 



210 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

they captured Warsaw, and Augvist 5, Ivangorod. 
The fall of these two places, followed shortly after- 
ward by that of Novo Georgievsk and Ossovetz, 
with a number of minor forts, permitted the 
Central Powers to occupy virtually all Poland, 
and by thus straightening out their lines, shorten 
it several hundred kilometers. 

On August 25 Brest Litovsk fell, and on Sep- 
tember 2, Grodno. Kovno had fallen August 17. 
This meant that not only had the Central Powers 
arrived in that part of Russia proper to the east 
of Poland but that the center of their line was in 
direct communication with the northern part in 
Livonia; and that practically all the main fortresses 
which protected Russia from invasion from the 
west had fallen into their hands and could be 
used by them as bases from which to operate 
against Russia. 

Immediately Brest Litovsk was taken, troops 
were withdrawn from the center of the line and 
sent south with their artillery and trains. This 
was only one of many indications that the advance 
of the Central Powers had gone about as far into 
Russia as the high command intended. While 
the public and press both in Germany and Austria- 
Hungary frequently mentioned the possibilities of 
an advance to Petrograd, military circles were 
concerned only with the question as to how far it 
was advisable to go in order to establish a defen- 



SUMMARY OF THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 211 

sive line similar to that held in France. This 
made it possible to free a large number of troops 
for an offensive in another direction, for it was 
believed that Russia would be unable to take a 
real offensive for at least six months, because of 
her heavy losses in captured artillery and in 
trained effectives, killed, wounded, or captured. 
The belief was that since France and England had 
been unable to make any impression on the line 
in the west, Russia would be unable, even when 
reorganized, to make any impression on such lines 
as the Central Powers might establish in the east. 
While the center of the line of the Central Powers 
in Russia advanced to Pinsk, such offensives as 
were continued consisted of a local attack in the 
north, leading to the capture of Vilna, unsuccessful 
attacks on Dvinsk and Riga, and an Austro- 
Hungarian drive in the south in the Rovno district 
successfully opposed by the Russians and even 
somewhat forced back. The general advance of 
the Central Powers into Russia practically came 
to an end in the first part of September. 



\.* 



lU 



KEY 

First General Period: August, igi4 
(:fififi;;;:;^ The first line of heavy fighting between 

the Russian and German -Austro-Hun- 

garian troops. 



Second General Period: Sept. i-Ocl. 23, IP14 
3 The battle line after General von Hinden- 
burg's advance to the Vistula River. 



Third General Period: Oct. 24-Ncn. 10, IQ14 

3 The Russian advance which compelled 

the transfeiTing of the German general 

offensive from the western to the eastern 

theatre of war. 

1 Where the battle lines of the second and 
third general periods were coincident. 

Fourth General Period: Nov. //, 1914- 
May 1, :gis 
3 The battle line at the end of April, 



Fifth General Period: May- July, igi^ 
I The battle Hne just before the fall of the 
Polish quadrilateral of fortresses. 

I Where the battle line of the fourth and 
fifth general periods were coincident. 

Sixth General Period: August-October, igi^ 
I Approximate position of troops at the 
end of the general offensive of the Cen- 
tral Powers in the eastern theatre of war. 



Fortresses and fortified areas. 



International botmdajyiine: 



The campaign to the eastern theatre of war may 
be divided into six general periods, as follows: 

First General Period: Aiignsi, igi4 

The Russians invade East Prussia from the east 
and south; the Austro-Hungarians invade south- 
east Poland, while the Russians enter Galicia. 

Second General Period: Sept. i-Oct. 23, igi4 
North— 
The Russians, compelled to retreat across their 
frontier, later force the Germans back into East 
Prussia. 

South — 
The Russians advance, penetrating as far as the 
Carpathian Mountains and to the vicinity of 
Cracow; but due to Hindenburg's advance to 
Warsaw and to Ivangorod, the Russians retire to 
the San River. 

Third General Period: October 2j-Novetnber 10, igi4 
The Russians force Hindenburg out of Poland, 
and cross the German frontier in several pi 
they advance from the San River to the vicinity 
of Cracow and in some places cross the Carpathian 
Mountains into Hungary. This Russian advance 
compelled the Germans to transfer their general 
offensive from the western and to the eastern 
theatre of war. 

Powlh General Period : Nov. 11, igi4-May i, igi; 
The Russians are driven back to positions before 
Warsaw. Hea\'y fighting takes place all along 
the line without marked results, except in the 
north where Hindenburg advances capturing 
Libau and in the south where the Russians 
advance over the Carpathian Mountains into 
Hungary. 



'''M Cmeral Period: May-July, igis 

Mackensen's victory along the Dunajec, resulting 
in the Russians being forced back on the Polish 
quadnlateral of fortresses. 

S'«l. &„„ai Period: August-October, 1915 

he fall of most of the Russian fortresses and the 
Ihp D^ of the armies of the Central Powers to 
of IV ^'''°""5''-Rovno line, marking the end 
Pow ^^"^''*' offensive in Russia of the Central 



MAP SHOWING 

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE 
EASTERN THEATRE OF WAR 

AUGUST, 1914-OCTOBER, 1915 




PART IV 

MODERN BATTLE 



CHAPTER XXII 

THE volunteers' FIRST SIGHT OF WAR 

September, IQ14. 

AN army must have good weapons and must 
be well trained in their use. Although this 
is generally conceded, it is not nearly so well 
understood that, above all, an army must have 
high morale. An army without morale is like a 
person without a soul — dead and already on the 
road to decomposition. When troops leave home, 
while bands play, people cheer, and their friends 
load them with presents, war seems pleasant, and 
enthusiasm is high; but when troops, and par- 
ticularly green ones, for the first time come in con- 
tact with a large number of wounded, war seems 
anything but pleasant, and enthusiasm is dampened 
considerably. It is then that morale counts. 

No better example of some of the disconcerting 
sights which young green soldiers first see in time 
of war can be had than the experience of the first 
battalions of British territorials sent to France. 
Made up of a very high type of young men, they 
were eager to get to the front and finally, much to 
their delight, were sent to France. However, 
instead of the battlefield they were sent to a 
British base just outside of Paris. Here the 
trains of wounded bound for the coast put off those 

215 



2l6 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

so seriously hurt that it was doubttul if they could 
continue the journey longer and live. They were 
carried into large, gloomy railway sheds, with 
concrete floors and walls and galvanized iron roofs. 
The battalion of British territorials was quartered 
in similar sheds and, day and night, in addition 
to guarding the base, helped carry the wounded 
out of the cars into the sheds, and out of the sheds 
into motor ambulances which took them to hospitals 
in Paris. Here for many weeks the men of this 
battalion had their first sight of war. No excite- 
ment, no tremendous interest, no exaltation — 
nothing but the sight of the gloomy railway yards 
and sheds, and long trains unloading the severely 
wounded, mam?- of whom died before getting any 
farther. 

Generally the trains carrying the badly wounded 
are made up of freight cars, the floors of which are 
covered with straw, the wounded men lying on 
stretchers. On removal from the train, the men 
are laid out in rows in wards separated by canvas 
hung from the roof supports of the sheds. 

A card is tied on each wounded man stating the 
nature of his wotmd and the treatment he has 
received. The British doctors, and also American 
doctors belonging to the American motor-ambulance 
service, go rapidh^ from man to man. The worst 
cases are sent at once to the American hospital, 
which at present receives most of its wotmded from 
this station. 



VOLUNTEERS' FIRST SIGHT OF WAR 217 

The American hospital, with the generous aid of 
a number of private individuals and a motor-car 
company, has arranged a motor-ambulance service, 
which extended to the actual field of battle when 
the fighting was near Paris, and since then has been 
bringing wounded from the British base to the hos- 
pitals in Paris. 

The American motor-ambulances are fitted with 
the regulation French stretcher. The British 
wounded come in on British stretchers, which are 
too big for the American ambulances. This necessi- 
tates moving each wounded man from one stretcher 
to another, which frequently is a very painful 
operation, especially if their wounds have not 
been dressed for some time, this being occasionally 
as much as a week. No attempt is made to dress 
wounds at the base, except when absolutely neces- 
sary, as the less a wound is interfered with until it 
can be properly dressed, the better. Where ban- 
dages have slipped, they are replaced. When men 
are in great pain they are given a hypodermic 
injection. 

After the wounded have been transferred to the 
ambulance stretchers, the territorials carry them 
to the motor-ambulances which are sent to Paris 
in groups of four and five. Among the territorials 
serving as privates are several doctors who have 
been of considerable assistance. The American 
drivers and orderlies of the cars, when not otherwise 



2i8 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

engaged, and the British soldiers, go among the 
wounded giving them water, cigarettes, and, to 
those who are permitted to have it, food. Those 
asleep or unconscious, they keep covered with 
their blankets, and keep the flies from their faces. 

Many of the wounded are glad to talk ; it affords 
them relief from the dreary, seemingly unending 
days and nights passed in pain, surrounded by 
others in the same condition. Most of them tell 
very much the same story — of being either on the 
firing line or advancing under fire; of shrapnel 
bursting in different places near them, of a sudden 
explosion right in front or alongside of them, and a 
cloud of dust and smoke, and then of finding them- 
selves on the ground hit in one of more places. 
Then came hours, in some cases more than a day, 
when they lay there, sometimes helpless, at other 
times succeeding alone, or with the aid of some 
other soldier, in roughly adjusting the first-aid 
package, too often entirely inadequate in the case of 
shrapnel wounds which are frequently accompanied 
by fractures. 

In many instances the trying trip back to the 
field hospital, where the wounds are given the 
first proper dressing, is the most painftil memory 
of all, as by that time the niunbness, generally fol- 
lowing the receiving of the wound, has v/om off 
and has been succeeded by great soreness. As 
most of the wounded had made this part of their 




LIGHTLY WOUNDED ARRIVING AT EVACUATION HOSPITAL 
ON EDGE OF THE BATTLEFIELD 




BRITISH WOUNDED AT BETHUNE 
Heavily wounded waiting to be taken in the evacuation hospital 



VOLUNTEERS' FIRST SIGHT OF WAR 219 

journey in springless country carts, they suffered 
considerably. The railway journey to the base, 
while not nearly as bad as that in the carts, was 
hard enough, as it had seemed interminable. 
Whenever the train stopped or started, the jerks 
had hurt the wounds, causing many to cry out. 
Like all badly hurt men who learn very quickly 
to associate movement of any kind with pain, 
these soldiers were anxious to know where they 
were going next, how they were to be taken there, 
and how far off their destination was. The 
answer that they were going in motor- ambulances 
having excellent springs, over good roads, to a field 
hospital a few miles from Paris, where their wounds 
would be properly dressed, where they would be 
bathed, put in clean night-clothes and clean, warm 
beds, and then properly fed, cheered them up some- 
what. 

All of the British wounded are regulars, and 
consequently trained soldiers, and many have seen 
considerable service. Several said that the Boer 
War was a skirmish compared with the present 
conflict ; that in one month they had now seen more 
hard, serious fighting than in the whole of that war. 
Some told of attacks against the German position 
carried to within a few huadred yards of the 
German trenches and of then being forced back. 
All their stories showed that the Allies are con- 
fronted by a strongly intrenched German position, 
16 



220 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

which the Germans are stubbornly holding and the 
Allies determinedly attacking. 

Some of the wounded had had remarkable 
experiences, and many had shown remarkable 
fortitude. One soldier had a shrapnel burst just 
alongside, covering him with dirt and smoke, but 
not touching him. He called to a man on the 
other side: "It is not my turn to-day." Hardly 
had he uttered these words before another shrapnel 
burst directly in front of him. Both his arms 
were broken by flying fragments, while the rest 
of his body did not receive even a scratch. 

One big, determined sergeant, the type of non- 
commissioned officer of regulars well known to those 
familiar with the British and American regular 
armies, had one of his feet all but cut off by a shrap- 
nel burst. It was hanging by some shreds of flesh 
only. He cut it off with his bayonet, and then 
rolled down the side of the high railway embank- 
ment on which he had been wounded and where 
shrapnel was bursting everywhere, into the ditch 
below. He dragged himself along this to a dressing 
station. While in the shed waiting his turn to be 
taken out, he was told that he was to be trans- 
ferred to another stretcher. He asked where the 
other stretcher was. The attendant pointed it 
out, and at that moment was called away. When 
he returned, he found the sergeant on the stretcher; 
he had moved himself. 



VOLUNTEERS' FIRvST SIGHT OF WAR 221 

Since the most serious wounds are generally those 
made by shrapnel, and since the most seriously 
wounded are being put off at this British base, the 
attendants here have come in contact with practi- 
cally nothing but shrapnel wounds, which has 
caused some to jump hastily to the conclusion that 
shrapnel is responsible for most of the wounded. 

It is a bit hard on the members of the battalion 
of territorials to inaugurate their first service at a 
base where they see nothing but the most severely 
wounded, and not even those when they are first 
struck but days afterw^ard when the paleness of 
their faces and the increased soreness of their 
wounds only accentuate their dirty and suffering 
condition. One of them said: "We had no idea 
it was as bad as this ; v/e thought it would be glori- 
fied big-game shooting. So far, none of our com- 
panies has been to the front except to bring back 
German prisoners. It begins to look now as if we 
were to be used on the lines of communication only, 
and I don't know but we shall be better off."^ 

At the base there is one German hospital corps 
man who was captured with some German wounded 
whom he was tending and refused to leave when 
the German retirement took place. Although he 
speaks no English, all the British at the base are 
his friends, as they say he is the most gentle and 
the most competent nurse they have seen. 

1 This battalion was later sent to the front and acquitted itself very 
well. 



222 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

In one corner of one of the sheds there are about 
fifteen perfectly healthy, but rather bedraggled- 
looking British soldiers under a strong guard of 
territorials; two are said to be deserters, several 
looters, and the rest stragglers and drunkards, all 
waiting trial by a court martial at the base. 



CHAPTER XXIII 

THE APPROACH TO A MODERN BATTLEFIELD 

April, 1 91 5. 

IN the western theatre of war, due to the multi- 
phcity of railways, the troops generally ap- 
proach quite close to the battlefield by rail. Rail- 
heads are always scenes of great activity. A train 
will come in loaded with infantry. A few minutes 
later they form outside the station with their packs 
slung, and march toward the battlefield. 

Long hospital trains stand on sidings with strings 
of motor- ambulances coming up, each discharging 
a number of men either with head, arm, or leg 
bandaged, or men flat on stretchers who are carried 
to the train. 

Long lines of freight cars are unloading food and 
hospital supplies of all kinds, infantry and artillery 
ammunition, and perhaps wagons and motor trucks. 
Seemingly interminable lines of big motor trucks 
are backing up or getting their loads, and then 
forming in column in a nearby street, ready to start 
for the refilling points just off the battlefield. 

A town at the rail-head is also a busy scene if, 
as is generally the case, it is the headquarters of 
an army or army corps commander. Headquarters 
troops are to be seen everywhere, as are also staff 
officers, no longer mounted on horses but in motor- 

223 



224 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

cars, because of the immense distances which they 
are obhged to cover. 

The Grand Place of the town, usually with a 
cathedral on one side and the city hall on the other, 
ordinarily so quiet except on market-days, is the 
scene of tremendous activity. Here the mounted 
gendarmerie collects all the refugees from the 
country which is the scene of action. Nearly 
always among them are German spies who have 
taken advantage of the general exodus to come 
well within the Allies' lines. Here are parked 
the motor-trucks not for the moment in use. Here 
are motor repair shops, which are machine shops 
mounted on motors. Here are people crowding 
around the city hall and probably also the provost- 
marshal's ofhce, desirous of procuring passes to 
go to one place or another. 

Taking a street which leads to the road to the 
battlefield, a large four-story brick building is 
passed with a sign: School for Young Girls. This 
is now an evacuation hospital, where the wounded 
brought from the battlefield are collected and kept 
until they can be shipped by the hospital trains 
to the real hospitals at a base town, many miles 
in the rear. Coming out of the door is one motor- 
ambulance after another, each loaded with wounded 
and bound for the railway station where the hospital 
train is drawn up. 

On the outskirts of the town a new graveyard 



APPROACH TO A BATTLEFIELD 225 

is passed with numbers of new graves, each marked 
by a simple cross. These are the graves of the 
men who died while being brought from the battle- 
field or while in the evacuation hospital. Farther 
along on a hill is a field wireless station. 

Along the road outside of town a long string of 
sixty or seventy empty motor-lorries is seen coming 
up from the front. Many times, single ambulances 
or convoys are passed. Some are full of seated 
men, wearing torn and muddy uniforms, and all 
with bloody bandages on different parts of them. 
Others are filled with stretchers holding men so 
seriously wounded that they are lying flat. Nothing 
can be seen of these men as the ambulances go by, 
except perhaps the blanket which covers them and 
their shoes sticking out, or if wounded in the leg 
or foot, the bandage which covers the wound. 

At times, it is necessary to pass along lines of 
heavily-loaded lorries bound for the front. 

Several miles out of town, on one side of the 
road, there is a number of the large tents which 
shelter aeroplanes. On closer approach, several 
aeroplanes are seen resting near them in the open 
field. After a preliminary run on the ground, one 
bounds in the air, ascending higher and higher, until 
it finally heads straight for the front. 

The country having been recently fought over 
by the advance troops of both armies when they 
were feeling for each other during the great flanking 



226 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

movement after the battle of the Marne, old 
shelter trenches are seen occasionally, while here 
and there is a farmhouse which has been destroyed 
partially or wholly by shell-fire. 

As the top of a small rise in the road is reached, 
little white puffs can be seen against the blue sky, 
way in the distance. These are the first signs of 
battle. They are the bursts of shrapnel fired at 
an aeroplane somewhere over the trenches. The 
aeroplane is so small at that distance that it 
cannot be seen, while, of course, it is impossible to 
tell whether the shrapnel is being fired by the 
Allies' artillery or by that of the enemy. 

When about three miles from the rail-head, 
the first faint sound of firing can be heard, which 
does not permit of clearly distinguishing the 
different kinds of fire. 

A little farther on a long line of wagons is noted, 
drawn by horses and pulled up to the side of the 
road alongside of piles of food, ammunition, and 
supplies of all kinds. This is a refilling point, and 
it is outside of the zone of artillery fire. Here 
is as far as the motor supply lorries get, as from this 
point the supplies are taken by the horse transports 
as near to the divisions as they can get without 
being subjected to too heavy an infantry or artillery 
fire. The rest of the distance must be covered 
generally at night and frequently by means of 
push-carts or by the men themselves carrying the 
supplies. 



APPROACH TO A BATTLEFIELD 227 

About a mile farther on, another town is entered, 
this being the headquarters of a division. Here are 
found even more signs of activity than at the rail- 
head. The sound of firing is much louder; the long 
roll of infantry fire and the burst of machine gun 
fire can be distinguished from the artillery fire. 

In the Grand Place are several holes in the pave- 
ment. Numerous windows have been broken and 
the front of a number of houses are badly scarred 
by fragments, the result of several bombs dropped 
the day previous by an enemy aeroplane. 

As the open country is reached, on leaving the 
town, the smoke of bursting shells can be seen 
almost everywhere to the front. 

Way to the front, two aeroplanes, little more 
than dots, are discerned — one going in a straight 
line, the other making big circles and dodging 
here and there. The one coming in a straight line 
has finished its reconnaissance and is returning. 
Little puffs of white smoke can be seen now in front 
of it, now behind it, now above it, now below it, 
some so near that it would seem that the aeroplane 
must surely be hit, but on it comes until out of 
range and safe, when by the colors marked on its 
tail and on its lower wings, it is recognized as an 
Allies' aeroplane. Puffs of smoke also are bursting 
around the other plane, some apparently quite a 
distance off, others much nearer. Finally it, too, 
starts straight back, and in spite of the firing finally 
reaches safety. 



228 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

The road now is full of long lines of artillery- 
wagons and of those parts of batteries which are 
left in the rear when the guns go into action. Long 
lines of caissons are met going back to the ammuni- 
tion refilling points, while still more ambulances 
are seen, either empty and bound for the front, or 
loaded with wounded bound for the evacuation 
hospital. 

In a farmhouse alongside the road a field 
ambulance is established. A crowd of men who, 
although wounded, are able to walk or hobble, are 
coming out and being assisted into the motor- 
ambulances. Others on stretchers lie perfectly 
still; while others on stretchers look around in a 
slow, painful way. In the rear of the building are 
parked the horse ambulances, which must wait for 
night before they can approach the dressing 
stations just on the border of the infantry fire zone. 

In the field alongside the ambulances, some 
soldiers are digging graves for some of the wounded 
who died after reaching the field ambulance. 
Some graves already have been filled. Those of 
French soldiers are easily distinguished from the 
others, as the man's cap is always hung on the little 
cross, if there is one; if not, the cap is placed on 
the grave above his breast. 

A little farther along, at a crossroad, underneath 
the trees along a hedge, is the horse ammunition 
column of an infantry battalion. 



APPROACH TO A BATTLEFIELD 229 

Coming up to the front, on a parallel road, is a 
long line of motor-buses, full of infantry. As they 
reach the crossroad, near the ammunition column, 
the buses stop, the infantry get out, the companies 
are formed, the line breaks into columns of fours 
and moves forward. 

Down the road in a field, probably a thousand 
yards ahead, is a brilliant white flash, then a dense 
cloud of black smoke, followed almost immediately 
by a loud report. There are other less brilliant 
flashes and clouds of white smoke, all very much 
in the same vicinity. Several of the enemy's high- 
explosive shells, including one of their biggest — 
the one which gave off the black smoke — have 
exploded in that field. The beginning of the 
artillery fire zone has been reached. The column 
of infantry abandons the road, cuts across a field 
to the side farthest away from the one where the 
shells dropped, and, reaching a hedge and line of 
trees running in the right direction, merges into 
this natural concealment as it continues its 
movement toward the front. 

The beginning of the region of vacant spaces 
now has been reached. This is one of the most 
striking phenomena of the battlefields of modern 
war. Up to the edge of the artillery zone, the 
roads are crowded with all the life of an army. 
The small villages are hives of activity of one 
kind or another. Once the artillery zone is entered, 



230 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

all is changed — here are long vistas of roads and 
stretches of fields with apparently nothing on 
them or around them; here are groups of trees 
and stretches of undergrowth apparently deserted; 
here are houses with no signs of life. When the 
enemy's artillery fires on any part of this, there 
are, during the period of fire, violent disturbances 
in the locality where the shells are bursting, but 
only in that particular vicinity. Even at the 
height of a big battle, the distance to which the 
artillery can fire is so great and so much country 
is included in the artillery zone that all of it can- 
not be covered continually by bursting projectiles. 
The storm of bursting projectiles is here for a 
time, and there for a time, as the officers directing 
the enemy's artillery fire have reason to believe 
that in this or that locality troops or guns are 
hidden. 

These apparently vacant spaces in which the 
troops and guns are concealed carefully stretch right 
up to the infantry trenches. The trenches are fre- 
quently five thousand yards or more; that is, per- 
haps three or more miles, from the point where 
the outer edge of the zone of artillery fire com- 
mences. In a period of calm, those who do not 
know the extent of the zone often enter these 
spaces without realizing the danger. A road 
along which there is not the slightest sign of any 
shell- fire one moment, may the next be a regular 



APPROACH TO A BATTLEFIELD 231 

inferno of bursting projectiles. The stretch of 
several hundred yards from one house to another, 
across an apparently innocent field, may be, and 
frequently is, just the district to which some one 
of the enemy's snipers knows the exact range, and 
he is carefully watching for any individual who 
unwittingly may wander across it. 

Once the artillery zone is entered, it is best to 
keep off the roads and away from prominent 
objects, at the same time watching where groups 
of shells fall most frequently and trying to pick 
out safe country between. 

On -approaching a point near where the shells 
were seen bursting in the field, suddenly there is a 
burst of flame followed by a loud report apparently 
from a hedge, this followed immediately by five 
other bursts of flame and loud reports easily dis- 
tinguishable above the noise of the combat. 

Looking closely, it is seen that the guns of a 
heavy battery are distributed in an orchard back 
of a hedge. Each gim has had a little house of 
twigs and branches built over it which so con- 
ceals it that, except by looking after the flash 
and report have attracted attention, it would be 
quite possible to pass by without knowing that a 
battery was there. This was the target the 
enemy was trying to hit when the shells were seen 
bursting in the nearby field. 

Farther along is what was a main highway, 



232 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

which runs diagonally toward the front. For a 
considerable distance, up and down it near a 
crossroad, and to each side on the crossroad, 
there are craters which were made by bursting 
shells. One of these is fully fifteen feet across 
and six or seven feet deep; this is a hole made by 
a big German mortar. The other holes vary in 
size, the smallest ones in the macadam being two 
or three feet across and one and one-half to two 
feet deep. Some of the holes are in the middle 
of the road, others in the fields to each side. Big 
and little branches of trees and twigs are scattered 
around everywhere. 

Still farther on, placed along the imdergrowth 
at the edge of a wood, are the limbers and horses 
of a field battery in action. In their position 
stretched along the edge of the wood, it would be 
very difficult for an aeroplane to see them. 

An irregular line of flashes in a nearby field, 
back of a line of hedge and trees, shows where the 
guns of the battery are placed. Not more than 
one h\mdred yards in front of the battery, there 
are several vivid flashes overhead followed by loud 
reports and small clouds of white smoke. At the 
same time an enemy aeroplane is seen, way up in 
the air ; it probably has located the battery by the 
flash of its guns as they are discharged and is 
helping its own guns to find it with their fire. 

Five himdred yards farther to the front, there 



APPROACH TO A BATTLEFIELD 233 

is a group of brick farm-buildings, connected with 
one another. Loopholes have been cut in the 
walls, and the doors and windows have been 
barricaded. From this group of farm-buildings to 
each side runs a long irregular line of trenches, 
having barbed wire entanglement in front of them. 
These defenses are unoccupied, but are ready, 
should the infantry in front be driven back. 

The roof of one of the farmhouses has been 
badly shot away. In a corner of it, protected by 
sandbags, is an artillery observation officer, who 
from his position can see the enemy's trenches 
stretching in a thin, whitish line across the fields 
which show between the groups of trees and houses 
dotted here and there over the country to his 
front. By means of a telephone, he communicates 
the result of their fire to the officers in charge of 
the guns of his battery. 

Now and then, against the brick wall is heard a 
thud, and a piece of brick falls off the wall. Occa- 
sionally the whistling and whine of a ricochet 
bullet can be heard in the air. Here and there, in 
the nearby fields, little spurts of dirt fly up. The 
edge of the infantry fire zone has been reached. 
Above the almost continuous noise of the artillery 
fire, the infantry fire is heard swelling into an 
enormous voliune of sound, and- then decreasing, 
only to rise again. Through it all rises, now in 
front, now on one flank, now on the other, some- 



234 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

times more or less all along the line, the unmis- 
takable riveting-hammer sound of machine guns. 
In spite of all this, the express-train noise of the 
bigger projectiles of the enemy's artillery which 
pass overhead commands the attention. Where 
high- explosive shells burst within the range of 
vision, the attention is attracted immediately to 
the sudden white flashes, like the short flashes of 
a heliograph in a bright sun. 

To the left in a small low farmhouse is a dress- 
ing station, reached under the protection of the 
line of trenches nuining out from the artillery 
observation station. Inside, safe from infantry 
fire, but not from shell fire should any of these 
projectiles strike the house, are a surgeon with 
several hospital corps men and a nmnber of 
wounded. Near the house is a haystack. Start- 
ing from this haystack, running along and con- 
tinuing under a hedge, is a narrow trench which 
zigzags toward the front. Out of the trench, 
and back of the haystack, and then across to the 
farmhouse, there come, from time to time, slightly- 
wounded soldiers. The surgeon attends to their 
wounds and makes them as comfortable as possible 
inside the farmhouse. 

The trench, which starts by the haystack and 
runs along the hedge until deep enough to hide 
men, is the communicating trench, leading up to 
the support trench, and beyond it to the firing 



APPROACH TO A BATTLEFIELD 235 

trench; it is simply a ditch about seven to eight 
feet deep, and just wide enough to permit of a 
man walking in it. To prevent the enemy from 
firing down it, it zigzags, running first to the 
right then to the left, and then to the right, and 
so on, instead of approaching the front directly. 
In this manner it covers a distance to the front of 
about five hundred yards, and then opens into a 
narrow deep trench, running to the right and left. 
This is the infantry support trench. In it are 
the supports squatted down in the bottom of the 
trench, their backs against the front face of it, 
some smoking, some talking, and others snatch- 
ing sleep as best they can. On the way to the 
support trench, a communicating trench is passed 
with the sign: "To headquarters Bat- 
talion." In the support trench can be heard the 
constant — sste — sste — sste — of the infantry bullets 
which pass overhead, with little thuds as they 
strike the parapet and occasionally send little 
sprays of dirt down into the trench. 

From this trench, leading forward, are a number 
of communicating trenches, which open out into 
a long, irregular line of trench, broken up into 
sections by traverses. All along the top of the 
front face of the trench are steel plates having 
oblong holes, through which infantry soldiers are 
intently firing. They are firing across a stretch 
of open field with a barbed wire entanglement in 
17 



236 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

the foreground, at the flashes from a line of loop- 
holes in a long, low mound of earth with a barbed 
wire entanglement in front of it, not two hundred 
yards away. 



CHAPTER XXIV 

HOW THE ARMIES HAVE BECOME ENTRENCHED ^ 

April, IQ15. 

NEAR at about noon, on a certain day in 
October, a long line of French skirmishers is 
advancing to the east upon a gentle slope which 
would seem almost level were it not for the fact 
that a crest can be seen ahead, and beyond it still 
another crest. 

The German infantry has taken position in a more 
or less sunken road which runs along the farther 
crest; this infantry and their field guns well behind 
the second crest are doing the best they can to stop 
the advance of the French infantry. 

As the French advance, there is always a certain 
amoimt of cover given by the crest in front of them, 
sometimes the variations of the ground give com- 
plete cover, except from artillery fire. Here and 
there, men drop, killed or wounded from rifle bul- 
lets, but generally it is the enemy's shrapnel which 
does the most damage. Most of the shells drop in 
front of or behind the line, or in the intervals be- 
tween the groups of the line of supports which is 
following the firing line a considerable distance to 
the rear; however now and then one bursts just 
right, and a little group of men fall to the ground. 

^ See diagram facing page 276. 



237 



238 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

As the different parts of the Hne reach the points 
where the slope flattens out and is in plain view of 
the second crest where the Germans are located, 
men commence to be hit in suddenly increasing 
numbers. They are now in plain view of the 
Germans, about a thousand yards away. The 
German infantry increases its fire, while the 
riveting-hammer of the machine guns commences 
up and down their line. 

Some parts of the French line already have 
thrown themselves down and have commenced to 
fire at the Germans. Other parts, which attempt 
to go beyond and continue the advance, have a 
good many men hit. The balance of the men run 
back quickly, throw themselves down and com- 
mence to fire with the rest of the line. Some of 
the men from the supports are brought up and 
strengthen the fire of the line. This increase in 
fire of the French line beats down the German fire, 
as is shown by the fact that the French losses are 
less. 

Following this, the French attempt to advance 
by moving forward a section at a time, while the 
remaining sections fire, and then try to run up to 
the new line established by the advance sections. 
When the designated sections rise and run forward, 
the German fire increases, particularly that of the 
machine guns. Some of the sections go forward, 
but only with considerable loss. Others suffer so 



HOW ARMIES ENTRENCH 239 

much as they start that the survivors return to 
their old positions. 

The supports then come up with a yell, and the 
whole line goes forward irregularly. The German 
fire is so great and produces such loss, however, 
that the men soon throw themselves down on the 
ground and put their knapsacks in front of them to 
get such protection as they can. While some men 
fire, others unstrap from their knapsacks their 
entrenching tools, which are little picks and shovels. 
Soon the whole line is busily at work, each man 
sometimes firing and sometimes scraping up in 
front of him with his tools such earth as he can to 
protect himself from the enemy's fire. 

During the afternoon, two other attempts are 
made to advance, but each time the fire is too great. 
The only thing left to do is to remain where they 
are tintil darkness and then to entrench. The 
hasty trenches which the men are digging and con- 
stantly deepening as they have the opportunity 
dtiring the afternoon, are nothing more than a 
zigzagging line of individual shallow ditches with 
the longer axis pointing toward the enemy and all 
the dirt taken out put in a little parapet around the 
end toward the enemy. In this way, when com- 
pleted, a man lying flat on his stomach has protec- 
tion from rifle bullets but not from shrapnel burst- 
ing overhead, as lying at full length he is exposed 
to shrapnel bullets coming from above. 



240 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

While the firing Hne is holding its own and en- 
trenching as best it can, the supports back of the 
crest, and therefore under more cover, also are 
entrenching. Being under a much less heavy fire, 
they are able to build what is called a kneeling 
trench. Instead of each man scraping a little 
hole for himself, as the firing line is doing, they dig 
a long ditch and throw all the earth taken out to 
the front. It is dug deep enough for a man kneeling 
in it to fire over the parapet made by the earth 
thrown up; it is just wide enough to permit men 
to kneel and fire. The narrower a trench is, the 
more protection it furnishes from shrapnel and 
other artillery projectiles which explode in the air 
above it. 

In the meanwhile, the heavy entrenching tools, 
which are full-sized picks and shovels, have been 
brought up to the edge of the infantry fire zone. 
With the coming of darkness, the fire gradually 
dies out. As soon as it is really dark these heavy 
tools are distributed, and everyone sets to work 
digging standing trenches, the lines of which are 
marked by the officers. As the French soldiers 
work along their front line, they can hear the occa- 
sional noise of picks and shovels coming from the 
ridge, nine hundred yards away, where the Ger- 
mans are entrenched. Each side is busily engaged, 
so that the morning finds them protected from the 
fire of the other. 



HOW ARMIES ENTRENCH 241 

In the morning, there is a long, more or less irregu- 
lar line of trench along the position where the Ger- 
man fire had forced the French infantry to stop 
the afternoon previous. At intervals, along the line 
where the supports had dug their kneeling trenches 
that same afternoon, there is a comparatively- 
irregular line of standing trenches. From this 
second line of trenches, there are narrow trenches 
six to seven feet deep which zigzag to the front, 
first to the right, then to the left, and so on, until 
the first line of trench is reached. These zigzag- 
ging trenches are the communicating trenches; they 
are the means of getting from the second-line to the 
first-line trench without exposure to the enemy's 
fire. The first- and second-line trenches each are 
standing trenches — that is, they are deep enough 
so that when a man stands upright to fire, he can 
do so comfortably over the top of them. 

If a long, straight line of trench were built and 
a shell exploded right in it, there would be nothing 
to prevent the pieces flying a considerable distance 
down the trench to the right and left. In the same 
way, if any of the enemy should succeed in firing 
down the trench, they could shoot down its whole 
length. This kind of fire is called enfilading fire. 
To prevent it, every ten or fifteen yards along the 
trench pieces of earth, the full height of the trench 
and three or four feet wide, are left standing, a 
passageway being cut to the rear around them. 



242 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

These pieces of earth are called traverses, and pre- 
vent pieces of an exploding shell or enfilading fire 
from doing damage in more than one of the fifteen- 
to twenty-yard long sectors of the trench. The 
Germans accomplish the same object by having 
sharp loops to the rear at intervals along the trench. 

At the beginning of the war, the Allies threw the 
earth to the front when they dug trenches. This 
saved labor, as the earth thrown to the front gave 
protection and, therefore, the trenches did not have 
to be so deep. The Germans never did this because 
the line of earth showed from the front where the 
trench was ; they always had the top of their trench 
practically level with the ground, and did every- 
thing they could to make the field, or whatever it 
was dug in, look undisturbed. The Allies now do 
the same, except when the trenches are so near there 
is no object in trying to conceal their position. 

Once the troops are under cover, they can pro- 
ceed to add to their trenches until they are comp- 
pleted. Sometimes trenches are prepared before- 
hand along positions which it is expected that the 
army may take up. This work is generally done 
by the engineer officers and soldiers of the army, 
who hire sufficient labor from among nearby 
civilians. Trenches prepared beforehand are nat- 
urally the best placed with respect to their position, 
and are also the best built, as enough time can be 
taken and proper materials can be obtained. 



HOW ARMIES ENTRENCH 243 

At the beginning of the war, the favorite position 
for a trench was where it would have a long, gentle, 
down-hill slope in front of it. However, the fire 
of the heavier guns of the artillery has proved so 
destructive to trenches that now there is a tendency 
to build them on a long, gentle slope on the side of 
the crest of the hill away from the enemy. In this 
manner, the enemy's artillery cannot fire on them 
directly, as it cannot see them. In this position 
trenches are still difficult 'for infantry to take, 
because after the enemy's infantry has reached the 
crest, they have to go across a considerable open 
space swept by the fire from the trenches and 
unsupported by their own artillery who no longer 
can see where they are. 

The greatest difference between trenches pre- 
pared in advance and those constructed under fire 
lies in the obstacles which are placed in front of 
them. In a position prepared in advance, long 
lines of trees are cut dov/n and laid in parallel rov/s 
on the ground, their branches interlocked and 
pointing toward the enemy. Series of circular 
holes are dug without room between them for men 
to walk on, and with sharp sticks at the bottom. 
Lines of barbed wire entanglement, made by driving 
in the ground long lines of stakes generally about 
four feet high, are put up from fifty to a hundred 
yards in front of the trenches. The tops and bot- 
toms of these stakes are connected by lines of v/ire 



244 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

running horizontally and diagonally from one to 
the other. The front strands only are of barbed 
wire, although sometimes all the wire used is barbed. 

Different kinds of entanglements are made. 
The whole idea is to place an obstruction which will 
furnish no cover a short distance in front of the 
trench. In this way, attacking parties must stop 
under a very close fire while they try to cut their 
way through. In a position prepared under fire, 
the barbed wire entanglement is constructed at 
night. If it cannot be built at night, a substitute 
is thrown out from the trenches, consisting of cubes 
of barbed wire, the diagonals of which are wooden 
sticks. If there is a ditch filled with water or a 
stream in front of the position or around any part 
of it, a barbed wire entanglement frequently is 
placed in it below the surface, so that it cannot 
be seen. 

But to go back to the men who on that night in 
October have dug themselves in. 

While they have a fairly good trench, there is 
yet a good deal to be done. If they all remain in 
the front-Une trench, and it is bombarded by the 
heavy artillery of the enemy, they will suffer con- 
siderable loss. If all except a few sentinels go back 
to the second-line trench, they will be so far off that 
in case of an infantry attack they will be unable 
to reach the first trench in time to stop it. There- 
fore, twenty-five to seventy-five yards back of the 



HOW ARMIES ENTRENCH 245 

firing trench, depending upon circumstances, they 
start digging what really become underground 
rooms. Starting from each communicating trench, 
they dig parallel to the firing trench a narrow deep 
passage to the right and one to the left. When 
these have progressed six or seven feet, they enlarge 
them into rectangular trenches twenty to thirty 
yards long and eight or nine feet wide. Along the 
center of the bottom of these, running from one 
end to the other, they dig a ditch about three feet 
wide and two feet deep, which leaves a fairly wide 
bank on each side. These banks are covered with 
straw, and here the men sleep and rest. These 
ditches are roofed over with logs and covered with 
earth up to the level of the ground. The thickness 
of earth is enough to stop any but the very heaviest 
projectiles; the chambers are high enough to enable 
the men to stand up comfortably. Here the men 
habitually live and eat. 

When no attack is going on or expected, or during 
an artillery bombardment by the enemy, only 
sentinels are in the firing trench, the rest of the men 
being in the dug-outs. The Germans generally 
put thick overhead cover at intervals along their 
first-line trenches. The men get under these for 
protection from artillery fire. When using their 
rifles, they stand in the intervals between these 
overhead covers. They have well-made rest cham- 
bers in their last line of trenches. 



246 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

In addition to the building of these dug-outs, 
little ditches must be dug along the trenches for 
drainage purposes. These run into some comer 
in the connecting trench, where a large circular 
hole is dug to receive the water drained off by them. 

As soil with no support frequently will break 
down, it is necessary to place along the front face 
of the trenches what is called a revetment, which 
consists sometimes of sheets of galvanized iron sup- 
ported by stakes, but more often of upright stakes 
having pliable branches of trees and hedges inter- 
woven around them, in the same way that a basket 
is made. Logs also are cut lengthwise and are used 
for the revetment. 

Not only do the British, French, and Belgian 
trenches differ, but very often trenches made by 
the same army vary a great deal. Sometimes 
there are no support chambers, and the men live 
and stay always in the firing trench. In these cases, 
they burrow under the front face of the trench and 
fill the holes with straw. Here they get such sleep 
as they can. 

In many places where the trenches have ap- 
proached so close to each other that there is no 
longer need to conceal their position, head-cover 
of one kind or another has been built. Head-cover 
is simply something placed along the front edge 
of the trench, with holes in it for the rifles, and 
high enough so that when the men fire, their heads 



HOW ARMIES ENTRENCH 247 

are concealed from view from the front. Often 
these head-covers consist of steel plates having 
rectangular holes just large enough to stick a rifle 
through to aim comfortably. These plates are 
placed in vertical positions along the front face of 
the trench. Again sacks filled with earth are used 
not only to make these holes but to carry the whole 
parapet along at a height sufficient to hide the heads 
of the men behind it. Various other means are 
adopted to have the parapet high enough to protect 
men standing up, while leaving holes through which 
they can fire when necessary. 

When the trenches are very close, often pieces of 
cloth are hung over these holes, so that when not 
in use the enemy's snipers cannot see when anyone 
passes by. As small as these rifle holes are, it is 
not uncommon for men using them, or passing by 
them when the holes are not covered by cloth, to 
be shot. General Manoury and General de Villaret 
were shot by the same bullet while looking through 
the same loop-hole. 

The French use head- cover extensively. The 
British not so much, but as the war progresses, 
they apparently are coming to it more and more. 
In some British battalions the men had put up 
head-cover but were forced to take it down again 
by the higher ranking officers, who insisted that it 
interfered too much with the movement of the men 
when they jumped out of their trenches to make 



248 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

an attack. Another reason given was that loop- 
holes make too good targets. 

In some few instances, trenches are also provided 
with overhead cover; that is, the top of the trench 
is covered with branches of trees or logs surmounted 
by a thick coating of earth. This gives protection 
from shrapnel and fragments of shells, but, of course, 
not from the direct hit of high-explosive shells. 

As in most cases the support chambers are built 
just back of the firing trench, head- cover for the 
firing trench is seldom seen. Sometimes a head- 
cover consisting only of branches of trees with their 
leaves is put over a trench ; this is not for protection 
from fire, but to deceive enemy aviators who fly 
over the position. 

Where the line runs through swampy land, breast- 
works must be built, for trenches, if dug, immedi- 
ately fill with water. These breastworks are of 
various kinds. Where they have to be built more 
or less luider fire, they generally consist of an 
earthen bank supported by a revetment of sheets 
of galvanized iron held in a vertical position by 
stakes; or of logs, or of branches of trees woven 
around vertical sticks like a basket. Using this 
as the front wall, the men generally build here 
and there little huts with roofs made of timber 
covered with earth, and the sides and ends con- 
structed of anything they can get a hold of, from 
sod to doors off farmhouses and other buildings. 



HOW ARMIES ENTRENCH 249 

Sometimes, these parapets are loop-holed so that 
the men can fire in a kneeling position from inside 
their huts. Even machine guns are placed inside 
these huts, to enable the men to fire through holes 
in the front wall, which is also the parapet. In 
such cases, the huts are continuous. Where this 
is not done, the huts are placed only here and there 
along the parapet, the men coming out of them to 
fire in a standing position over the top of the parapet 
in the intervals between the huts. 

Where the position is prepared ahead of time, or 
where it is a second line hidden by a forest from the 
direct view of the enemy, a favorite type of com- 
bined breastwork and hut is a lean-to, made of logs 
with the inside facing to the rear. This lean-to 
is then covered with a thick bank of earth on the 
side toward the enemy and on top. Along the open 
part of the lean-to facing the rear is built a platform 
just wide enough for men to stand on, and high 
enough so that when they do so, they can com- 
fortably fire from the top of the lean-to. When 
they are off this platform the lean-to is high enough 
to keep their heads from being seen. The men 
sleep inside the lean-to. In this way, breastwork 
and huts for shelter are combined. In some 
places, the thickness of earth put on these lean-tos 
is such that they are practically proof against 
anything but a direct hit by the very largest size 
high-explosive shells. 



250 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

Going back to the French. 

The men spend a busy second day in the position 
trying to complete their trenches. They reaHze 
that with the night there probably will be fighting. 
The first part of the night passes quietly. The 
men are in the firing trench. Their rifles are loaded 
and laid on the parapet. Those not designated to 
watch, snatch what sleep they can, sitting in the 
bottom of the trench with their backs to the front 
of it. 

Now and then, a sentinel notices something 
suspicious moving, or hears a noise — and fires. 
The men spring to their feet. Then some nervous 
one fires a shot or two before he can be stopped by 
an officer. This starts a ripple of fire to his right 
and left, as other men fire, thinking the command 
has been given. 

About nine o'clock, faint noises are heard from 
the direction of the German trenches. These grow 
nearer, and are followed by sounds which seem to 
indicate the use of picks and shovels. But as the 
ground in front is a field, there can be no certainty 
as to this. Again, a few nervous men fire and cause 
little bursts of fire in different sections of the line; 
these are promptly stopped by the officers. There 
is, however, no return fire. 

Several officers and men are sent out from differ- 
ent parts of the trench to make a reconnaissance. 
They are gone what seems an interminable time. 




LOOKING DOWN ON A COMMUNICATING TRENCH 




mUk 



ind 



H. J. B. 

RUSSIAN TRENCH FROM THE FRONT SHOWING LOOPHOLES 



HOW ARMIES ENTRENCH 251 

Finally, way to the front, in the dark, there is a 
flash from a rifle fired, followed by several cries. 
A little later, way to the right, there are the flashes 
of three shots in rapid succession, but no other 
noise of any kind. After another long wait, all but 
two of the reconnoiterers come back. They report 
that about two hundred and fifty to four hundred 
yards in front of the trenches, there is a line of 
German skirmishers, and they think back of them 
men are digging a trench. 

Fire is opened all along the line, but bringing no 
reply, is stopped again. This is kept up at inter- 
vals until daylight, which reveals a new line of 
German trench, about four hundred yards to the 
front and including a farmhouse on the right. 

About one hundred yards back of this new line 
of trench, a field glass shows a second line. All 
along the line of each, spades appear above the 
ground throwing earth to the front. No man, 
however, is in sight. 

The French artillery promptly opens fire on the 
new trenches and on the group of brick farm build- 
ings, the roofs of which soon are badly torn up, 
while jagged holes through the walls show where 
the projectiles have burst. 

With the exception of the sentinels left here and 
there along the firing trench, the men return to the 
support chambers, as yet incomplete. They not 
only work to finish them but fix up holes in the 

18 



252 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

inside walls of the chambers, where they store away 
food and ammunition brought up during the night. 
They continue to work on the drainage in all parts 
of the trenches and enlarge the sanitary arrange- 
ments, which are at the end of narrow trenches 
built off to the right or left of the communicating 
trenches, and which are kept in good condition by 
frequent use of chloride of lime and constant change 
of position. 

The activity of the Germans during the night 
revealed their evident intention of making a deter- 
mined attack. The French, in consequence, pre- 
pared a second position about eight hundred yards 
back of the line of trenches originally dug by the 
supporting troops. This new position runs across 
open farming country and then into a thick wood 
full of underbrush. Across the open is built a line 
of trench similar to the ones in which the troops 
already are fighting. 

A large French farm, consisting of several brick 
buildings around a courtyard and situated at a 
crossroads, is chosen as a good point for stubborn 
defense. Starting in front of it and running out 
to the left for about one hundred and fifty yards, 
an infantry redoubt is built. This merely consists 
of a breastwork roughly in the form of the arc of a 
circle with a double line of breastwork straight 
across from one end of the arc to the other. By 
this arrangement, the garrison of the redoubt can 



HOW ARMIES ENTRENCH 253 

fire in all directions. If the front parapet is taken, 
the remaining defenders are enabled to get behind 
the more forward one of the two rear parapets. If 
the rear parapet should be taken first, its remaining 
defenders can get on the front face of the interior 
parapet. Along the inside face of the front and of 
the rear parapet, but not of the middle one, there 
are traverses, or little earth projections, which pre- 
vent fire from a flank doing damage to more than a 
few men at a time. In the interior are several 
bomb-proofs for ammunition. 

The roof of the farmhouse has been considerably 
smashed by German artillery fire, but the lower 
walls are still intact, and the windows and doors 
are filled up with sacks of earth and broken brick, 
leaving loop-holes through which the men fire. 
Loop-holes are cut through the brick walls at the 
proper height for a man standing to fire through. 
A hole is cut through the wall next to the redoubt, 
so that an entrance may be had to the redoubt from 
the farmhouse, or vice versa. All around the 
redoubt and the farmhouse is built a barbed wire 
entanglement. 

The woods to the left are in rather low, marshy 
ground. When they are reached, the trench is 
changed to breastwork on the lean-to type. Back 
of the line of breastwork in the woods is built a 
second line of breastwork, but only at intervals, 
each piece being twenty to thirty yards long; this 



254 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

second line is for the supports. Long branches of 
trees are nailed horizontally from one tree to another 
leading from each support breastwork to that part 
of the breastwork in front of which the men of 
that support are supposed to reinforce in case of an 
attack at night. By keeping one hand on these, 
they can run quickly from the support breastwork 
to their proper positions in the firing line. 

Several hours before sunset, the German artillery 
starts a heavy bombardment of the French trenches. 
Only the sentinels are in the firing trench, the rest 
of the men being in the support chambers. A good 
many shells fall just short of the trench, or just 
over it. While sending up clouds of smoke and 
some dirt, a portion of which sometimes falls in the 
trench, these bursts do no other damage. 

A shell from one of the big mortars biursts right 
on the edge of the trench. It kills a sentinel nearby 
and knocks down about twenty feet of the front 
face of the trench, filling up the trench and leaving 
a more or less funnel-shaped hole, about fifteen 
feet across and eight feet deep. In two instances, 
high-explosive shells from field guns strike just 
above the roof of the support chambers, making 
cylindrical holes about three feet in diameter and 
two feet deep. The men underneath are startled 
by the explosion. They jump to their feet^at the 
first shock of it, but are in no way injiu'ed. 

The artillery fire continues luitil well after dark. 



HOW ARMIES ENTRENCH 255 

Before it has entirely ceased, fearing an attack at 
any instant, the men are hurried up to the firing 
trench, which results in some loss. As soon as the 
men reach the firing trench, they squat down in the 
bottom of it, and so are reasonably safe except from 
the bigger high-explosive projectiles. One of these 
lands directly in the trench, killing seven men and 
wounding five others. Three of these men are 
wholly covered by the earth which is displaced by 
the explosion, and three other men are partially so. 

The artillery fire ceases. As soon as the men's 
ears have become accustomed to the shock caused 
by the bursting of the projectiles, some of them 
imagine they hear a movement to their front. One 
is sure he hears the tick of wire falling, as if the 
barbed wire entanglement were being cut. He tells 
his officer what he has heard and fires a shot in the 
direction of the noise. Several others in different 
parts of the line do likewise. This is followed by 
the decided noise of men moving in the darkness in 
front of the trench. Some of the men commence 
firing just before, and others just at the moment, 
the officers give the command. 

As the firing swells to a roar, there is a shout 
from out of the darkness in front of the trench, 
and large numbers of Germans swarm to the edge 
of the trench. All have their bayonets fixed. All 
are yelling. Here and there officers can be dis- 
tinguished by their naked swords. To the right of 



256 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

the line, the rifle fire and the fire of machine guns 
prevent their reaching the edge of the trench. 
Many killed or wounded fall where they are; others 
lie down and commence to fire. A few rim back 
into the darkness. On the left, however, they 
come with such a rush that some manage to jump 
down into the trench. These are promptly bayo- 
neted or shot. A machine gun, farther to the left, 
is turned on those still on the parapet, and the men 
who do not drop, run back into the darkness. 

The men in the trench keep firing continuously 
to the front, although they see nothing but a line 
of flashes quite near the spot where many of the 
attackers have thrown themselves down to fire. 

Soon the yelling again is resumed and from out 
of the darkness the mass of gray figtues with shining 
bayonets again rushes forward on to the trench. 
On the right, once more, they are stopped by the 
fire before they can reach the trench; while on the 
left, for a length of about ten yards, they jump 
down into the trench. Amid yelling, cursing, 
groans, the sotmd of firearms and the occasional 
clash of steel, the French are gradually being forced 
back along the trench in each direction, while more 
and more of the Germans jimip into it. 

Suddenly, out of the darkness, just to the rear of 
the part of the trench occupied by the Germans, 
come cries of "Vive la Francs! Sal Boschel" and 
the French supports run up to the edge of the 



HOW ARMIES ENTRENCH 257 

trench and. fire down in it upon the surprised Ger- 
mans. Then a machine gun brought up is turned 
on those Germans above who are trying to get down 
in the trench. They retire in the darkness, as 
before, and again nothing more can be seen than a 
Hne of flashes a short way to the front of the trench. 
The Germans caught in the trench, not killed or 
woimded, soon drop their rifles and throw up their 
hands. They are taken off to the rear under guard, 
through a commimicating trench. 

In a few minutes, but this time with more of an 
interval than the preceding time, the yells again 
are heard. Gray figures again appear suddenly 
out of the darkness and throw themselves toward 
the trench. On the right, they get a little farther 
than they did before; but the machine gun again 
causes a number to fall, others to throw themselves 
on the ground and fire, and the remainder to rim 
back into the darkness. On the left this time, 
thanks to the machine gun which has been brought 
up, they do not get into the trench, but are stopped, 
as on the right. Gradually, the line of flashes 
becomes more and more distant and the firing also 
grows less. Finally, except for occasional shots, 
there is complete silence. 

During the remainder of the night, the French 
troops carry their own woimded to the rear and the 
German wounded away from the front of the 
French trenches. They also repair the damage 



258 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

done to their trenches in different places by the 
shell fire which preceded the attack. 

At daybreak they discover that opposite their 
left, the Germans, in spite of their repulses during 
the night, have succeeded in digging a new trench 
only one hundred and fifty yards distant. The 
men, except the sentinels, are allowed to go to the 
support chambers to rest. By watching where the 
shovels, which are throwing out the dirt, appear 
above the field, the French learn that the Germans 
are digging a second line about a hundred yards to 
the rear of the new front line on the left. It is 
decided to capture this new trench, which stands 
out conspicuously in front of the German main line. 

Back out of sight of the Germans, extra batteries 
are brought up and put into position. About 
noon, all the batteries open fire on the new piece of 
trench, using high-explosive shells. The German 
batteries reply and fire on the French trenches. 
The French batteries, nevertheless, keep their fire 
concentrated on this one piece of trench. Occa- 
sionally, when some of the bigger French shells 
explode in it, pieces of wood and other objects fly 
up in the air and then fall back to earth again. 

Late in the afternoon, the infantry, brought up 
from the support trench, fills the communicating 
trenches running from the French first line to their 
second line. The men sit at the bottom of these 
trenches awaiting orders to attack, and wonder 



HOW ARMIES ENTRENCH 259 

which, if any, of the German shells that they hear ex- 
ploding around them, and which occasionally send 
dirt down over them, are going to land among them. 

When night time comes, the artillery fire again 
ceases, and the infantry, after passing through the 
remaining parts of the communicating trenches 
into the firing trench, climbs over its front face 
and crawls along the ground toward the front. 

Suddenly, there are several rifle shots coming 
from in front of them, and almost immediately 
afterward the Germans fire star shells into the air 
over the French position. These light up the 
scene and show the French to be coming up over 
the edge of the trench and crawling along the 
ground. Then rifle and machine gun fire comm_ence 
all along the main German positions and along the 
French trenches to the right and left of where the 
attack is being made. All the men and officers of 
the attacking party jump to their feet, and with 
cries of * ' Vive la France! ' ' rush forward the hun- 
dred and fifty yards necessary to reach the nearest 
German trench. A number of men pitch forward 
on their faces. Some do not move; others roll 
around a little, and then are quiet ; while still others 
get up in a stumbling, hesitating manner and grope 
their way back to the French trench. The mass, 
however, sweeps on, and is soon in the German 
trench, or what is left of it. As the first French- 
men reach the edge, the remaining Germans left 



260 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

alive in the trench fire at them. Some run back 
through the communicating trench, while others 
remain and resist, only to be killed or, in a few cases, 
captured. 

What is left of the trench is in utmost confusion. 
The fire of the artillery has beaten it out of shape. 
In some places what was the trench has been filled 
in, while nearby is a big hole made by a high- 
explosive projectile which filled in the trench with 
the earth it displaced when it exploded. Pieces 
of the wooden revetment are scattered around 
everywhere, intermingled with helmets, rifles, and 
other articles of equipment and clothing. Here 
and there lie human bodies, some terribly mangled. 
Sitting on the ground, leaning against a bank of 
earth, is an unarmed, apparently imharmed, Ger- 
man who stares dumbly around. So shocked is 
he by the concussion caused by the exploding shells 
that, for the time being, he does not know where he 
is, what he is doing, or what has happened to him. 

The attacking party stays only the moments 
necessary to kill or capture the few survivors in the 
trench, and then rushes up to attack the next new 
trench, about one himdred yards farther back. In 
spite of the fire and some losses, the men succeed 
in getting into the second trench and in killing some 
of its defenders. Just as they believe they have 
captured it, a German machine gun, at one end, 
opens fire right down the trench. Many of the 



HOW ARMIES ENTRENCH 261 

French are either killed or wounded. Immedi- 
ately, the remainder jump out, and, pursued by the 
fire of the machine gun, run back to throw them- 
selves into the first trench recently captured. 
Here they are comparatively safe, for as soon as 
they took this trench, other infantry and engineer 
soldiers occupied it and started to prepare it for 
defense against counter-attacks by the Germans. 

A few minutes later there is a rush of German 
infantry from the trench in which the machine gim 
had enfiladed the French. The reenforcements and 
the engineer soldiers vv^ith two machine gtms, which 
they brought up, fire so effectively that the rush is 
stopped about twenty yards from the trench. 
After this, the fire gradually dies down on all sides. 

During the rest of the night the French work 
steadily and persistently in turning the captured 
trench into one facing the Germans and connecting 
it by means of communicating trenches with their 
original first-line trench. To make their new posi- 
tion more secure, they also dig a trench about half 
way between it and their old trench. Along this 
part of the line, the German and French trenches 
are now only about a hundred yards apart. 

While the men in these trenches must be more 
on the alert for infantry attacks, at the same time 
they are safer than they were in their old trenches, 
for the reason that where the trenches are so close 
to each other, the artillery of neither side dares fire 



262 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

for fear of hitting the trenches of its own infantry. 
Morning shows a German trench just in front to 
be connected with their main trench by a long 
diagonal trench going to the rear. From this diag- 
onal trench the Germans are digging one which, 
if continued, would tend to flank the right of the 
new position just captured by the French; also 
opposite the center of the main French line, the 
Germans have started a sap to the front. A sap is 
nothing more than a ditch deep enough to hide a 
man, and dug diagonally in the direction of the 
enemy, the dirt taken out being thrown to the 
side toward the enemy, so as to give additional 
protection. It is always dug diagonally toward the 
enemy and not directly toward him, as, if this were 
done, the enemy could fire directly down it. The 
whole purpose of building saps, or sapping, as it 
is called, is to approach closer and closer to the 
enemy without suffering from his fire. When the 
sap has gone a certain distance, say diagonally to 
the right, it is then dug diagonally to the left, 
thus constantly gaining ground by zigzagging to 
the front, the dirt taken out always being thrown 
on the side nearest the enemy. 

As a rule, a ntmiber of saps will be started at the 
same time from different parts of the same trench. 
When all have advanced a certain distance, they 
are connected by a line of trench more or less par- 
allel to the original trench from which the sap was 



HOW ARMIES ENTRENCH 263 

started. These roughly parallel lines of trenches 
are called parallels. Their distance apart depends 
upon the distance from the enemy. The nearer 
the enemy is approached, the more often the paral- 
lels are dug; when within a few hundred yards of 
the enemy, they are dug every thirty or forty yards. 

The French dig out several saps on their right, 
with the object of getting nearer to the farm, which 
makes a strong point in the German line and which 
undoubtedly will be very difficult to capture. 

This starting to approach each other by sapping 
and digging parallels shows that each side has 
decided that the capture of the other's trenches by 
open infantry attacks is at too great a sacrifice of 
lives and has not sufficient prospect of success. 
They, therefore, have decided on the slower but 
much safer method of advance. 

For several days and nights, both sides continue 
sapping and digging parallels. The French work 
closer and closer to the farmhouse, while the Ger- 
mans work out more from the center of their line 
toward the center of the French line. This results 
in the French trenches bulging out to the right 
toward the farm and to the left toward the trench 
which they captured by assault from the Germans, 
while the part between of their original first-line 
trench is still the first-line trench. Some of the 
German trenches bulge out into this gap. 

While the original first-line trenches were con- 



264 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

tinuous for long stretches, this is not true of the 
trenches built since the sapping had commenced, 
due to various causes — such as, the desire to get 
as far forward as possible in a particular direction 
with the minimimi amount of digging, or to the 
building of a trench as a protection against a flank 
attack. Some of the trenches are very short, 
while others are much longer, irregular in outline, 
and face in different directions. 

Day and night the work goes on. Frequently 
attacks are made at night. Sometimes, these are 
attempts to capture a certain trench or piece of 
trench. In such cases, the attacking force crawls 
quietly out of its trench in the direction of the one 
it intends to attack, and when discovered, or at the 
barbed wire entanglement, rises to its feet and 
rushes on the trench. This always results in fierce 
little fights in which the bayonet inevitably is used. 
The defenders who remain in a trench long enough 
to resist with the bayonet are nearly always killed 
or badly wovinded. If the attack succeeds, the 
trench sometimes is held, in which case the captors 
work feverishly to connect it with their own trenches 
and to blockade the communicating trenches lead- 
ing to the enemy's trench. Sometimes the attack- 
ers get the trench, only to be driven out again. 
At other times the attack is on the head of a sap in 
the process of construction, in which case the 
object is generally to kill or drive out the workers 



HOW ARMIES ENTRENCH 265 

and to destroy as much as possible of the work done. 

In all these attacks, hand grenades are used. A 
hand grenade is a metal receptacle filled with a 
high-explosive which has either a fuse so arranged 
that the shock in hitting the ground or any object 
causes the grenade to explode, or one which after 
being lit, as in striking a match, burns a number 
of seconds before exploding the grenade; in other 
words, it is simply a high-explosive shell which a 
man throws in the same way as a base-ball is thrown. 
Some forms of grenades are m^de so that they can 
be fired from an ordinary infantry rifle. 

If attacks can be made before the enemy can build 
a barbed wire entanglement, or place obstructions 
of any kind in front of his trench, the attack has a 
much better chance of succeeding. If this entangle- 
ment has been made, it must be cut through before 
an attack can reach the enemy's trench. 

All sorts of means have been tried to cut this 
wire from a distance — such as, hooks on the end 
of poles and other grappling devices, but most of 
these do not work very well. High-explosive shells 
or hand grenades frequently are used with con- 
siderable success. One of the best methods is for 
men to crawl out at night and quietly cut the wire 
with wire-cutters. This is very dangerous and 
often results in the death or wounding of the men 
who try it. Sometimes the men so wounded can- 
not get back and therefore lie several days between 



266 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

the lines before they are rescued. This also occa- 
sionally happens to the men who are wounded in 
an attack which fails. 

Hand grenades are a weapon of past wars which 
the Japanese resurrected in their war with the 
Russians. The grenadiers, who are now infantry 
like any other infantry, a few hundred years ago 
were the men who threw hand grenades into the 
ranks of the enemy — hence the name, grenadiers. 

Another weapon considered obsolete, again re- 
vived, is the small mortar. These are little, short, 
thick, metal cylinders. In the breach end of the 
bore is placed a charge of powder, and on top of 
the powder a shell full of high- explosive which 
bursts when it strikes, or shortly after. These 
mortars are pointed almost straight up in the air 
when fired. Consequently, the shell comes down 
almost vertically, and if the aim is good, drops in 
the enemy's trench a hundred yards or so away. 
The advantage of these mortars is that they can be 
used where the trenches are so close together that 
the enemy's artillery cannot fire for fear of hitting 
his own trenches. 

The Germans foresaw the use of these mor- 
tars and had especially-designed ones ready. The 
Allies have been making use of all the old ones, 
long considered relics, which could be found in the 
old fortresses. The Germans also have some sort 
of a machine for trench digging, which the Allied 



HOW ARMIES ENTRENCH 267 

soldiers frequently hear at work, particularly at 
night. 

In this trench warfare, the German sniper has 
proved, and still is proving, a great danger. Al- 
most anything, from a shovel to a man's head stick- 
ing above a trench, immediately gets a hole through 
it. Sometimes these snipers find a position from 
which, unseen, they shoot into a certain part of a 
communicating trench. One day six men from the 
same company were wounded while going for water 
through a communicating trench. , At another 
time, a sergeant having a grazed wound along the 
side of his head, told of being the only survivor of 
eight men who had been in his part of the trench, 
the other seven having been shot by the same sniper 
who had wounded him. 

Going back once more to the Germans and 
French in their trenches. 

The day finally arrives when the French troops 
on the right of their line have advanced so near the 
new German trenches, which the latter have built 
to the front of the fortified farmhouse, that the 
Germans without leaving their trenches can throw 
hand grenades into the French saps. This prevents 
any farther advance by sapping. 

The time has come to mine — that is, to dig a 
tunnel from the French trench to the front until 
underneath the German trench, and then to blow 
up the enemy's trench. Just out of range of the 

19 



268 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

German grenades, a small trench parallel to the 
German trenches is dug out from the French sap. 
The part of this trench nearest the sap is dug very 
deep, and is covered with logs and earth up to the 
level of the ground. A nimiber of engineer soldiers 
start in this covered portion of the trench to tunnel 
to the front and gradually downward at the same 
time. The rest of the trench, in which is the open- 
ing of the tunnel, is occupied by a nimiber of infan- 
try soldiers; they constitute a guard to keep the 
Germans from attacking and destroying the en- 
trance to the tunnel should they suspect that one 
is being dug from this trench. 

The tunnel is made about four feet high and wide 
enough for a man to work with a pick and shovel 
with some degree of comfort. While one or two 
men are thus employed, others carry out the dirt 
in baskets or bags, while still others put up wooden 
braces to keep the walls and roof of the timnel in 
place. After the tunnel has reached a distance of 
about fifteen feet below the surface of the groimd, 
it is continued at a level. When a short distance 
underneath and in front of the barbed wire entan- 
glement and trenches of the enemy, the timnel is 
made to branch to the right and left. Sometimes 
there are two branches, sometimes more, and they 
are smaller than the main tunnel. Only one man 
can dig at a time in each, and he is obliged almost 
to take a lying position. The main reason for this 



HOW ARMIES ENTRENCH 269 

is that as the German trench is approached, there 
is danger that the Germans might hear the noise 
made by the miner ; the smaller the tunnel, the less 
noise and the quicker the tunnel moves forward. 

It frequently happens that both sides are mining 
at the same time; occasionally the men of each side 
hear the work going on in a tunnel nearby. Some- 
times, a man working in one tunnel finds that the 
earth in front of him gives way suddenly and he is 
in a tunnel built by his enemy. 

Once mining has started, each side digs from its 
trenches to the front, what are called listening 
galleries — little individual trenches or little tunnels 
when men are posted to listen for the mining opera- 
tions of the other side. Whenever the enemy is 
heard thus at work, an attempt is made to under- 
mine his tunnel; that is, to place a charge of high- 
explosive below him and blow him and his tunnel up. 

The branch tunnels are continued to the front 
for a short distance and then are made to turn to 
the right and left. Officers in charge are respon- 
sible for determining the exact positions of the tun- 
nels ; they must know how far below level they are, 
and what particular parts of the surface they are 
directly under. 

When the small branch tunnels have almost 
reached the spot where it has been decided to place 
the explosive, the engineer soldiers instead of a 
pick or shovel use a long bar having a large gimlet 



270 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

at the front end and a handle fixed at right angles 
to the bar at the other end. By turning this handle, 
the soldier works the bar into the earth in front of 
him, which enables him gradually to make a hole 
the size of the bar. When the hole is far enough 
along, a high-explosive called melinite, which comes 
in little packages, is shoved by the soldier to the 
end of the hole to the amount that the officers have 
calculated necessary to blow up the barbed wire 
entanglement and the trench above. The charges 
being ready, there remains only to arrange the 
means of firing them. The last package of melinite 
placed in each hole has a cap of fulminate of mer- 
cury to which electrical wires are fastened. These 
wires are run back through the tunnel to the trench 
from which the original tunnel started. It now is 
only necessary to complete the electric circuit 
to explode the mines underneath that section of the 
enemy's trench which is in front of the fortified 
farmhouse. 

When everything is ready, it is almost dark. 
Back on the second line of trenches, where are the 
supports, the men of a battalion of infantry are 
preparing to move out. As soon as it is dark, they 
move up through the different communicating 
trenches to a point near where the explosion is to 
take place. When the word is given by the officer 
in command, the engineer officer in charge of the 
mines presses a plunger, thus completing the 



HOW ARMIES ENTRENCH 271 

electric circuit. Then there is a series of muffled 
roars, and along a part of the German trench 
four columns of smoke and earth shoot up into the 
air. Debris is scattered in all directions, some of 
the lighter pieces falling down upon the men of the 
battalion. 

With the explosion, the leading men crawl out 
of the trench and to the front. Others quickly 
follow. Before they have gone far, star shells are 
fired from the German positions, which light up 
the scene and show the attacking infantry. They 
immediately jump to their feet, and yelling rush 
across the intervening space into the series of craters 
which before the explosion was the German trench. 
Finding no one alive to offer resistance, they rush 
out the far side and on to the brick farmhouse and 
the German trenches to the left of it. 

Behind them a company of engineer soldiers 
has come carrying picks and shovels and the mate- 
rial needed to revet a trench. They enter the 
craters made by the explosion of the mines and 
immediately start to arrange a parapet along the 
edge of them toward the Germans. Others dig 
a communicating trench between the captured 
position and the French trench nearest to it. 

But the farmhouse has proved too strong. The 
surviving attackers soon commence to come back 
into the new positions, singly and in twos and 
threes. The attack on the trench to the left of the 



2']2 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

farmhouse succeeds, however, and men crowd 
over it. Hidden back of the brick farm is a small 
mountain gun in such a position that it can fire 
into the flank of troops capturing the trench to the 
left of the farmhouse. As the French swarm over 
the trench and up the other side, this gim is fired 
very quickly a number of times. The fire is reason- 
ably accurate and come5 as a complete surprise. 
This, coupled with a sharp rifle and machine gun 
fire in front of them, is too much. Some of the 
men run back immediately, others fire a few shots 
and then itm. Before long, those not killed or 
wotmded are back behind the breastwork which is 
being made by the engineer soldiers in the new 
position. 

The German trench which was blown up was 
only part of a line of trench, the rest of the trench 
still being in German hands. The French engineer 
soldiers, while busily engaged constructing the 
breastwork in the front part of the craters, are at 
the same time obliged to block up the two ends of 
the German trench to the right and left. This is 
done quickly. When the Germans, recovering 
from the shock of the explosion, come down their 
trench on each side of the part occupied by the 
French, they are met with a heavy rifle and hand 
grenade fire, which drives them back behind the 
nearest traverses. They, therefore, fill in a portion 
of their trench so that they will have a breastwork 



HOW ARMIES ENTRENCH 273 

between them and the part of the trench occupied 
by the French. ^ 

As soon as the new position is well organized — 
that is, as soon as all the breastworks and trenches 
necessary for its defense have been completed — a 
tunnel is started with the object of mining the 
brick farm to blow it up and ultimately capture 
that position. 

In this manner the two armies have become en- 
trenched over the immense front which they now 
occupy from the British Channel to Alsace. This 
is the method they have adopted to push their 
trenches forward, and trench warfare is now being 
carried on in this way. Everywhere it may be 
roughly divided into four periods: 

The first is one in which the two forces advance 
toward each other and finally entrench. This may 
be because one side has assumed the defensive, and 
the other side in attempting to attack has found an 
open assault to be impossible; or each side may be 
trying to attack the other, but finding the fire too 
strong, entrenches. 

The second period is one in which they try to 
capture one another's trench by attacks across the 
open space between, while advancing their own 
trenches by moving forward at night and entrench- 
ing their new position. 

The third period is one in which they advance 
on each other, primarily by sapping and digging 



274 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

parallels. In this period, attacks across the open 
space between the trenches also are attempted. 

The fourth period is one in which the trenches 
have been pushed so near to each other that they 
no longer can be advanced b}^ sapping, because 
the hand grenades and bombs can be thrown into 
the saps without the enemy having to leave his 
own trench. They advance, therefore, by tunnel- 
ing underneath the ground, blowing each other's 
trenches up and occupying the craters caused by 
the explosions. 

Often, the two lines of trench riui right through 
a village. In this case, due to the protection fur- 
nished b}" the houses, the difficulty of capturing 
them, and the greater damage done when they are 
mined and blown up, the fighting is of much more 
vicious nature. Sometimes, the trenches are just 
outside and around a large town, such as AiTas. 
Then defensive positions are prepared within the 
towns themselves, in which case the towns not 
only suffer from the fighting which takes place 
outside but, should the enemy once gain entr}^ 
they inevitably are badly damaged by the fighting 
which takes place within them. 

When a soldier is in one of the support chambers, 
he is not at all badly off. While he, of course, 
keeps his clothes on all the time, he is well supplied 
with food and has brasiers in which he burns coal 
or coke to keep warm. His greatest enemy is the 



HOW ARMIES ENTRENCH 275 

mud. Had the weather during the winter gone 
below freezing point and remained there, he would 
have been much better off. However, while there 
have been some freezing spells, lasting a number 
of days, most of the time the temperature has gone 
from above freezing to just below it and back again. 
This has been accompanied by considerable rain, 
so that the bottom of all the trenches have been 
filled much of the time with half -frozen mud, which, 
each time the temperature rises, turns into liquid 
mud. This has resulted in a great many cases of 
frozen, or partially frozen, feet. 

In addition to the physical strain, there is fre- 
quently great mental strain, due to the necessity 
of sitting inactive hours at a time under artillery fire, 
not knowing at what moment a shell may kill or 
wound the individual concerned ; the men frequently 
also have too much time to reflect on the difficulties 
of making an attack on the enemy's trenches. 

While in no cases has the morale of the troops 
broken down, every eftort is made to have the men 
remain on duty in the trenches only a certain length 
of time and then to take them back out of danger 
where for a few days they can be rested physically 
and mentally, get cleaned up, and have all the 
sleep they want. By this method of reliefs, the 
men are kept in good physical condition, and when 
they return to the trenches have plenty of vim and 
enthusiasm to make the necessary attacks. 



276 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

Trench warfare thus far has produced no really- 
great developments. All that may be said is that 
now it is being adopted on a much larger scale, 
and that the explosives used both in projectiles and 
in ammunition are much more powerful than ever 
before. 

Advancing by saps and parallels, mining under 
the enemy's position, and the use of grenades all 
date back to the siege warfare carried on everywhere 
in Europe in the i8th century. This period of 
siege warfare was followed by one in which armies 
fought in the open field and, as a rule, without 
protection of any kind other than that given by 
villages or farms which happened to be on their 
battle line. 

As modem firearms became more powerful, the 
necessity was seen of finding some protection for 
the soldiers. In the American Civil War, trenches 
and breastworks were used to a very great extent, 
and more and more so as the war progressed. 
Toward the close of the war, almost invariably, 
the infantry of both sides started building breast- 
works or trenches as soon as they took up a position. 
However, very little attention was paid in Europe 
to the American Civil War. The first war which 
attracted considerable attention among the Euro- 
pean nations to the subject of field-entrenching 
was the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, in which 
Osman-Pascha defended Plevna for some time with 



/y 



I/PI'S OF F/PW6 MD C0MMUWarmT/?£^C//E5 




DIAGRAM OF A SECTION OF THE 

FRANCO-GERMAN LINE OF TRENCHES 

SHOWING 



HOW THE ARMIES HAVE BECOME ENTKENCHEK 



To Accompjitiy 

'WHY PREPAREDNESS' 



Captain IIknhv .1. Reilly 



EXPLANATION 



Sunken road occupied by German troops 
during the first day's figlit; later cunvoilcd 
into a reserve trench by digging bomb-proof 
liuts in the front face. 

Communicating trenches. 

Trenches dug by Germans the first night, 
with redans, n, or sharp loops to rear, to 
avoid enfilading fire. The German tn-nches 
also had overhead cover at intervals for 
protection from artillery fire. 

Two lines of trenches built by the Germans 

the second night; brick farmhouse at right 

"ncluded as part of the scheme of defense. 



Latrine. 

Listening posts. 

Barbed wire entanglements. 

Trenches of French supports. 

Redan. 

Traverse. 



A 1 Trenches built by the Germnns tho tliinl 
B i night. B wns " ' 

assault; winn- 

drivt-n L.ul. I.-. 

thatu.u>:i i; 



French to 

Germans in 

barbed wire ci 

Where the French cafHured German trt^nchcs, 

mountain £ 



• of (I 



by rifie and machine gun fire 
from F. 

D German trenches in front of tho brick farm- 
house where the Frcneli attack failed hcwuac 
of the strength of the brick farmhouse. 

EE Section of German trench occupied by the 
French after the explosion of tho mlnoa. 

F Craters mode by the explosion of French 
mini' ; immediately occupied by the French 
mid c<'»nntcl<(l with trench G4 by saps. 

GiGj French paralleli built in the advance on the 

G.iG« brick farm. 

H French trench built to guard paralleln frnm 

Qttacka by Germans from Ka. 
KiKaGt'iman parallels connected by saps made in 
Ka the advance on the French trenches. 
L I'arallel buUt by the French to atrengtlicn 

their hold on B. 
M Entrance to French mine tunnel. 
H French mine tunnel. 
P German position from which rifle and machine 

gun fire was directed at the French wlio had 

[wnetratcd to C. 



HOW ARMIES ENTRENCH 277 

no other than the field fortifications built by his 
army. In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904- 1905, 
and in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, trenches 
were used extensively. 

When the present war broke out, it was found 
that the German army knew more about field- 
entrenching and had made much greater prepara- 
tions for it than had the armies of the Allies. The 
Allies soon learned from their enemy, however, 
especially the French. German trenches captured 
were careftilly studied and engineer officers and 
soldiers were distributed among the infantry as 
instructors. The French infantry soon learned the 
lessons so taught, particularly those who had been 
under fire. What the French soldiers now think 
about entrenching is shown by the fact that thou- 
sands have thrown away the small entrenching tools 
issued to them as part of their equipment, the 
weight of which they had frequently grumbled 
about during peace manoeuvres, and instead carry 
around with them full-sized picks and shovels, 
naturally much heavier. 



CHAPTER XXV 

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BATTLE 

April, 1 91 5. 

AS the infantry dismount from their motor- 
buses, just out of range of the artillery — in 
other words, on the edge of the battlefield — 
of what are the men thinking? What sensations 
do they undergo? These are questions frequently 
asked, not only by those who have not been in 
battle, but by those who have undergone the ordeal 
and are anxious to compare their impressions and 
feelings with those of others who have had similar 
experiences. 

Most of the men have thought about battle on 
the way to the front; now they have reached the 
point where they are about to enter it. 

The sight of the wounded in a nearby hospital; 
the noise of the firing to their front; the burst of 
the artillery projectiles which land a short distance 
in front of them — all these are indications that the 
hour finally has arrived when they are to be sub- 
jected to probably the hardest test that htiman 
beings can undergo. 

The men may be divided primarily into two 
classes: those who have never been under fire, 
and those who have. Of the ones who have not, 
a few are boastful, and some of these probably 

278 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BATTLE 279 

will show a lack of nerve before the test is over; 
others will sober down into good soldiers. Many 
are afraid they are going to be afraid; many of 
these will be, others not. A few feel exhilarated 
and look forward to the combat. Of those who 
have been under fire, some are afraid and know 
that they will be afraid throughout, but they will 
do as they have done before, be governed by a 
sense of loyalty and do their duty as well as the more 
intrepid fellows. Some are frightened as they 
have been every other time before entering battle, 
but know that once in it they will forget their fright. 
A few are careless and are not concerned one way 
or the other; they have formed the habit of accept- 
ing things as they come. A few have found in 
combat an excitement to be found nowhere else, 
and look forward to experiencing that excitement 
again. Many pray — some as a result of habit 
extending through years, others for the first time 
in a long period; some want to pray, but, having 
neglected prayer for a good many years, are ashamed 
to do so now that they are about to enter danger. 
Some talk rather quickly, but on the whole most 
are silent. A few are morose and very downcast. 
Many show by their expression that they have faith 
in their ability to do their duty, no matter what 
happens. 

While the officers and noncommissioned officers 
are human beings and subject to the same feelings 



280 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

as their men, there are certain differences if they 
are men of long mihtary training. They look upon 
combat as a problem to be worked out ; as a business 
to be brought to a satisfactory conclusion, with the 
minimum expenditure and the maximum results. 
They have many responsibilities and many things 
to think of. The habit of discipline brought on 
by work and study over a period of 3^ears enables 
them to concentrate their minds on the work ahead 
to such an extent that soon they forget themselves 
complete^. In addition, they have bred a deter- 
mination which makes them work to their extreme 
limit, physically and mental 1}^ to overcome every 
obstacle and shove the combat through to a suc- 
cessful tennination. 

Artillery fire alwa3''S has had a considerable 
demoralizing effect. The gi'eener the troops, the 
greater the eft'ect. However, until recentl}^ the 
fire of artillery was not really deadly enough to 
affect sufficientl}^ the morale of veteran troops. 
The efficacy of the artillery in the present war has 
increased the moral effect, while the material effect 
is gi*eat enough to make even veteran troops cordi- 
ally dislike to be mider its fire. The}^ dislike most 
the high-explosive projectiles, and the larger the 
projectile, the more they dislike it. 

This dislike is due to several causes: the great 
range of artillery which compels troops to advance 
over great distances under shell fire before they 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BATTLE 281 

can reach rifle range; the abiUty which this great 
range gives to surprise troops on roads, or in dis- 
'^tricts where they do not know that they are even 
within range until suddenly fired upon; the power 
of the heavier projectiles to tear down and destroy 
all cover which they may hit, gives rise to a feeling 
of utter helplessness; but doubtless the greatest 
cause is the physical shock to the nervous system 
Vjrought on by the concussion of the exploding 
shell, with its vivid white flash, even though a man 
be out of range of the fragments. There are a num- 
ber of instances where men have become tempo- 
rarily insane, due to their inability to withstand 
this fire. Continual exposure to these shocks 
tends to wear out a man's resistance, to break down 
his nervous system, and to afl:ect seriously his 
moral strength. 

Aeroplane bombs are not particularly dreaded, 
as the men can see the aeroplanes and then know 
that, unless directly underneath them, there is no 
danger. 

Trench warfare is particularly trying on the 
morale of the men. They are always in con- 
siderable danger, and yet frequently have long 
periods with nothing to do but think about what 
they see. When their trenches are being shelled 
by a few guns, as is often the case when no heavy 
combat is taking place, they can tell by the sound 
whether the shells are going to land in their vicinity 



282 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

or not. Bombs sent up by the enemy trench mor- 
tars frequently are seen coming. When men are 
killed or wounded, their bodies inevitably remain 
for a time right in the trench, alongside of the 
living, instead of being left behind by the advancing 
or retiring line, as is the case when fighting in the 
open. An isolated incident of a man being shot 
through the head is never a pleasant sight. 

During the attacks, the men see the efficacy of 
machine guns and the difficulty of getting across 
the short distance between their trenches and 
the enemy's trenches. After attacks, they see the 
dead, and in many cases the wounded, left lying 
in this space. It has come to be pretty well under- 
stood that all this works so much on the morale 
of the men that if they have been in the front-line 
trench for some time, when they are ordered to 
make an attack they are as good as beaten before 
the attack begins, for in their own minds they con- 
sider it hopeless. They will make the attack from 
a sense of duty, but without the determination and 
vim necessary to carry it through successfully. 
The same men, however, if taken to the rear and 
given plenty of rest and good food for a few 
days, will come back and make an attack which 
will prove quite successful. 

W^hen the men have some cover to get behind, 
shrapnel fire is a relief after high-explosive fire. 
Infantry fire is a decided relief from artillery fire of 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BATTLE 283 

any kind. While an infantry bullet can do enough 
damage when it hits a human being, it does not 
harm his nervous system by coming very close with- 
out hitting. There is no doubt that infantry fire 
alone exhilarates and excites many men. 

Bayonet fighting takes place with great fre- 
quency. Every time an assault is made on a trench, 
the bayonet is used. These hand-to-hand fights 
are particularly vicious. They never last long, 
but while they do, mercy is seldom shown. For 
this reason few bayonet wounds are treated in 
hospitals. Of those wounded by bayonets, few 
get farther than a field ambulance, so serious are 
the wounds. 

A case is known where, after one of these vicious 
hand-to-hand fights in which most of those who 
did not escape without any mark were killed, three 
men wounded by bayonets were brought into the 
same field ambulance. One was a German, stabbed 
through the chest, who died in about an hour; the 
other, a Highland Scotchman, who had his leg 
ripped open from his knee nearly to his hip ; and the 
third an Irishman, who had six stab wounds,, two 
in his arms and four in his legs. 

The morale of the wounded, as they come to the 
rear from the battle line, is frequently a good indica- 
tion of what is happening. When there are many 
men who have to be put face downward on the 
stretchers, because their wounds are in the back, 
20 



284 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

no questions need be asked. When they crowd 
around ambulances and try to get in, regardless of 
their wounds, things are not going very well on the 
firing line. 

One of the most difficult duties in every field 
ambulance is for the surgeon to separate the sheep 
from the goats; that is, to pick out from those 
who claim to be sick or to have minor ailments, 
those who really should be in a hospital and those 
who are merely malingerers. The hotter the 
fighting and the worse troops are getting beaten, 
the greater the number of malingerers. During 
the fighting in October and November, when the 
British were so hard pressed, every day or two a 
little crowd of men would be gathered together in 
the field ambulances and sent back to the front, 
the surgeon having found their complaints not to 
be such as to warrant their being sent farther to 
the rear. 

As in all wars, there are in the present one 
instances of men who deliberately mutilate them- 
selves in order to escape from the firing line. A 
few of these cases have been found among the 
white troops, but a much larger number of cases 
among the British Indian troops; in fact, gun shot 
wounds in the left hand became such a common 
spectacle among the Indian wounded that it occa- 
sioned considerable remark. 

No better object lesson of the value of morale 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BATTLE 285 

and the terrible strain to which the troops are sub- 
jected, particularly when on the defensive and just 
holding their own, could have been had than that 
experienced by those who observed the faces of 
the British and Indian troops when going into 
action, during the great turning movement in 
October and November, and the faces of the men 
who were still alive and unwounded after days 
of being constantly attacked, after having been 
shoved back literally foot by foot by the Germans 
and having suffered heavy losses in killed, wounded, 
and prisoners. They finally succeeded in keeping 
the Germans from breaking through, but at a 
cost and under a strain which no green troops 
could have stood more than a day, much less for 
a period of weeks. 

The Indian troops, while perfectly wilhng to 
take part in hand-to-hand fighting or to subject 
themselves to infantry fire, in many cases in the 
beginning found the artillery fire more than they 
could stand, with the consequence that in spite 
of the splendid example set them by their white 
officers, many bolted from the firing line. Their 
Oriental fatalism did not stand the strain of sitting, 
expecting death at any moment and seeing it all 
around while unable to make reply, in the way in 
which the white man's sense of duty withstood it. 
In moral courage, the white man, in this war, has 
shown himself to be far superior to those Orientals 



286 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

who, up to the present, have participated in it. 

While the physical demands made on a man in 
battle now are no greater than they ever have 
been before, and while the danger to the individual 
is probably, on the whole, no greater, the mental 
strain and the strain to which men's nervous sys- 
tems are subjected, are far greater than ever before. 
Napoleon said the morale was to the physical as 
three is to one. Probably, if he lived to-day, he 
would vastly increase the ratio of the value of the 
morale, for more than ever is it necessary that 
everything possible be done to start troops into 
action with a good morale and to keep that 
morale up. 

As the war progresses, the need of strengthening 
the morale of troops is being felt more and more. 
The British have established back of their lines a 
number of hospitals for the care of those who have 
suffered a moral and nervous breakdown. In 
reality, these hospitals are rest cures. 

Although the British regiments went to war 
without bands, the government is now contem- 
plating sending bands to the front, because of the 
great beneficial effect which music has on soldiers 
under adverse conditions. The British regiments 
do not carry their colors in the field. The French 
do. There is no doubt that the possession of these 
colors by a regiment, with the consequent necessity 
of preventing the enemy from capturing them and 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BATTLE 287 

the shame felt when they are lost, considerably 
adds to the morale of the troops. 

The nature of men has not changed. The in- 
stinct of self-preservation still looms large; it must 
be so overcome by discipline that sudden death, 
wounds, or nervous breakdown cannot bring it to 
the surface. This has always been known to 
trained soldiers, and the present war but accentuates 
the fact. 



CHAPTER XXVI 

HOW THE WOUNDED ARE BROUGHT IN FROM 
THE BATTLEFIELD 

April, 1 91 5. 

IT is morning and an almost complete silence 
reigns along the front, as the men of the two 
armies in their trenches, not more than a few hun- 
dred yards apart, try to snatch a little sleep after 
a night full of fighting. 

The men in the British trenches hear a report 
followed by a whistling noise, then more reports 
and more whistling noises. They strain their ears 
to find out the direction this whistling noise is 
moving, because practice has enabled them to tell 
approximately whether projectiles are going to 
explode well beyond, to the right, or to the left of 
them. 

This time, those of a certain section know that 
the shells are coming toward them. They crouch 
lower in the shelters they have dug out in the front 
face of their trench. Now follows a series of loud 
explosions, some just in front of the trench, some 
just in rear of it, but one right on the front edge of 
it. The latter sends up a cloud of dirt and breaks 
down the front face of the trench, burying in the 
dirt the men who are crouching under it, while 
fragments flying to the right and left kill and wound 
many. Men from each side come up with their 

288 



THE CARE OF THE WOUNDED 289 

spades and try to dig out those who have been bur- 
ied. They succeed and get out four men, each 
badly shaken and bruised and almost suffocated. 

The hospital corps men give the wounded first- 
aid treatment. Many have broken bones, and 
bodies badly torn by pieces of shell. With the help 
of some infantry soldiers, they are carried back, 
through the communicating trench to the support 
trench. 

In the early stages of the war, surgeons were 
kept in the trenches to take care of the wounded 
immediately they were hit. However, so many of 
these surgeons were killed or wounded, that it was 
decided to send them no farther to the front than 
the dressing stations. 

The enemy's artillery fire having started up 
again and continuing in earnest, the wounded can 
be moved no farther; in fact, they are fortunate to 
have been taken that far, as frequently the fire is 
so great, they cannot be moved from the place 
where they fell when struck. Here, during the 
remainder of the long day, these men lie. Some, 
fortunately, are unconscious, but those conscious, 
as the first numbness, which generally succeeds any 
bad wound, wears off, suffer terribly. 

From time to time, as the fire slackens, other 
wounded are brought in to join them. Those men 
not so badly hurt who are able to walk or drag 
themselves along, drift back continuously from 



290 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

the firing trench. Some of these walking cases, 
as they are called, prefer to risk the journey back 
through the communicating trench, getting to the 
dressing station as best they can, rather than wait 
until night comes, and with it relief. It is surprising 
with what bad wounds men can manage to move 
along without help, or with very little help. How 
painful the effort is, however, is shown by the way 
in which they always very largely over-estimate 
the distance they have come. 

Once it is really dark, the stretcher-bearers arrive 
from the dressing stations, and with the help of 
such soldiers as can be spared, if any can be spared, 
carry those who cannot walk, and help the others 
back the half or three-fourths of a mile to the 
dressing station. These stations are usually near 
the outer limit of effective infantry fire. 

If the night is a calm one and there is not much 
firing, the wounded are lifted out of the trenches and 
taken straight back across the country. If the 
firing is too heavy for this, the trip must be made 
back through the narrow zigzagging communi- 
cating trenches, a much greater distance. 

Arrived at the dressing station, the wounded are 
carried, or helped in, through the gateway of an 
apparently deserted French farm, consisting of a 
house, two barns, a stable, and a number of smaller 
buildings, all built around a rectangular court- 
yard and all joined directly to each other or by 



THE CARE OF THE WOUNDED 291 

high brick walls. The quick opening and closing 
of the door shows that the farm is not deserted, 
and that there is a light in one of the rooms. As 
anything on a modern battlefield is in danger of 
being struck, the greatest precautions are taken 
to insure concealment. Dressing stations, field 
ambulances, ambulances, doctors and stretcher- 
bearers are continually in danger of being hit, and 
frequently are, even though the enemy never may 
fire on them directly. There are two reasons for 
this: one, modern projectiles are so powerful they 
frequently go way beyond the object aimed at, 
and hit something that those who fired cannot even 
see; and the other, artillery and troops being scat- 
tered over a battlefield of great depth, the enemy's 
artillery, in its endeavor to hit them, must cover 
considerable space with projectiles. Because of 
the great range, the artillery officers do not know, 
and have no means of ascertaining, what is in the 
space being fired upon. Firing, however, cannot 
be suspended because of danger of hitting some 
person or object belonging to the medical service. 
Several sergeants of the hospital corps come out 
of the dressing station to receive the wounded. 
They have those most seriously hurt taken in the 
main room of the farm — a low, fair- si zed room 
with a stove at one end, which while throwing out 
heat is at the same time giving out considerable 
smoke. All the windows are closed and covered, 



292 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

so that not the least bit of Hght may escape. On 
the floor, on stretchers or on straw, and covered 
with blankets. He the more seriously wounded. 
-The only light is that given out by a nimiber of 
lanterns, by the light of which the surgeons make 
such dressings as are necessary. They reduce 
fractures, and make as secure as possible the more 
dangerous wounds. Experience has taught them 
that the less a wound is interfered with until the 
patient arrives in a hospital equipped with every 
convenience for operating, the better the chance 
of the patient to survive, and in a case of lesser 
wounds, the better the chance of recovery without 
permanent injury. 

The lesser wounded, after having been looked 
after, are taken to the barns and made as com- 
fortable and as warm as possible in the immense 
piles of straw which fill them. All who are able 
to take it, are given hot broth. While the wounded 
are being attended to, little cards telling the nature 
of their wound or wounds are being filled out and 
prominently affixed to some part of their clothing. 

About midnight, if the sound of the firing is not 
too great, the horse ambulances can be heard 
approaching. They are pulled up close to the 
dressing station, on the side away from the enemy, 
so as to get as much protection as possible. 

Sometimes, when the firing is severe, the ambu- 
lances cannot come closer than within a half mile 



THE CARE OF THE WOUNDED 293 

of the dressing station. Then the wounded either 
must walk or be carried by hand from the dressing 
station to the ambulances. The most severely 
wounded are picked up first and put into the first 
ambulance, which is then sent off to the field ambu- 
lance. If there are a great many wounded, the 
less serious cases have to wait until the ambulances 
make a second or third trip. Often wounded 
arrive at the dressing station just before dawn, 
too late for the ambulances to make another trip, 
and are obliged to remain until the following mid- 
night before they can be moved. 

Some of the severely wounded die in the dressing 
stations. They are buried at night, in the little 
cemeteries formed on all the battlefields near the 
dressing stations. Here also are interred those 
killed in action. 

The trip back to the field ambulances, established 
on the edge of the artillery zone, is, at best, a painful 
one. The ambulances must travel without lights 
and over roads frequently full of holes made by 
exploding shells, some big enough to overturn an 
ambulance should a wheel drop into them. 

The roads often are shelled by the enemy, as he 
knows that troops, ammunition, and supplies 
probably reach the firing line over them. There- 
fore, at any time, the ambulances may be under 
shell fire without the officers of the enemy's artillery 
having the slightest idea that their projectiles are 



294 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

endangering ambulances. When the roads are 
frozen, the horses move with difficulty, as they 
slide and frequently fall. In the dark, it is easy 
to make a mistake in the road, and such a mistake 
might lead to a dangerous position in front of one 
of their own batteries. 

Finally the field ambulance is reached. The 
buildings used are those of the public school of a 
small village. There are two, two-story brick 
buildings connected by a covered passage-way. 
The roofs have been badly damaged and most of 
the windows smashed by the fighting which took 
place in the vicinity several weeks previous. In 
the front face of the second story of the first build- 
ing a large round hole tells where a projectile has 
struck. The room inside is torn to pieces, while 
half the back wall has been blown out. The yard 
is muddy and littered with fragments of brick, 
while in one corner is a fire on which some hospital 
corps men are cooking coffee. The flames of this 
fire reveal, heaped up against the" side of the 
building, a pile of rifles and infantry soldiers' field 
equipment taken from the wounded. 

The ambulances back up to the front gate. 
Tired hospital corps men and the surgeons who 
went out with the ambulances help to carry the 
wounded into a large room on the ground floor of 
the first building. There is a stove which throws 
out an agreeable warmth ; the holes in the windows 



THE CARE OF THE WOUNDED 295 

have been stuffed with rags of various kinds; and 
several lanterns on the floor afford a flickering 
light. Here the wounded are laid in rows if on 
stretchers, while the walking cases huddle around 
the stove. 

In the next room, which in appearance is quite 
similar, the surgeons have arranged an operating 
table. All around the sides of the room are the 
open panniers holding all the instruments and kit 
necessary for a fleld ambulance. Here also are 
some lamps with reflectors. The wounded are 
brought in one by one, their wounds carefully 
examined and re-dressed. They are then carried 
by the hospital corps men to the second building, 
where they are laid in rows around the walls on 
straw which has been strewn thickly over the 
floor. Many of the wounded lie flat on their 
backs. Some stare straight up into the air, as if 
their gaze were flxed upon some object far above. 
Others move their heads from side to side and 
groan occasionally. A man in a corner who has 
a bayonet stab through his chest groans as he 
rolls from side to side; at times he tries to rest 
himself on his elbows. A hospital corps man 
holds up his head and does what he can to soothe 
him, but his sufferings seem only to increase. 
Soon his movements become weaker, his groans 
less audible until, with a little shudder, he stretches 
out — and is dead. 



296 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

Two German prisoners lie next to each other. 
One, with a compound fracture in his right 
leg, is on his back, taking notice of everything in a 
dazed sort of a way, while he smokes a cigarette 
which his comrade has given him and lit for him. 
The other, with his left arm in a bloody sling, sits 
with his back to the wall and his legs spread far 
apart, while he watches with evident interest all 
that goes on about him. Although he is wondering 
what is to happen to him next, it can be easily seen 
that he has made up his mind to hide his anxiety. 

On the whole, all the wounded are silent. They 
seem to care but little about anything until the 
hospital corps men start to move them, when 
their interest becomes intense, for movement of 
any kind to a badly wounded man is the one 
thing he dreads most of all. 

If the wounded are arriving in such large num- 
bers that the field ambulance becomes over- 
crowded, word is sent to the evacuation hospital, 
situated at the rail-head, and motor ambulances 
are started off immediately to bring in the wounded. 

If this is not necessary, the motor ambulances 
arrive very early in the morning. The worst 
cases are taken charge of first. However, the 
ambulances are kept busy until all the wounded 
have been withdrawn. The roads being in better 
condition, the motor ambulances are able to move 
more quickly and with less jarring than horse 



THE CARE OF THE WOUNDED 297 

ambulances. Therefore, the trip of from three, 
and sometimes as much as eight or nine, miles to 
the evacuation hospital is less trying for the 
wounded than was the trip from the dressing 
station to the field ambulance.- 

As is the case with the dressing stations, some 
men reach the field ambulance only to die, some 
die en route. Near most field ambulances is found 
a little group of freshly-made graves where the 
neighboring peasants have planted sod, and as 
the spring approaches are planting flowers. 

Once out of the field ambulance and started on 
his way to the clearing, or evacuation, hospital, 
the wounded man has left behind him the battle- 
field. The evacuation hospital to which he is 
taken by the motor- ambulance is the beginning 
of the line of communication and therefore does 
not belong to the field army. From the clearing 
hospital he is sent by rail to the base hospital, 
where every modern convenience awaits him. 

The evacuation hospital is really not a hospital 
at all, but a big building, or groups of buildings, 
at the rail-head, where the wounded are collected, 
fed, kept warm, and given such surgical attention 
as is absolutely necessary until they can be sent 
on by train to the base hospital, well to the rear. 
The reason for this is that just back of the battle- 
field, out of the range of artillery, there must be 
points at which the wounded brought in from 



298 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

the battlefield may be assembled. As the army- 
ad vances or retires, these points must move with 
it. As an evacuation hospital must be ready to 
start at any time, it is impossible to establish a 
permanent hospital near the battle front and to 
give the wounded there the complete attention 
which can be given with safety only in a regular 
hospital far to rear. 

When heavy fighting is going on, ambulances 
full of wounded arrive at the clearing hospital 
almost continuously, not only during the day 
but very often during a large part of the night. 
They enter a big courtyard and are unloaded by 
the hospital corps men, who place the stretchers 
containing the severely wounded in long rows on 
the ground, while the wounded able to walk are 
helped to chairs set along the walls. 

The marked characteristic of most wounded 
men is listless indifference until approached by 
some one to move them; even those who are 
suffering so that they groan occasionally have the 
same air of listlessness. 

As the severely wounded are almost completely 
covered by their blankets, only here and there 
can be seen a bandaged head, a bandaged arm, or 
a torn, bloody, muddy, empty sleeve or other 
piece of clothing hanging from the stretcher. 

The walking cases, as the wounded are called 
who are not on stretchers, mostly have bandaged 




H. J. R. 

FRENCH LIGHTLY WOUNDED TAKING A HOSPITAL TRAIN TO BASE 




AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN WOUNDED BEING BROUGHT TO FIELD 
AMBULANCES BY WAGON 



THE CARE OF THE WOUNDED 299 

heads, arms, legs, hands, or feet. Of every branch 
of the service, and sometimes mixed with wounded 
German prisoners, they patiently, and for the 
most part silently, wait until given attention. 

Immediately they are unloaded, noncommis- 
sioned officers of the hospital corps start taking 
their names and regiments. They then look at 
the little cards fastened to each soldier in the 
dressing station, which state the nature of his 
wound or wounds. By means of these cards, 
the wounded are sorted. The lying cases are 
carried to^'^different wards, dependent upon the 
nature of their wound; the sitting cases and those 
walking or being helped, pass to a long room having 
chairs all around the sides. In the middle of this 
room are an operating table and a number of 
tables upon which are spread out all the surgical 
instrum.ents and many atomizers filled with iodine. 
When put on the raw wounds the iodine frequently 
causes more pain than most of the instruments, 
but it saves greater suffering in the end, as it is a 
powerful antiseptic. It is squirted liberally over 
all the wounds. 

Among the badly wounded, there are some- 
times men who can be saved only by immediate 
operation. Nearly all the fair-sized French towns 
have permanent hospitals. If the clearing hospital 
is in a town of this character, the serious cases are 
sent immediately to the permanent hospital where 
21 



300 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

they are operated on. If not, a motor- ambulance 
is sent with the serious cases as rapidly as possible 
to the nearest permanent hospital. 

There are always some beds in a clearing hospital, 
but when large numbers of cases are to be handled, 
most of the wounded must be content with straw 
mattresses placed on the floor. However, after 
their experiences in the cold, the wet, and the 
mud of the trenches, being in a warm room, with 
plenty of hot food, is a trem^endous relief. While 
there are no bathing facilities and the wounded 
cannot be undressed, as they must be ready to be 
shipped whenever a hospital train may anive, the 
dressing of all wounds is very carefully examined 
and adjusted. 

After the men have recovered a little from the 
shock of being wounded, the trip in from the 
battlefield and the re-dressing of their wounds, 
many of the more slightly wounded wander about 
the courtyard, talking to each other and to the 
hospital corps men. They display the greatest 
interest in new arrivals, and crowd around, par- 
ticularly when some wounded German prisoner is 
questioned by an officer. Some of these men are 
suffering a great deal and have that characteristic 
restless desire to move about, to do anything which 
for the moment may take their minds off their 
pain. Some are very cheerful, and may be seen 
contentedly eating large slices of bread and jam 



THE CARE OF THE WOUNDED 301 

with an uninjured hand, or if both arms and 
hands are injured, as is at times the case, being 
fed by another wounded comrade. 

Aside from the arrival of the wounded, the 
courtyard is interesting, because the hospital 
corps men are going over the rifles and piles of equip-" 
ment taken from the wounded soldiers. These 
rifles are carefully examined to be sure that they 
are unloaded. All the belts are searched for 
ammunition. This ammunition is sent back to the 
battlefield, while the equipment and rifles go to 
the ordnance depots at the base to be put in proper 
shape for reissue. 

In the courtyard the hospital corps men also are 
scrubbing the bloody stretchers, to some of which 
large lumps of gauze stick. They stand them up 
in rows against the sides of the building to dry out 
in the sun. When in a great rush, there is no time 
to wash the stretchers, so the dirty ones must be 
used just as they are. 

Another point of interest consists in the end 
windows of one of the wards on the ground floor, 
through which may be seen the more seriously 
wounded German prisoners placed here. All help- 
lessly flat on their backs, their faces pale, their 
bandages bloody, and their gray uniforms torn, 
bloody, and muddy — they never fail to cause 
comment on the part of their wounded enemies 
gazing at them through the windows. 



302 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

The men's gaze is frequently also directed, when 
delirious cries are heard, to the small room where 
are placed the men shot through the head, who are 
unconscious and who cannot live much longer. 
One of these men, though unconscious, yelled 
almost continuously for three days and three nights : 
"Orderly, turn me over! Orderly, orderly, do you 
hear me, turn me over, d — n you, turn me over!" 
The ward orderly turned him again and again, but 
still he continued his demands. When the orderly 
was busy tending to the others, he would cry: 
"Turn me over, or I will yell!" and then he would 
scream, "Murder! Murder! Help! Help! Po- 
lice! Murder!" 

Sometimes during the day, but more often early 
in the morning, stretcher-bearers come out from the 
different wards carrying men who are completely 
covered by their blankets. They are the ones 
who have died as a consequence of their wounds, 
and are being taken to a little building off to one 
side, used as a mortuary. Here they are sewed 
up in their blankets. On the breast of each is 
fastened a piece of paper giving his name, rank, 
regiment, and religion. Then they are placed in 
wooden coffins on the top of which is fastened a 
cross with the same information. After this, they 
are buried in groups by a priest or minister of their 
own sect in a cemetery of that sect; or, if there be 
none, in one of the new military cemeteries which 



THE CARE OF THE WOUNDED 303 

have grown up on the outskirts of all towns where 
are clearing hospitals. 

While during heavy fighting a clearing hospital 
IS always a place of great activity, the maximum is 
reached when the hospital train arrives. At times 
one arrives every day, in which case wounded 
coming from the battlefield may be sent straight 
to the train without passing through the clearing 
hospital at all. At other times, the men may be 
obliged to wait two or three days in the clearing 
hospital, due often to the non-arrival of trains or 
to the fact that there are so many wounded that 
the train is filled up before all the wounded can be 
taken from the hospital. 

The best of the hospital trains, of which the 
number is increasing continuously as the war goes 
on, are practically hospitals on wheels. In some 
trains, the wounded as soon as received are bathed 
immediately, given every attention which they 
could receive in a hospital, and put in comfortable 
beds. The average train, while not so well equipped, 
nevertheless ensures the wounded proper accommo- 
dation. It consists of ordinary passenger coaches 
for the wounded who can sit up, and of second- 
and third-class coaches, or of baggage cars, for the 
lying cases in which stanchions have been fixed so 
that the stretchers containing the men can be slung 
on them. Thus they avoid the dreaded changing 
of the wounded from one stretcher to another. 



304 - WHY PREPAREDNESS 

In the rush of the heavy fighting at the beginning 
of the war, there were not enough passenger coaches 
available to carry the large number of wounded, 
so many were obliged to travel on straw placed at 
the bottom of freight cars. 

All hospital trains are now well heated, have 
plenty of surgeons and hospital corps men, and 
ample accommodations for feeding and taking care 
of the woimded. Before these arrangements were 
completed, and even yet in many instances, groups 
of women met each train at all way stations and 
gave the wounded hot soup, coffee, and various 
things to eat. 

The splendid way in which the care of the 
wounded now is organized, is best seen at the big 
stations, such as the one in Paris, where vast nimi- 
bers of wounded are received and distributed 
among the different base hospitals. Here a large 
freight shed has been taken over. On arrival the 
train runs under cover. The wounded and sick 
are carried, or helped out, into a big central room, 
which is heated and separated from rooms to the 
right and left by huge railway tarpaulins. Before 
leaving the train, surgeons mark on the shoulder 
of each soldier, in white chalk, "B" for Blesse 
(wounded), if wounded; and "M" for Malade 
(sick), if sick. Over the opening of the tarpaulins 
to the right is a big sign Blesses; over the opening 
of the tarpaulins to the left is a big sign Malades. 



THE CARE OF THE WOUNDED 305 

Dependent upon whether a man is marked "B" 
or "M," he is sent, or carried, either to the right 
or left. 

The two rooms marked respectively Blesses and 
Malades are identical. Each is heated by big 
brasiers, with long lines of benches around these 
brasiers for sitting cases. Each has long lines of 
supports on which the stretchers are placed at 
about the height of an ordinary bed. Each has a 
number of surgeons to attend to emergency cases. 
Each has a number of women who, voluntarily 
and without pay, see that every soldier is provided 
with hot food and drink. 

A number of hospital administration officers are 
busy at a table sorting out the wounded by means 
of the lists which they have received from the sur- 
geon in charge of the hospital train. A long string 
of motor-ambulances arrives from all the hospitals. 
The driver of each ambulance is given a number. 
When the wounded are sorted, a nimiber are as- 
signed by name to the number given to the ambu- 
lance on its arrival. In the meantime the leading 
ambulances have entered another part of the same 
freight shed in which are all the wounded and sick. 
As soon as the wounded or sick are assigned to an 
ambulance, that ambulance is loaded; the driver 
is given a list of his patients and sent off to his 
hospital, being told whether or not to return. By 
this system, the wounded are taken off the train 



306 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

quickly and without confusion, are sorted and fed 
in a warm room, and dispatched to the different 
base hospitals where they are given every care and 
comfort modern surgical science and the tenderness 
of their fellow countrywomen can provide. 



CHAPTER XXVII 

MODERN INFANTRY IN BATTLE 

September, 191 5. 

WHEN the development of gunpowder reached 
the point where foot soldiers gave up their 
pikes and took to firearms, the infantry rapidly 
became the backbone of all armies, and it has 
remained so ever since. 

While artillery relative to infantry has increased 
in importance, this is only because it now can extend 
to its infantry greater aid than has been the case 
since the days of Napoleon. 

When two armies meet, it is the artillery of the 
attacking side which, by its fire on the enemy's 
artillery, must help its own infantry over the several 
thousand yards of country to be crossed before a 
point is reached where they can use their rifles. 
From then on the artillery not only must endeavor 
to keep down the enemy's artillery fire but the 
enemy's infantry fire. The artillery of the defense, 
of course, must work to aid its infantry by shaking 
the enemy's infantry as much as possible through- 
out their advance, and also by keeping down the 
enemy's artillery fire. While these roles are of the 
utmost importance, it can be easily seen that it 
is because of the help given the infantry. 

The difficult role of the infantry in an attack 

307 



308 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

or on the defensive is also evident. In an attack, 
the infantry may come under fire of the heavier 
guns at as much as eight thousand yards from the 
enemy's trenches. This means facing the explosion 
of shells of various size filled with high-explosive. 
Generally they can be heard coming through the 
air with a rushing, whistling noise; then follows 
a series of violent explosions, their number depend- 
ing on how many shells have been fired. These 
explosions shake the ground for some little dis- 
tance and tear to pieces almost everything they 
may hit. The fragments are irregular in shape 
and produce nasty wounds, not only from the 
point of view of the man hit but of all those who 
see them. 

When at about five thousand yards from the 
enemy's trenches, the enemy's field batteries com- 
mence with shrapnel. These projectiles, on burst- 
ing, throw a cloud of bullets and fragments to the 
front, very much in the manner of a shotgun. 
They generally come in large numbers in a very 
short space of time. This is because the enemy 
batteries try to cover with their fire the territory 
over which the infantry is advancing. While 
these explosions are not as intense as those of the 
larger shells, they are reasonably so. The bullets 
and fragments cover considerable territory, and 
also produce nasty wounds among which are many 
bone fractures. 



MODERN INFANTRY IN BATTLE 309 

If the advancing infantry succeeds in continuing 
the advance, as they generally do, the point finally 
is reached where infantry bullets commence to 
drop here and there on the ground. Still farther 
along, they begin to go by and occasionally to 
strike men. Gradually they increase in number, 
and as the advance continues this fire becomes so 
efficacious that efforts to move forward result in 
such losses that the line as a whole remains sta- 
tionary. Then the attacker digs his first trench. 
From this point on, comes the most difficult part 
of the infantryman's task. Generally efforts are 
made at night to rush across the space between 
the two trenches and to capture those of the 
enemy. These attempts usually result in failure 
and reasonably heavy losses. However, if some 
of the intervening ground can be held and a new 
first-line trench built, something has been gained, 
as the enemy's trench is that much nearer. 

The time finally arrives when the two lines of 
trenches are so close that this method no longer 
can be used. Then the trenches must be moved 
forward by sapping. Thus, in one way or another, 
an endeavor is made to get quite close to the enemy's 
position, with enough men left alive to rush over 
some day and take it away from him. 

During all this procedure, attacks are made 
from time to time. The enemy also indulges in 
counter-attacks, to take back what has been lost. 



310 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

or attempts to discourage the attacker by taking 
away some of his trench. 

When the trenches are from several hundred to 
a few yards apart, the fighting becomes more 
vicious. If they are not too close, the artillery 
of each side will do its best to destroy the opposing 
trenches by means of high-explosive shells. When 
properly, concentrated, this fire blows in large 
sections of trench and in many places makes it 
impossible for human beings to remain alive. In 
such cases, the defenders must take refuge in 
bomb-proofs and try to get out in time to meet 
the enemy's infantry. Sometimes they do; but 
often they are caught penned in their bomb-proofs. 

Frequently one, or both sides, will tunnel under 
the other and blow up its front-line trench. These 
explosions are always signals for the successful 
side to take advantage of the confusion to make 
an infantry attack. In these attacks, the object 
is to rush as many men into, and as far beyond, 
the enemy's trench as they can penetrate. 

For such attacks the men are crowded in the 
trenches. As it is difficult to get out of these 
trenches, the attacks really consist of bunches of 
men led by officers coming out of a trench at 
different places at the same time and running as 
hard as they can across the intervening space. 

If the artillery fire or the mine explosion has 
done its work, the men generally cross the first 




BRITISH INFANTRY AT A RESERVE BREASTWORK ON A RAINY DAY 
The German trenches are 400 vards to the front 




WHERE AN AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN 10-CM. SHELL KILLED TWELVE 

RUSSIAN INFANTRYMEN 

Parapet of Fort Kobilyani 



MODERN INFANTRY IN BATTLE 311 

line of enemy trench without difficulty, and per- 
haps even the second. However, sooner or later, 
they come up against a trench full of infantry 
and machine guns, from which a most effective 
fire is opened. This generally results in their 
being driven back into one of the captured trenches. 
They are not safe here, because almost invariably 
there is a counter-attack. This means that the 
blown, tired remnants of the original attackers 
must try to defend a very much damaged trench. 
For this reason, in all attacks, line after line of 
infantry is sent in. The remnants of each line 
serve to make good the losses of the line ahead. 

In this trench fighting the bayonet is frequently 
used. Aside from the average bayonet wound 
having a tendency to prove mortal, little mercy 
is shown. Many men have not the courage to 
face the bayonet, and either run away or throw 
up their hands and surrender before the attackers 
close in. The surgeons, therefore, do not have 
many patients wounded by bayonets. 

The hand grenade is getting to be more and 
more a factor in attack and defense. They also 
are used a great deal where the trenches are near 
enough for the men to throw them into the enemy 
trench. 

Trench mortars are another weapon which cause 
infantrymen a great deal of worry. They consist 
of various devices for throwing a large charge of 



312 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

high explosive into an enemy's trench, too close for 
the artillery to fire at without risking hitting the 
trench of its own infantry. 

The problem of the offense is to get enough live 
infantrymen into the enemy's position to break 
a hole through all his trenches and widen it to the 
point that he must retreat or surrender. The 
problem of the defense is to kill enough of the 
attacking infantry and so scare and discourage 
the rest, that they cannot break through. Which- 
ever position the infantry soldier occupies, his 
training and morale must be of the highest or he 
will never prove a success. 

This war has demonstrated from the beginning 
that hastily raised infantry, no matter how brave 
individually, cannot succeed. 



CHAPTER XXVIII 

THE FAMOUS FRENCH FIELD GUN 

April, IQIS- 

A SUNDAY in February was set aside in France 
as ''The Day of the 75" when children and 
young women sold little medals bearing the numerals 
"75." The proceeds were devoted to Red Cross 
work. Since the beginning of the war, almost 
everywhere in France, one has heard of the "75." 
In the music halls songs are sung about it, and 
many of the picture post-cards have allegorical 
allusions to it. 

This "75" is nothing less than the French field 
gun, the diameter of the bore of which is seventy- 
five millimeters, or about three inches. Originally 
brought out in 1897, this weapon in the present 
war has more than justified the hopes of its inven- 
tors and the artillery officers who have worked 
during many years of peace to get the maximum 
benefit from the new qualities possessed by it. 
As much as, or even more than, the German 
heavy guns have aided the Germans against the 
Allies, the "75" has helped the French against 
the Germans. Not only has it helped the French 
but, again and again, it has been the means of 
pulling the British troops out of a tight hole. 
To comprehend the reason for the success of 

313 



314 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

this weapon, it is necessary to understand a few 
of the underlying principles of the use of artillery 
in battle. 

Artillery may be roughly divided into three 
classes: permanent, siege, and mobile artillery; 
the last of the three generally being called field 
artillery. In the permanent artillery, the guns 
are mounted on carriages permanently fixed in 
position. The siege artillery is sometimes mounted 
on wheels and sometimes on permanent carriages, 
but the guns are always so large and so heavy, 
that positions must be prepared for them; it 
therefore takes both time and trouble to move 
them and to put them in action. In the field 
artillery, the guns are mounted on wheels, so that 
they may be moved around easily. 

In the permanent artillery and the larger types 
of siege artillery, the gun carriage consists of two 
parts: the lower part, which remains rigid when 
the gun is fired; and the upper part, which slides 
back over the lower carriage after each shot. 
This system has many advantages over the old 
type of field gun, in which all the sections being 
rigidly attached to each other, the carriage recoiled 
some distance after each shot and had to be moved 
back into its former position by the gun crew. 
This recoil also necessitated the gun being aimed 
over again after each shot. 

For many years means were sought to apply to 



THE FAMOUS FRENCH FIELD GUN 315 

field artillery the well-understood advantages of 
having a lower carriage which would remain 
stationary during firing. 

Two things were desired : to find a way by which 
the lower carriage would remain stationary when 
the gun was fired, without having it so heavy that 
it could not be pulled by horses; and to find a 
means by which when the gun had reached its 
maximum position in recoil, it would be restored 
automatically to the firing position. While simple 
enough in principle, the mechanical difficulties con- 
nected with the solving of these problems were 
great. 

The French, in 1897, re-armed their field artillery 
with the first field gun of this improved type. The 
lower carriage is held in place, after the first shot, 
by a spade on the end of the trail and by brakes on 
the wheels. The gun, on being fired, moves back 
about forty-six inches in a cradle. Its movement 
to the rear is stopped by a piston working in a 
cylinder full of oil. The latter movement forces 
the oil into a second cylinder, where it compresses 
the air into another part of this second cylinder. 
When the air pressure is about one hundred and 
twenty times normal air pressure, it expands, 
pushing the oil back into the first cylinder, and thus 
forces the piston forward. The piston pulls the 
gun back into the position it occupied before firing. 

The means by which the mechanical difficulties 
22 



3i6 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

connected with this operation were overcome was 
the secret of the French "75," and was carefully 
guarded for many years. There were several other 
improvements. Where, formerly, to move the 
gun right or left, the whole carriage had to be 
moved, the new French gun carriage permitted the 
gun to be moved right or left without changing the 
position of the lower carriage. The number of 
motions necessary to open or close the breach- 
block of the gun were reduced from three to one. 
Instead of first putting the projectile into the gun, 
and then a bag of powder, thus having to load two 
objects, the projectile and the powder were manu- 
factured in one piece, like the cartridge for a rifle, 
which could be loaded with one motion. Instead 
of the necessity of putting a friction primer in a 
vent-hole, attaching a cord to it and then the men 
firing the gun having to pull it, a trigger arrange- 
ment, very similar to that of a rifle, was introduced. 
These improvements meant a great saving of 
the time necessary between any two successive 
shots. The lower carriage being stationary, the 
gun crew can remain at their post inside the gun 
wheels. The sight, instead of having to be re- 
moved for each shot, remains in position. The 
gunner keeps his eyes constantly on it, so that the 
gun is always pointing at the target. The lessening 
of the number of motions in loading and firing 
saves much time. The French realized imme- 



THE FAMOUS FRENCH FIELD GUN 317 

diately that the greatly increased rate at which 
they could fire meant more than was at first 
apparent. 

Napoleon relied greatly on the fire of his artillery. 
At the critical moment of a battle, he would smash 
a hole in his enemy's lines through which his own 
infantry could enter, and thus gain a victory. He 
did this by bringing up, at the decisive moment, a 
large number of batteries which he had held in 
reserve for this purpose. These would concentrate 
their fire on some one part of the enemy's infantry. 

As the infantry rifle became more powerful, this 
became less and less possible, because the infantry 
by their fire could keep the artillery at such a 
distance that a large mass of guns could not be 
brought up close enough to do the desired dam- 
age. As a consequence, for a long period of years, 
the artillery could not help its own infantry in their 
advance against the enemy in the way in which they 
formerly had done. While the range of artillery 
was sufficiently great to permit of it firing on the 
enemy's infantry, at the same time keeping out of 
range of rifle fire, the rate and accuracy of its fire 
were not sufficient to produce the desired smashing 
effect on that infantry. The French soon realized 
that with the new weapon, the artillery had come 
into its own again, as by means of the rapidity of 
its fire this hoped-for effect was possible. 

The old method of artillery fire, still used in some 



3l8 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

armies, was first to get as closely as possible the 
range of the object to be fired at — say, for instance, 
an advancing line of the enemy's infantry. Then 
a shot would be fired at this range. If it fell short, 
another would be fired at a gi'eater range, and so 
on until they got one over the target. Then the 
target was bracketed; that is, it was known to be 
between two ranges, one of which was short of it 
and the other over it. The eft'ort then would be 
made to decrease the bracket until the target was 
hit. This method may sometimes be used mth 
considerable eft'ect against a target which remains 
stationary. If the target, however, is continually 
on the move, as is attacking infantr}^ it is difficult 
to produce any great effect. 

By the new French system, once having bracketed 
a target, instead of trying to hit it exactly, imme- 
diate advantage is taken of the rapidity with which 
they can fire to cover all the space within that 
bracket by exploding projectiles; in other words, 
having found that the enem^^'s infantry, or whatever 
other troops they may be firing at, is between two 
ranges, they sprinkle all the gi'ound between these 
two ranges with bursting projectiles. Due to the 
rapidity of their fire, this can be done so quickly 
that it is almost impossible for men in this space 
to run out of it. 

Even in getting their target within a bracket, 
they save time. Instead of firing one shot at a 



THE FAMOUS FRENCH FIELD GUN 319 

time until the target is bracketed, they frequently 
fire all the guns of a battery practically at the same 
time, each with a different range. In this way, 
they often bracket the target at the first salvo. 
This bracketing takes from one and one-half min- 
utes under favorable circumstances, to five minutes 
under unfavorable circumstances. As soon as the 
target is bracketed, the battery opens what is called 
effective fire, or fire to produce effect. Frequently 
thirty seconds are sufficient to cover the desired 
space with such a rain of projectiles that the troops 
in it must suffer considerable loss. 

Sometimes this effect is produced by having each 
gun fire one or more shots at a certain range, then 
increasing the range a little and firing the same 
number, and so on, until it has gone from the 
lowest of the brackets to the highest. At other 
times, the method used is for each gun to fire a 
certain number of shots at a given range, the aim 
being moved a certain distance to the right or left 
after each shot. The range then is increased and 
the same number of shots are fired as before, but 
this time the gun is moved the same distance to 
the left or right after each shot, as it was moved 
before to the right or to left. Thus the fire is kept 
up by first increasing the range and sweeping right 
or left, and then increasing the range and sweep- 
ing left or right, until the whole distance within 
the bracket is covered. What this means, can be 



320 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

understood from the fact that at a range of 2,500 
yards, each gun can cover a front of 250 yards 
without moving the lower carriage. 

A well-trained gun crew fires one of these guns as 
much as twenty-two times a minute. In spite of 
this rapidity of fire, the guns can be fired from 
4,000 to 6,000 times each before it is necessary to 
send them to the arsenal to have the rifling renewed. 
Once the captain of a battery has bracketed his 
target and made up his mind what kind of fire he 
is going to use, he gives his orders, and each gun crew 
goes right ahead as quickly as possible. 

The sound of a French battery of four guns in 
action is easily distinguished from that of other 
guns by the rapidity of the discharge. Where a 
number of batteries are in action at the same time, 
it soimds almost like one continuous discharge. 

While making all these improvements, the French 
realized that guns exposed to such fire as they 
could produce would soon be put out of action. 
They, therefore, developed what is called the method 
of indirect fire, which has been more or less under- 
stood and experimented with before. However, 
owing to imperfect sighting apparatus of field 
artillery and to the general methods of fire of field 
artillery, it could not be used heretofore with any 
serious effect. 

Roughly, the method of indirect fire consists of 
putting the guns of a battery far enough down the 



THE FAMOUS FRENCH FIELD GUN 321 

side of a hill away from the enemy, so that they 
cannot be seen from the front, but not so far down 
that they cannot be fired over the crest of the hill 
at the enemy in the distance. An observer is 
always posted who can see both the enemy being 
fired at and some point, such as a church steeple, 
which the men at the guns also can see; this point, 
called the auxiliary aiming point, even may be in 
rear of the guns. By simple trigonometrical calcu- 
lations, which, being virtually worked out mechan- 
ically, take little time, the observer can tell the gun- 
pointers how they must set their sights, so that 
when they see the auxiliary aiming point in the 
center of their sight, the gun is pointed at the enemy. 

Even more important than that a gun should hit 
the mark is the consideration that what it does 
shoot should produce the de^sired effect on the 
target. The old projectiles were solid round can- 
non balls. Later, shells were invented. These 
were simply hollow cannon balls filled with powder 
which, by means of a fuse, were exploded a certain 
time after leaving the gun or by impact with what- 
ever they hit. When these shells burst, the pieces 
flew in all directions. 

An English colonel, named Shrapnel, invented a 
projectile known ever since by his name, which 
consists of a projectile full of bullets and an explosive 
of some kind. Shrapnel, like shell, bursts as many 
seconds after leaving the gun as the fuse has been 



322 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

set for, or by impact with the object hit. When 
it bursts, instead of the pieces flying in every direc- 
tion, as do the pieces of a shell, they are thrown to 
the front in very much the same manner as the shot 
from a shot gun. 

It is an interesting fact that shrapnel was first 
used with considerable effect by the British on 
the French infantry during the battle of Waterloo. 
Since its invention this projectile has been 
employed against men and horses, for, because of 
its scattering effect, its bullets cover a considerable 
ground area. For instance, at 3,500 yards, the 
French shrapnel covers an elliptical space about 
300 yards long and 25 yards wide. However, in 
the 140 yards of this space farthest away from the 
gun, the bullets have so little velocity that they 
do not, as a rule, seriously injure anyone they 
may strike. 

Prior to the war, shrapnel was considered to be 
the proper projectile to be used against troops 
and high-explosive shells, the right projectile for 
use against material of any kind, such as guns, 
ammunition, wagons, walls, and earth works. The 
French high-explosive shell always explodes by 
percussion; that is, the force with which it strikes 
the object aimed at causes it to explode. 

The French shell bursts on explosion into two 
hundred pieces sufficiently large to be dangerous, 
while the rest of it practically is pulverized. In 



THE FAMOUS FRENCH FIELD GUN 323 

plan the pieces fly in five different directions: 
straight to the right; straight to the left; to the 
right front; to the left front; and to the rear. 
Between these five groups, there are spaces in 
which there are no pieces. This explains some of 
the apparently marvellous escapes which many 
men have had while under high-explosive shell fire. 

In one instance, a captain and the lieutenant of 
a battery were standing almost side by side. A 
German high-explosive shell burst nearby. It 
killed the captain instantly, but it did not injure 
the lieutenant, merely knocked him down and 
rolled him over about ten times. 

In another case, a colonel and a captain were 
standing about ten yards from a third officer. A 
German high-explosive shell burst practically on 
the latter and he never has been seen since. The 
colonel, who was standing on the side of the captain 
farthest away from the officer who disappeared, 
was very badly wounded, while the captain escaped 
uninjured. 

There are cases of men being killed by a burst 
of one of these high- explosive shells without 
having a single mark made on their bodies. This 
is caused by the shock. 

The French high-explosive shell does damage 
only for about twenty yards from the center of 
its burst. It makes up for this, however, by 
literally tearing nearly everything to pieces within 



324 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

this range. It uproots the ground in the direction 
taken b}^ each group of fragments in a way that 
would suggest a giant having used a large hatchet 
on it. It has little effect against trenches unless 
it bursts directly above or in them, when it kills 
everybody for about fifteen or twent}^ 3^ards along 
the trenches. If it strike a field gtm, it damages 
it so badl}' that it is no longer of an}- use. 

As the war goes on, the French artillery is com- 
ing to use more and more of the high-explosive 
shell and less of the shrapnel. \^^iile the high- 
explosive is not as effective against trenches as is 
to be desired, it is much more so than is shrapnel. 
German prisoners describe the fire of these guns 
as being terrible. 

The question may be asked. Why have not 
Gennany and other countries as good a gun as 
the "75"? This gun dates from 1897. Just 
before the French brought it out the Gennans 
re-armed all their field artillery ^^dth the best gun 
of the old type which had ever been built, at 
an enomious expenditure. Therefore, when the 
French sprang their new tj^pe of gim, the Gemians 
for financial reasons were for a number of 3^ears 
unable to re-arm their field artillery. ^Mien they 
did so, they converted their old guns into the 
new type, because of the enonnous expense of 
getting entirely new guns. This left them \^dth a 
gun inferior to the French in practically every way. 



THE FAMOUS FRENCH FIELD GUN 325 

But the possession of this splendid weapon is 
not sufficient to insure success in war; it is more 
necessary to know how to use it, and, above all, 
to have men well trained in handling it. During 
years of peace, the French have carefully prepared 
the officers and men of their artillery, so that 
they might get the maximum value from the 
excellent weapon which they were given to use. 

The marked superiority of the French field 
artillery to that of either the British or Germans, 
shows that the years of preparation and the money 
spent to procure these guns were one of the best 
investments France ever has made. 



CHAPTER XXIX 

ARTILLERY IN THE PRESENT WAR 

September, igiS- 

THE average person, if asked what he beUeves 
to be the most prominent feature of the 
fighting on land in the present war, generally 
answers, aeroplanes or the trench warfare. He is 
wrong. While aeroplanes have fallen far below 
what the popular mind expected, they have not 
suipassed in any material way what was expected 
of them by the military authorities. Trench war- 
fare is simply a revival on a larger scale, with a 
few minor changes, of what has been well under- 
stood and practiced for many years. 

The average soldier or officer, if asked what he 
believes to be the most prominent feature in the 
present war, \^dll promptl}^ reply, the artillery. 

From the beginning, it has been the artillery 
which has lived up to the expectation of its officers. 
It has been the artiller}^ which, by the intensity 
of its fire, has surprised even the other branches 
of the service. While they knew that it had 
improved, with few exceptions they had no con- 
ception of the extent of these improvements. 

At the beginning of the war, every cavahy divis- 
ion of 3,600 to 4,000 men had twelve field guns, 
the diameter of whose bore was about three inches. 

326 



ARTILLERY IN THE PRESENT WAR 327 

Every division of 12,000 infantry had 36 or more 
field guns of a similar character. In addition, 
every infantry division, or in some armies every 
army corps — which generally consists of two 
divisions — possessed a number of heavier guns. 
As the war progresses, the number of these heavy 
guns has increased. Not only have more heavy 
guns been brought up, but guns of heavier caliber 
— that is, with bores of greater diameter. So 
many of these guns have been brought up during 
the trench fighting, that in some of the more 
important parts of the line occupied by a division 
of infantry, instead of only the thirty-six field guns 
which ordinarily belong to the division, there are 
more than a hundred guns of all calibers. These 
heavy guns vary in size -— from howitzers four 
and one-half inches in diameter to the German 
sixteen-inch mortars. The lighter ones are 
mounted on wheel carriages, pulled by eight 
horses; the heaviest ones can be moved only in 
sections on trucks, pulled by traction engines. 
Some naval guns are mounted on railway fiat cars 
behind circular shields, which give almost as much 
protection as a turret; these guns, of coiu'se, can 
be used only along the railways. In spite of the 
difficulty of moving these different kinds of heavy 
guns, they are always in demand, because of their 
great range and the destructive effect of their 
projectiles. 



328 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

The most prominent feattire along the edge of 
the battlefield is nearly always the artillery ammu- 
nition trains going to the ammunition re-filling 
points, well out of artillery range. Everywhere 
just off the edge of the battlefield also are seen 
parked the extra ammunition wagons and the 
horses of the batteries which are in action. 

Night is about the only time it is possible to see 
artillery on the move on the battlefield, because 
of the concealment which darkness gives. Even 
then, the batteries generally move strung out at 
intervals along the roads, so that should the 
enemy suddenly shell the road on w^hich they 
happen to be, the minimum amount of damage 
will be done. 

The gun positions are prepared very carefully, 
if possible before the batteries are put in action. 
A favorite place is along a hedge at the bottom of 
a line of trees. Underneath the trees of an orchard 
is another good position. In these cases, little 
huts consisting of branches with their leaves are 
generally built over the guns, so that they blend 
into the landscape, particularly when seen from 
above. Sometimes they are placed in the middle 
of a field, where roofs of logs and planks thickly 
covered with earth are generally built over the 
guns. Again a hay stack is pulled to pieces and 
the hay used to cover the guns when they are not 
in use. In all instances, the caissons and limbers 



ARTILLERY IN THE PRESENT WAR 329 

not needed with the guns while in action are taken 
well to the rear, or on a flank, where they are put 
under a line of trees alongside a hedge or around 
the sides of houses. Often these are covered with 
branches of trees or with hay, so that it would be 
difficult for an aviator to pick them out. The 
horses are nearly always taken back out of artillery 
range where they are cared for and exercised daily 
by men detailed for this purpose. 

The light field guns, which in practically all 
armies are about three inches, are generally found 
in the zone from 2,000 to 4,000 yards from the 
enemy's trenches. The heaviest guns, such as the 
305 mm. (about 12 inches) howitzer, are found at 
from 6,000 to 8,000, or even more, yards from the 
enemy's trenches. The guns of intermediate cali- 
ber — such as ten-inch howitzers and fifteen- 
centimeter rifles are found somewhere between the 
light field guns and the heavy ones. 

The guns, in addition to being concealed from 
aviators, are nearly always also placed in gun-pits 
so that they will have a certain amount of protec- 
tion from the enemy's fire, should the enemy's 
batteries discover where they are. However, they 
are practically always far enough back to be out of 
the range of infantry fire. 

The gun-pits vary somewhat in detail. Gener- 
ally, a gun-pit is a rectangular excavation deep 
enough so that when the gun is placed in it, the 



330 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

muzzle is just above the level of the ground. To 
each side of it are built bomb-proofs — one for the 
gun crew, and the other for the ammunition — 
which are merely deep, underground rooms, roofed 
with logs and a thick coating of earth, the top of 
which is on a level with the surface of the ground. 

As the ordinary field gun cannot be elevated 
sufficiently to fire at aeroplanes almost directly 
overhead, special gun-pits are built so that the trails 
of the guns can be below the surface of the ground, 
thus making the muzzle of the gun point up in the 
air. One way of doing this is to dig a cylindrical 
pit of such size that when the end of the trail rests 
in the center of the bottom of the pit, the gun will 
rest on a circular wooden platform constructed 
around the top edge of it. In this way, the gtin can 
be pointed quickly in any direction at an aeroplane 
up in the air. Near these circular pits are always 
gun-pits of the regular type, so that when no aero- 
planes are around, the guns can be run into them 
and used in the ordinary way. 

Roughly, opposite the center and in rear of every 
battery, there is a small bomb-proof or earth shelter 
of some kind from which the battery commander can 
see his guns . Here also is a telephone which connects 
him with the next higher artillery commander. 

Artillery officers are posted as observers at points 
from which they can note where the shells fired are 
bursting. It is seldom that the men or officers 




© u. & u. 



GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN SOLDIERS MOUNTING A 305-MM. MORTAR 

IN POLAND 








© u. ,t- u. 

AN AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN 305-MM. MORTAR MOUNTED AND READY 
FOR ACTION 



ARTILLERY IN THE PRESENT WAR 331 

with a battery can see the target at which they are 
firing; they can see only some point, such as a 
church steeple, which may be, and generally is, in 
the rear of the gims. This point is called the auxil- 
iary aiming point. By simple trigonometrical 
calculations, practically worked out, the battery 
commander knows that when the man who aims 
each gun sees the auxiliary aiming point in the 
center of his sight, that the gun is pointing at the 
target thousands of yards in front and hidden from 
view, either by the gentle slope back of which the 
guns are placed or by the trees, houses, and other 
features of the landscape which intervene between 
the gun and the target. 

The effectiveness of the fire of the guns depends 
upon the skill of the officers who are detailed to 
observe the result and to telephone or signal the 
necessary corrections to the gunners. These ob- 
servers, or spotters, as they are called, may be 
in the trenches, in a church steeple, on the top of a 
hay stack, or up in an aeroplane. They are con- 
nected by telephone with the batteries and higher 
commanders of the artillery, except when in 
aeroplanes. 

The observation stations in the roofs of houses 
are very interesting. Generally the station is in a 
house which has been badly mauled by artillery fire, 
as have all houses close to the trenches. On enter- 
ing one of them, the stairs leading from the lower 

23 



332 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

story to the attic are found practically to be shot 
away, and what is left to be covered by debris 
caused by the explosion of a shell in the house. 
Ever>n;vhere are pieces of brick, plaster, chimks of 
furniture and other household articles. 

The attic, finally reached, is covered with pieces 
of brick and slate knocked from the chinme3^s and 
roof. In one corner a platform of hea^n>- planks 
has been built which is reached by a ladder. On 
top of this platform is a parapet constructed of 
sacks filled with broken brick and other debris. 
Behind this parapet is stationed an artillery officer, 
who has a map in one hand and a pair of field glasses 
in the other. Below the platform is another para- 
pet, similarly constructed, behind which is a soldier 
with a telephone. 

Looking through the hole in the roof used by the 
artillery observer, one sees a long, irregular line of 
earth running across a field about seven hundred 
yards away and disappearing to one side in a clump 
of woods and to the other behind a very much 
battered group of farm buildings nestling among a 
number of trees. This is the trench of the Allied 
infantr3\ About one hundred and fifty yards 
farther distant is a similar line of dirt across the 
same field. This is the German trench. 

Off to the rear, where are the gtms, one hears 
the hoom as one is discharged, followed by that 
' ' wind-whistling-around-the-corner ' ' noise which 



ARTILLERY IN THE PRESENT WAR 333 

a shell passing overhead always makes, then a thud. 
A cloud of earth and smoke flies up just in front of 
the German trench. The officer takes his eyes from 
his glasses, looks at his map for an instant, and sa3^s 
to the telephone man just below him: "Fifty 
yards short." The operator repeats this into the 
telephone. Almost immediately, another shot is 
fired, this time resulting in an upward spurt of earth 
and dirt just the other side of the German trench. 
The battery which is firing, is doing what is called 
registering; that is, it is finding the exact range to 
difterent points of the enemy's line, so that in case 
there is an attack to be repelled, or to be made, it 
will know just how to fire in order to do the most 
damage. 

The map in the hands of the artillery officer is 
marked oft' in squares five hundred yards to a side. 
As all the maps used by the officers are similarly 
divided, it is eas}' for them to locate b}^ means of 
these squares the position of any object to be fired 
at and to telephone directions, so that the officer 
receiving the communication also easily finds the 
desired object. Incidentally, the observer is very 
careful not to expose the map above the top of the 
parapet, as the movement of any white object 
across the hole in the roof probably would attract 
the attention of some German snipers, who are 
keenly on the watch for all artillery observers. 

While artillery observers in the trenches are 



334 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

nearer to the enemy than those in the roofs of 
houses, the latter can do better work, as they are 
above the level of the ground. The artillery of 
both sides frequently fire at church steeples and 
roofs of houses so as to dislodge as many observers 
of the other side as possible. 

When spotting is done by an observer in an aero- 
plane, a reconnaissance first is made in an attempt 
to locate the enemy's batteries. At the end of the 
reconnaissance, the observer returns to the battery 
and indicates on the map where the enemy's bat- 
teries are located. Whenever the batteries are 
ready to fire, the observer makes another trip in an 
aeroplane to see if the enemy's batteries are still 
in the same place. If they are, he signals to the 
battery, either by wireless or by smoke signals, 
that he is ready to spot. The battery then opens 
fire, and the results of the fire are signalled back 
from the aeroplane. . 

The aeroplane is probably the greatest enemy of 
the modern battery when in action, as it is the only 
sure means the enemy has of discovering the exact 
location of the guns. Frequently batteries stop 
firing when enemy aeroplanes appear in the neigh- 
borhood, as the flash from the gun when it is dis- 
charged attracts the eye of an observer in an 
aeroplane more quickly and more surely than 
anything else. Sometimes, in the hope of deceiv- 
ing observers in aeroplanes, imitation guns made of 



ARTILLERY IN THE PRESENT WAR 335 

logs placed on wheels are put out where they can 
be seen, but not too easily, from an aeroplane. 

While infantry and machine guns in action make 
considerable noise, it is nothing compared with 
that made by the discharge of guns and the burst- 
ing of their projectiles, particularly when a large 
number are firing at one time. The noise of the 
discharge of the ordinary field gun is not very loud. 
The French field guns, however, are fired so rapidly 
that sometimes it seems almost as if they must 
be machine guns of very large caliber. Shrap- 
nel exploding makes a considerable racket. The 
bursts of high-explosive projectiles, even of as small 
a caliber as the three-inch field gun, are particu- 
larly violent. Large guns, when discharged at a 
distance, sound like a heavy door being slammed 
violently. Their projectiles strike the ground with 
a heavy thud and explode, shaking everything in 
the vicinity. The jar from the explosion of a four- 
teen-inch German mortar shell is perceptible some- 
times a mile away. Some of the heavier projectiles 
give out clouds of yellow, whitish smoke; others, 
clouds of black smoke. The distinguishing feature 
of the burst in the air of high- explosive projectiles 
is the instantaneous brilliant flash of white light. 

If the firing is not heavy, the enemy's projectiles 
can be heard coming through the air, and with but 
little experience, the men can tell whether they 
will burst near them or well to the right or left. 



336 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

While high-explosive projectiles are very power- 
ful, the damage done by them does not extend very 
far away from the center of their burst. Although 
the strongest masonry buildings cannot resist 
them, it takes a considerable number to destroy a 
large building, such as the Cloth Hall at Ypres or 
the City Hall at Arras. Only direct hits are 
effective. A case is known of a fourteen-inch 
mortar high-explosive shell which burst in a field 
alongside of a small farmhouse, making a hole in 
the field about fourteen feet in diameter and about 
eight feet deep. The edge of this crater was not 
six feet from the side of the farmhouse. While 
the wall of the farmhouse was spattered with 
earth from top to bottom, no other damage was 
done. Had the projectile hit the farmhouse, it 
would have demolished it. 

A favorite practice is to shell roads along which 
it is reasonable to suppose that men, food, and 
ammunition must proceed to reach the trenches. 
The holes made by shell fire in a macadam road 
vary from about two and one-half feet in diameter 
and one and one-half feet deep made by an ordinary 
field-gun projectile, to ten or eleven feet in diameter 
and six to seven feet deep made b}^ a fourteen- 
inch mortar. In order that the roads may be kept 
open for traffic, engineer soldiers often are kept 
busy in the intervals between shellings filling up 
the holes in the roads. Many times automobiles, 



ARTILLERY IN THE PRESENT WAR 337 

with staff officers in them, going quickly along a 
road, have been hit by shrapnel. Then the auto- 
mobiles look more like colanders than anything 
else. Alongside the ruins of the City Hall in Arras 
are the remnants of two automobiles which were 
caught there and destroyed by bursting shells. 

Bursting shrapnel or high-explosive shells hitting 
among troops in the open, send them down in 
little groups of killed and wounded. As long as 
the men keep well down in a trench they are quite 
safe from shrapnel fire. Even high- explosive shells 
bursting just in front or just in rear of a trench do 
little or no harm. However, when one bursts in 
a trench or just on the edge of it, a great deal of 
damage is done. The larger shells will fill in a 
section of trench with earth for a distance of 
fifteen to twenty yards, killing and wounding 
everybody in that section and burying some under 
the dirt thrown down. The men wounded gen- 
erally not only have one or more bones fractured 
but are frequently very badly mangled as well. 

When shells commence to burst near a battery, 
almost always everyone seeks shelter in the bomb- 
proofs. While these are of sufficient thickness to 
stop fragments and ordinary shells, they will not 
intercept one of the fourteen-inch mortar shells 
should it make a direct hit. Once it is reasonably 
certain, from his fire, that the enemy has found the 
range to a battery, the battery changes its position. 



338 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

Troops and guns may have shells burst very 
near them and yet escape injury. Once, how- 
ever, the shells drop directly among them, the 
damage not only is great but is done very sud- 
denly. A case is known of a battery which occupied 
a position for two months without suffering any 
loss. One morning, a tauhe hovered over it for a 
few minutes. Shortly after, a few shells burst in 
front of the battery and then almost immediately 
they were bursting in the battery. In about three 
minutes, sixteen men were killed, sixty wounded, 
and three guns so badly damaged as to be of no 
further use. 

One of the most striking phenomena of a modern 
battlefield is the way in which artillery fire is 
switched on- and off in different localities. Every- 
thing may be practically quiet in a certain vicinity 
with no shell bursting v/ithin a thousand yards or 
more, and then suddenly, without warning, or only 
with the warning of an aeroplane flying overhead 
and perhaps a preliminary shot or two to find the 
range, that same locality will be torn up by burst- 
ing shells. 

Not only is the material effect produced by 
artillery great, but also the moral effect. There 
are numerous instances where it has proved too 
much for men, causing them, as a consequence, 
to bolt to the rear. This is much more true of 
the British Indians, and the French Moroccans 



ARTILLERY IN THE PRESENT WAR 339 

and Sengalese troops than of the white British and 
French soldiers. 

The cessation of artillery fire, even though it 
leave the troops under heavy infantry fire, 
comes as a welcome relief. One reason for 
this is that under infantry fi_re, the men generally 
are busy firing in return; under artillery fire, they 
often must sit in the bottom of a trench and listen 
to the exploding shells, having plenty of time to 
wonder which one is going to burst among them, 
and now and then seeing the havoc created when 
one does burst nearby. 

Modern artillery has three tremendous advan- 
tages: rapidity of fire, long range, and great 
smashing effect. One of the advantages taken of 
the rapidity of fire is to establish what is called 
a curtain of fire. To do this, the artillery com- 
mander selects a comparatively narrow strip of 
ground in rear of and parallel to the enemy trenches. 
He then has his batteries cover this strip with 
bursting projectiles. Most infantry will not go 
through such a curtain of fire. However, some of 
the most highly-trained and best-disciplined men 
will sometimes do so v/hen such a curtain is made 
up of bursting shrapnel. When high-explosive 
shell is used, practically no one will go through 
it. Of course, this curtain of fire not only shuts 
off any supports needed by the men in the front- 
line trench but their food, water, and ammunition 



340 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

supply as well. Thus, when the enemy's infantry 
attack finally is made, these soldiers, cut off from 
help for several days, have to meet it as best 
they can. 

The long range of modern artillery is used not 
only to smash distant targets, but to keep the 
guns out of range of the enemy's infantry fire, and 
also to concentrate the fire on some one point of 
the enemy's lines without having to assemble the 
guns in one thick line, thus offering a good target 
for the enemy. The smashing effect of modern 
projectiles is of the utmost importance, because, 
coupled with the ability to concentrate, it gives 
the artillery the power literally to tear trenches to 
pieces and make it very difficult for human beings 
to remain alive in them. 

When infantry took to digging itself in, in order 
to gain protection against fire, the artillery lost 
the power it had had in the days of Napoleon of 
actually blowing a hole in the enemy's infantry 
through which its own infantry could advance. 
This was for two reasons: because, until the 
development of high explosives, artillery could not 
materially damage a trench, even if successful in 
getting a shell into it; and because the trajectory 
of the ordinary field gun was so flat that it was 
almost impossible to drop a shell into a trench. 

The short gun, or howitzer, which shoots up 
into the air, causing its shell to drop almost 



ARTILLERY IN THE PRESENT WAR 341 

perpendicularly, could drop a shell into a trench. 
However, it was not very accurate, and as a great 
part of its energy was expended in throwing its 
shell into the air, its range was short. This meant 
it had to come so close that the regular field pieces 
could put it out of action by their fire. If heavier 
guns were manufactured, the difficulties of mov- 
ing them were so great, they could not accompany 
an army. 

As high-explosives were developed, the first of 
these obstacles disappeared. Gradually the rest 
of them have been overcome. The result is that 
the present war shows artillery to have regained 
its old position, in that, in spite of the power of 
modern infantry rifles and of machine guns, in 
spite of the protection of trenches, it once more 
can smash a hole in the enemy's line for its own 
infantry to enter. 

This was the way the Germans and Austro- 
Hungarians broke through the Russian line on the 
Dunajec in May and started the Russian retreat, 
which lost to Russia all of Poland and most of her 
conquests in Galicia. 

When Przemysl was retaken, the fire on the 
forts, which incidentally, because of their promi- 
nent position, made excellent targets, was so 
intense that the Russians withdrew their infantry. 
They apparently intended to rush them back in 
time to meet the German infantry attack. The 



342 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

latter were too quick for them, however, and had 
the forts before the Russian infantry could come 
up again. 

The smashing effect of well-handled modern 
artillery, when it has a good target, is so great 
that the Russians removed their artillery from 
some of the Polish fortresses and used it from 
field positions while defending these places. This 
was true both at Ivangorod and Brest Litovsk, 
the two southern fortresses of the Polish quad- 
rilateral. 

General Kovos, the Hungarian general who took 
Ivangorod, stated that on most occasions where a 
heavy artillery fire was concentrated on a Russian 
infantry trench, they would withdraw their infan- 
try to bomb-proofs in rear of it. They then 
would try to get back to it during the interval in 
which the attacker's artillery must stop, for fear 
of hitting his own advancing infantry. 

He also stated that one of the contributing 
causes of the Russian retreat was the fact that 
they apparently did not have as much artillery 
ammunition as the Germans and Austro-Hungar- 
ians. Therefore, they were unable to keep the 
German and Austro-Hungarian artillery fire down, 
or to subject the enemy's infantry to so heavy a 
fire as the Russian infantry had to stand. Cer- 
tainly, the volume of German-Austro-Hungarian 
artillery fire whenever an action was going on and 



ARTILLERY IN THE PRESENT WAR 343 

the large piles of artillery ammunition always 
seen in central points in rear of a battlefield, 
testified to the possession of immense quantities. 

General Kovos said that the large caliber and long 
range of the big guns more than outbalanced the 
much more rapid rate of fire of the usual field gun 
when attacking an intrenched position. The large 
caliber permits of a sufficient amount of high- 
explosive being used in the projectile to do consid- 
erable damage. The great range permits the gun 
to be used out of range of the enemy's light field 
pieces, which, if within range, because of their 
rapidity of fire, could drive away or destroy the 
crews of the big guns. 

He said that the rapidity of fire of the light guns, 
of course, was invaluable whenever troops came 
into the open for an attack or when driven from their 
position and retreating. 

The Austro-Hungarian 305-mm. howitzer has 
been very efficient throughout the war. A large 
part of the work credited by the Allies to the 
420-mm. in reality has been done by the 305-mm. 

One of its marked features is its mobility. This 
305-mm. howitzer, the carriage of which is in two 
parts, and a steel platform on which the gun and 
carriage rest during firing, travel on four steel 
trucks with heavy wheels, which are pulled by 
one or more traction engines, depending upon the 
condition of the roads. When the firing position 



344 • WHY PREPAREDNESS 

is reached, the ground is leveled, the steel platform 
put down, and the gun and carriage mounted on it. 
The roar of these guns as they are fired, the noise 
of their projectiles going through the air and their 
burst as they land, can be distinguished above all 
the other din of combat. 

Two of these guns, called affectionately by their 
crews Greta and Louisa, participated in the artillery 
preparations which preceded the assault on the 
Russian position in front of Ivangorod. Though 
seventy Austro-Hungarian guns were in action, 
and to their left probably an equal nimiber of Ger- 
man ones, to say nothing of the Russian guns, the 
noise made by Greta and Louisa was heard above all. 

While the increase in the power of artillery has 
been tremendous, it must not be forgotten that 
advantage of this increased power can be taken 
only when competent gun crews and officers handle 
the guns and well-trained infantry are ready not 
only to enter the gap made by the artillery but to 
keep from being shoved out, and to enlarge the 
opening until the enemy is forced to retreat. 



CHAPTER XXX 

CAVALRY IN MODERN WAR 

September, igi6. 

AMONG the ideas which have gained currency 
since the outbreak of war, the most erron- 
eous is the behef that the day of cavalry is past. 
This misconception apparently is founded on the 
thought that the accuracy and volume of modern 
fire limits cavalry to reconnaissance duties, and that 
even these duties are being usurped by aeroplanes. 

It is true that mounted charges are few and far 
between, but all cavalries are armed with rifles and 
are therefore able to fight dismounted as infantry. 
This method, well understood in the American 
cavalry since the Civil War, is being practiced 
more and more by European cavalry, particularly 
the German cavalry, which has made extensive 
use of dismounted action. 

At the beginning of the war, the German patrols 
sent out to gather information, whenever attacked, 
promptly galloped to the rear and behind carefully- 
concealed dismounted cavalry with machine guns. 
This resulted in many cases of French and British 
cavalry being badly cut by the fire of the dis- 
mounted men and the machine guns, and was the 
cause of reports that the German cavalry had run 
away. 

345 



346 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

The great point about cavalry is its mobility. 
It can get over long distances in a manner which 
infantry never can equal. Even the use of large 
ntmibers of motor-buses does not give the infantry 
the same mobility, as there are not enough buses 
to carry large bodies of troops and these buses are 
confined to good roads. 

Cavalry played a significant role on both sides 
in the Allied retreat and the German advance to 
the Marne. During the battle of the Marne, the 
German cavalry held the gap in the German line 
between von Kluck's flank guard north of Meaux 
and his main force on the right flank of the main 
German line. "When the Allies were endeavoring 
to extend their line to Antwerp, and the Germans 
were trying to reach the Belgian coast in October, 
1 91 4, the cavalry of both sides played an extremely 
important part in the region of Lille and Ypres; 
in fact, a large part of all the earlier engagements 
in this region were fought by cavalry. 

In the eastern, or Russian, theatre of war, the 
cavalry has played a prominent role from the 
beginning. Both the Germans and the Austro- 
Hungarians continually speak of how their move- 
ments have been hampered by the superior numbers 
of the Russian regular cavalry. 

The general of the Twelfth Austro-Hungarian 
Army Corps is an officer, who has spent his whole 
life in the infantry service. On being asked his 




FRENCH DISMOUNTED CAVALRYMEN ARMED AND OPERATING AS 
INFANTRYMEN IN FLANDERS 




HUNGARIAN CAVALRYMEN 



CAVALRY IN MODERN WAR 347 

opinion, formed from personal experience, as to 
the usefulness, or the contrary, of cavalry under 
modern war conditions, he stated that it could 
be taken as axiomatic that as long as war existed 
on this earth, cavalry not only would be useful 
but highly necessary. 

He added that on his recent advance through 
southern Poland, he found the Russian retreat 
covered by large bodies of cossacks, and that only 
the fighting superiority of his cavalry enabled him 
to push the Russians the way he wished. While 
in this case the Russian cavalry probably was 
superior to his in numbers, they were made up of 
cossacks whose fighting qualities are distinctly 
inferior to those of the regular Russian cavalry. 

He also stated that however much the aeroplane 
might replace cavalry in reconnaissance work, 
this would not affect the value of cavalry, because 
mobility is its chief asset, and in these days of 
long battle fronts, mobility makes cavalry espe- 
cially valuable as a reserve. 

A good example of the use of cavalry in filling 
in gaps between different forces was afforded by 
this same advance. The Austro-Hungarian and 
German troops coming in general from the west, 
had driven the Russians into Ivangorod on the 
Vistula. At the same time, the army of the 
Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, with that of von 
Mackensen on its right, was advancing in general 

24 



348 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

from the south between the Vistula and the Bug 
rivers. 

When the army coming from the east halted in 
front of Ivangorod, the Austro-Hungarian cavalry 
division belonging to it took position on the right, 
or southern, flank along a front of more than ten 
kilometers along the Vistula. They then brought 
detachments across the river which finally came 
in touch with the Archduke's cavalry coming from 
the south, thus filling in the gaps between the two 
armies and making the Russian position in Ivan- 
gorod more precarious. Later, when some infantry 
divisions had succeeded in crossing the Vistula 
between Warsaw and Ivangorod, it was discovered 
that there was a considerable gap in the Russian 
line between these two places. 

Each infantry division of an army has a certain 
amount of cavalry attached to it, called divisional 
cavalry. In addition, every army has its inde- 
pendent cavalry division, that is, divisions made 
up entirely of cavalry. 

Immediately this hole was discovered, ninety- 
six squadrons (about 15,000 men) were gathered 
together by taking the cavalry division attached 
to the Twelfth Corps, all the divisional cavalry of 
the corps, and most of the Archduke's cavalry. 
These ninety-six squadrons then were shoved into 
the gap between the Russian forces, and because 
of their mobility were able to display such activity 



CAVALRY IN MODERN WAR 349 

as to hasten considerably the evacuation of Ivan- 
gorod and the retreat of the Russians from the 
Vistula to the Bug River. 

At the present time, due to the difficulty of 
getting exact data covering both sides of every 
action in which cavalry has been engaged in this 
war, it is too early to come to definite conclusions. 
However, there are certain marked tendencies 
which seem to indicate, in a general way, what 
these conclusions will be. 

While prior to the Franco-Prussian War, cavalry 
with some exceptions, nearly always was used for 
reconnaissance purposes, this duty was always 
subordinate to that of taking part in the battle 
proper and, above all, in completing a victory 
by pursuing, cutting off, capturing, or otherwise 
destroying the retreating enemy. 

The Franco- Prussian War put emphasis upon 
the reconnaissance duties of cavalry, because the 
German cavalry took advantage of the fact that 
the French cavalry mostly was kept concentrated 
and with the infantry to spread out far in front 
of the German armies for reconnaissance purposes, 
also because both cavalries disdained to fight on 
foot and, therefore, contented themselves with 
waiting for opportunities to make mounted attacks. 
These opportunities came but seldom, and in the 
majority of cases furnished examples of the failure 
of the mounted attack rather than the reverse. 



350 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

Many of the more thoughtful cavalry officers in 
all countries have felt for years that undue emphasis 
was being put on the reconnaissance duties of 
cavalry, and that cavalry should not consider itself 
an obsolete fighting arm merely because it cannot 
habitually use the saber, any more than infantry 
should rule itself off the battlefield because 'it 
cannot habitually use the bayonet. 

These cavalry officers have welcomed the pos- 
sibility of the aeroplane taking over the duties of 
reconnaissance from the cavalry, as that means 
the end of the period in which cavalry has been 
split up into small bodies, and the return to its 
use in large bodies under cavalry leaders. In 
other words, its use would be on a much larger 
scale, but in the same manner in which Sheridan 
in the closing days of our Civil War cut off and 
destroyed Ewell, Lee's rear guard, and afterward 
stopped Lee until the infantry could arrive. 

The exponents of this use of cavalry point out 
the fact that though there have been big advances 
and retreats in the present war, there have been 
no decisive victories, with the exception of 
those gained by the Germans in East Prussia 
which, considering the situation as a whole, were 
relatively small. The reason is that infantry can- 
not catch infantry. Cavalry can; but as modern 
infantry travels in large numbers, it can take care 
of itself, unless attacked by large bodies of troops. 



CAVALRY IN MODERN WAR 351 

Thus, it will be seen, a decisive victory can be 
gained only by catching the enemy's infantry. 
This can only be done by cavalry, but it will not 
be successful then, unless the cavalry is numerous. 



CHAPTER XXXI 

MACHINE GUNS IN THE PRESENT WAR 

September, 1915. 

THE present war has brought about a great 
development in the use of machine guns. 
The proportion of these guns to troops has greatly- 
increased, particularly on the defensive; in fact, 
the number used in defending a position seems 
only to be limited by the number which can be 
obtained. 

Prior to the war, there were two schools with 
respect to the best use of machine guns. One 
school was inclined to use them very much as 
artillery; that is, at long ranges, and to cover the 
advance of infantry or dismounted cavalry. The 
other school maintained that a machine gun pro- 
duced infantry fire, that it could not compete in 
any way with artillery, and was useful merely to 
supplement or replace infantry fire, not only at 
infantry ranges but especially at the shorter ranges. 

This latter school insisted that machine guns 
were valuable chiefly as a reserve, to be put in at 
decisive moments when the fight had become 
intense. In other words, when the infantry or 
dismounted cavalry had reached a decisive range, 
where a sudden increase in the volume of fire might 
mean the beating down of the enemy's fire or the 

352 



MACHINE GUNS IN THE WAR 353 

prevention of the enemy's fire reaching an over- 
whelming volume, the battalion or regimental 
commander, by putting his machine guns in action, 
could produce the desired effect, because of the 
ability of the machine gun to produce suddenly a 
large volumic of fire, which, though not accurate at 
long ranges, is sufficiently so at the shorter ranges. 

In all attacks the supporting artillery ceases to 
fire when its own infantry or dismounted cavalry 
has arrived near the enemy's trenches, otherwise 
they might hit them, as has happened at various 
times during the present war, particularly during 
the British attack at Neuve Chapelle, in March 
of this year. 

The range at which the artillery stops firing 
depends, naturally, on circumstances, but is gener- 
ally such that the attacking troops have to cover 
the last two or three hundred yards to the enemy's 
trenches, unsupported by the fire of artillery. 
The school which believed in using machine guns 
to increase the volume of fire in the last stages of 
the fire fight, maintained that this stage of the 
attack was, above all others, the time when 
the machine guns should come into action, and 
by their volume of fire keep the enemy down in 
his trenches so that the attacking troops can reach 
the position in sufficient numbers to capture it. 
Thus far, the present war seems to have borne out 
entirely the contention of this school. Machine-gun 



354 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

fire has not proved particularly effective at long 
ranges, especially when the amount of ammu- 
nition used is considered. What is more important, 
is that machine guns by opening fire at long ranges 
frequently betray their position, with the result 
that the enemy's artillery promptly fires on them 
and either drives them off or destroys them. 
Because of the range of artillery and the power 
of its projectiles, machine guns are powerless 
against it. 

The cavalry machine guns have been very useful 
in all the big advances and retreats. They have 
also been used in the trenches, when the cavalry 
has taken its turn in them, as has been done by 
the cavalry of all armies. On the advances and 
retreats, the machine guns, with dismounted cav- 
alrymen using rifles have been used to support 
the patrols sent out to gather information, to 
delay the advance of the enemy's cavalry, and 
frequently to ambush large parties of enemy 
cavalry which have advanced too precipitately. 

It is particularly in the defense of an intrenched 
position that machine guns are useful. Here, as in 
a fight in the open field, they must not open fire 
too soon, or the hostile artillery will wipe them 
out. Therefore, they generally remain silent until 
the enemy's infantry comes out of its trenches and 
starts across the intervening space in its endeavor 
to capture its opponent's trenches. Then the 




Courtesy Chicago Tribune 

FRENCH MACHINE GUN READY FOR ACTION 



MACHINE GUNS IN THE WAR 355 

machine guns open fire and keep it up until the 
last of the enemy left alive or unwounded have 
run back into their own trench, or until captured 
or put out of action by a hand grenade, should 
the attack prove successful. 

The Germans frequently arrange their trenches 
so that if occupied by the enemy a machine gun 
can fire down them, thus enfilading and driving 
them out. If the configuration of the ground will 
permit it, they place most of their machine guns 
in some position back of the first line, to avoid 
probable destruction by the heavy shelling to 
which a trench is subjected by the enemy's artillery 
before an attack is made. 

In accordance with this principle, where the 
Germans have been able to prepare a position 
ahead of time, they select a gentle slope and put 
three lines of trenches on it. The machine guns 
are placed in the last line, thus being able to shoot 
not only over the first two lines at any approach- 
ing enemy, but to make a strong third line very 
difficult to capture, even though the first two 
lines are taken; then, too, until this third line is 
captured and a hole thus broken entirely through 
the position, little is gained by the capture of the 
first two lines. 

Frequently in Poland there have been large 
stretches of country where the invaders have had 
no other desire than to remain on the defensive 



356 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

Here the Germans strongly intrenched and garri- 
soned the important points. Between these points 
they constructed several lines of trenches, each 
having a wide barbed- wire entanglement in front. 
These trenches have comparatively few troops in 
them, but a considerable number of machine guns. 
While a Russian attack might succeed in breaking 
through most of the entanglements, in spite of 
the machine-gun fire, it would take so long that 
the German reserves from central points in the 
rear of the line would have ample time to come up. 

Considerable use has been made of the machine 
gun for sniping purposes. In this use the gun, 
loaded and ready to fire, is carefully aimed at a 
loophole, or some other point, where one of the 
enemy is liable to appear. The man operating 
the gun takes position alongside and with a pair 
of field glasses watches the point chosen. Instantly 
any one appears, he fires the gun. Apparently 
this method of sniping has been very effective. 

In general, it may be said that now that the 
machine gun is being used in its proper sphere — 
as infantry, not as artillery — it has more than 
justified its existence when handled by well -trained 
men, as is best shown by the rapid increase in 
nimiber in all armies at present in the field. 



CHAPTER XXXII 

AIRCRAFT IN THE PRESENT WAR 

April, 1 91 5. 

THE present war is the first one in which air- 
craft have been used to any great extent. 
What has been done with them up to the present 
is intensely interesting, as it shows their positive 
uses and Hmitations, as opposed to what before 
the war was merely opinion. 

In working with aircraft before the war, the 
military authorities of the different countries soon 
realized their great limitations so far as being offen- 
sive weapons was concerned. These men believed 
that their chief functions would be reconnaissance, 
the gaining of information, and the observation 
of the effect of fire on the enemy. But not so the 
public; its mind was concentrated on the destruc- 
tion which might be brought about by aircraft. 
Serious articles were written showing how aircraft, 
by dropping bombs on battleships, on towns, and 
on columns of troops and guns were going to render 
war impossible. One of the most sedate of Ameri- 
can magazines at one time published a long article 
with illustrations, showing, among other things, 
how a column of infantry while marching down a 
road would allow itself, without making any resist- 
ance, to be wiped out by an enemy aeroplane which 

357 



358 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

hovered overhead and vigorously used a number 

of machine guns. 

In aviation contests, machines flew over nicely 
outlined battleships marked on the green grass, 
while the aviators from heights, very often no 
greater than three hundred feet — hardly more 
than pistol range — dropped bombs on the out- 
lined battleships. In their mind's eye, the specta- 
tors saw a twelve-million-dollar dreadnought flying 
into fragments. The public habitually made two 
errors: in overestimating the effect of high explo- 
sives, and in forgetting that warships and troops 
are able to hit, and hit very hard, and that this 
very ability to hit is the reason for their being 
brought into existence. 

In all the big armies of Europe, a great deal of 
money was spent in perfecting, so far as possible, 
aircraft for military purposes. Great Britain and 
the United States lagged behind, as their govern- 
ments paid little or no attention to the pleas of 
their military officers for enough money to make 
proper preparation for war in this new arm; this 
is even more true in the United States than in 
Great Britain. France apparently led in military 
aviation. However, in all French aviation schools 
there were considerable numbers of Germans, who 
always worked hard and had little to say. What 
the German military aviators were doing in their 
own country was kept very quiet, so that the world, 



AIRCRAFT IN THE PRESENT WAR 359 

as a whole, in thinking of aviation and Germany, 
thought only of the Zeppelins. When the war 
broke out, it was soon found that the Germans had 
an immense fleet of aeroplanes manned by expert 
aviators, and that several types of these machines 
were much faster than anything the Allies then 
had. These faster types proved to be modifications 
of fast French types with better engines. 

So far, the war has shown that military opinion 
prior to the war was right, and that the chief value 
of aircraft, in their present stage of develop- 
ment, is in reconnaissance and in observation of 
artillery fire. 

Speed is of the greatest importance for three 
reasons. In the face of a head wind, it is very 
difficult for a machine to make progress. Should 
the wind be blowing toward the enemy, and should 
a machine over the enemy's lines not have sufficient 
power to overcome it and come back to its own side, 
it would have to come down in the enemy's lines. 
This has happened several times during the present 
war. The greater the height at which the machine 
flies, the less the observer in it can see of the enemy. 
If it comes down too close to the ground, it offers 
a much easier target to the enemy's artillery. The 
importance of speed, therefore, is evident for the 
faster it moves, the harder it is to hit; also if a ma- 
chine cannot outfly the enemy's machines, it 
cannot escape from them when attacked by several ; 



36o WHY PREPAREDNESS 

neither can it overtake an escaping enemy machine. 

The great difficulty in reconnaissance is the 
height at which the fire of troops and guns compels 
aviators to keep. Before the war, aviators thought 
that at a height of three thousand feet they would 
be reasonably safe from infantry fire. The bring- 
ing down of several machines and the many bullet 
holes made in others by infantry fire have taught 
them that they must keep up at least six or seven 
thousand feet. At this height they are not at all 
safe from the enemy's artillery and must keep mov- 
ing quickly and constantly to escape being hit. 
Under very accurate artillery fire, aviators are 
compelled to go even to greater heights, or to come 
back more over their own lines, either one of which 
seriously hinders observation. 

Long columns of troops marching along roads, or 
lines of trenches where the dirt turned up is of a 
different color from the rest of the landscape, are 
easily picked out by an observer. Individuals, 
troops in extended order not moving, guns well dug 
in or otherwise concealed and not firing — these 
are very difficult to find. Even a trained officer 
must have considerable experience before he can 
become a really good observer. 

The concealing of everything, which is the 
marked characteristic of the modern battlefield, 
was brought about by a desire to avoid the intense 
fire of modern artillery, and it has been increased 



AIRCRAFT IN THE PRESENT WAR 361 

by the desire to prevent the success of aeroplane 
reconnaissance. Observers study the landscape 
carefully so that they learn to recognize any differ- 
ernce in it from a normal landscape; for instance, 
four hay stacks more or less in line and near each 
other immediately excite the suspicion of a trained 
observer for this is not the way a French 
farmer piles up his hay. The hay undoubtedly 
conceals guns covered during the intervals between 
action. The flashes from guns in action enable 
observers most quickly to locate an artillery posi- 
tion. Due to the difficulties of observation, a num- 
ber of aeroplanes, as a rule, are sent out at the same 
time, each with a different object or set of objects 
to look for. In this way, much better results are 
obtained than when each observer tries to find out 
everything it is desired to know about the enemy. 

The height and speed at which aeroplanes must 
travel when over the enemy's line render it difficult 
to see anything below. To overcome this, they 
travel in spirals up and down; this makes them 
appear like hawks looking for prey. 

The long ranges at which modern artillery fires 
and the efforts made by each side to conceal its 
batteries so that they may escape the intense fire 
of enemy artillery, make the efficient observation 
of fire by ordinary means almost impossible. There- 
fore observation of fire has become, along with 
reconnaissance, the chief duty of aviators. 



362 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

In the performance of this duty, the aviator, as 
in reconnaissance, has three enemies: bad weather, 
the enemy's fire, and the enemy's aircraft. He 
has also another difficulty — to signal to the guns 
what he has observed, as he cannot come down 
and go up after each salvo has been fired. Various 
means are used. One simple method, but one 
which does not give very accurate results, is the 
use of smoke bombs. The observer drops various 
kinds or numbers of smoke bombs to indicate 
whether the fire is short or over, right or left, or a 
hit. Sometimes the aeroplane is moved in different 
directions to indicate the same thing. The most 
satisfactory method for sending news from the aero- 
plane to the guns is by wireless, but the reverse 
does not work well, if for no other reason than that 
the noise of the machine makes it very difficult to 
receive a message. 

Aeroplanes fiying well up in the air with shrapnel 
bursting all around them are seen almost daily 
at the battle front and often several times the same 
day. As the aeroplane's chief value lies in recon- 
naissance or observation, it is important, if possi- 
ble, to keep it from performing either of these duties. 
The field guns, while they seldom bring down any 
of these craft, manage by their fire to keep them 
at a considerable height and even at times prevent 
them from coming over their lines. Most of the 
anti-aircraft guns designed before the war have 



AIRCRAFT IN THE PRESENT WAR 363 

been found not sufficiently powerful, for the reason 
that when they were designed, it was expected that 
aeroplanes could keep at lesser heights than they 
have been able to do. This has resulted in heavier 
guns being mounted in such a way as to permit 
them to fire easily up in the air in all directions. 

Probably the best means of decisively attacking 
an aircraft is to concentrate on it a number of 
similar craft, and thus either destroy it or chase it 
away. 

The fact that aeroplanes can carry so little weight 
not only prevents their being armed with anything 
but rifles or very light machine guns, but renders 
them unable to carry very much ammunition. 
Their constant movements in so many directions 
make them very unsatisfactory platforms from 
which to fire, particularly at such a moving target 
as is made by another aeroplane. 

There have been a few air-duels in which one of 
the combatants has been brought down, and there 
have been several instances where a number of 
aeroplanes have attacked and destroyed another. 
As a rule, however, after a few preliminary move- 
ments, one machine or the other generally decides 
its opponent to be too strong and makes off; or, an 
aeroplane seeing it is about to be attacked by. 
several, makes off before the attack can be delivered. 

The main weapons of offense used by aeroplanes 
are steel arrows and bombs. The bombs are of 

25 



364 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

high -explosives or of an incendiary nature. The 
arrows are of steel, about as long as an ordinary 
lead pencil and pointed at one end like a very sharp 
lead pencil. The greater part of the body is cut 
away into four flanges, which tend to steady the 
flight of the arrow through the air. These arrows 
are put up in a vertical position in large numbers 
in a wooden box, the bottom of which can be pulled 
out. When the aviator is ready to drop his arrows, 
he pulls out the bottom of the box, and the arrows 
fall in a cloud. They are chiefly for use against 
troops. There are said to be cases where these 
arrows pierced men from head to foot. 

The explosive bombs are used not only against 
troops but against trenches, buildings, guns, or 
material of any kind. The incendiary bombs are 
used chiefly to set fire to aeroplane hangars, fac- 
tories, etc., the destruction of which is possible by 
fire. These bombs may be used in the region occu- 
pied by the enemy's army, or against places far 
beyond the greatest range of artillery. 

It is very difficult to hit a desired object with a 
bomb dropped from an aeroplane, as with an aero- 
plane going from sixty to seventy miles or more an 
hour, when the bomb first is dropped, it is given a 
decided impulse in the same direction as that in 
which the aeroplane is moving. Until the impulse 
downward given by gravity becomes strong enough 
entirely to overcome the other, the bomb does not 



AIRCRAFT IN THE PRESENT WAR 365 

move straight dovv'n; in other words, its path,when 
first dropped, is a curved one with the curve bulging 
in the direction in which the aeroplane is moving. 

A wounded British aviator, in speaking of the 
difficulty of dropping bombs on the desired target, 
expressed it by saying: "Suppose you put a high 
hat on the sidewalk alongside the Singer Building 
in New York, and then went to one of the top stories 
and tried to drop a pea into it, how, well do you 
think you would succeed?" 

The bomb carried by ordinary aeroplanes pro- 
duces no greater effect when it lands, and generally 
not nearly so great an effect, as that produced by 
the projectile from an ordinary field gun; in fact, the 
projectiles from the heavier field guns do much 
more damage. This is where the Zeppelins have 
an advantage over aeroplanes — they can carry 
more and heavier bombs. 

The dropping of bursting projectiles on the heads 
of troops is nothing new, because the projectiles 
fired from howitzers and mortars apparently come 
straight down from overhead. Therefore, when 
it comes to troops within range of the artillery, the 
artillery can produce a much greater effect, due to 
its accuracy of fire, the larger projectiles which it 
can use, and to the much greater number which it 
can fire. Also, aircraft can be seen, and the troops 
know that unless they are directly underneath, they 
are not in any danger; while artillery can drop its 



366 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

bombs anywhere, and onco within range, troops 

reahze they are in danger of being hit at any 

moment. 

In its present stage of development, the offensive 
vahie of aeroplanes used against troops is almost a 
negligible quantity. In their ability to earry a 
certain amount of destruction to the enemy's 
people and material out of the zone of the annies 
lies the chief offensive value of the aircraft. Even 
here the eff'ect is chiefly moral, in that no one can 
feel entirely safe as to his person or as to his prop- 
erty, whei'eas fonnerly, once clear of the zone of 
the armies, there was no need to worry, either as 
to the safety of the one or of the other. 

The material damage done by aircraft bombs is 
not gi*eat. During the raid made by the fanben 
on Paris, in the earlier part of the war, there was 
but little material destruction, because the results 
of explosion of bombs were extremely local in their 
character, the pieces fl^Hng only very short dis- 
tances, and because most bombs aimed at impor- 
tant points, like railway stations and supply dep6ts, 
generally missed them. 

In tlie recent Zeppelin raid over Paris. e\'idently 
much hea\'ier bombs were used than those droppevi 
from the tauben. The holes made by these bombs 
were as much as fifteen to eighteen feet across and 
ten feet deep. One of these fell exactly in the 
center of the roof of a two-stor\- masonrv house, 



AIRCRAFT IN THE PRESENT WAR 367 

carrying with it a large piece of the roof, a large 
section of the second story, and a similar piece of 
the first story, down into the cellar. In spite of 
the fact that it practically ruined the entire center 
of the house, which was not a large one, there was 
no great destruction for an}" distance in lateral 
directions. 

Another bomb came through the glass roof of a 
factory, smashing most of the glass. It made a 
hole in the cement floor about twelve feet across 
and nine feet deep. Here, too, the destruction was 
extremely local in character, machinery and manu- 
factured products thirty to forty feet or more dis- 
tant from the center of explosion escaping any 
damage. 

Such fires as were started by the incendiary 
bombs, likewise dropped b}' the Zeppelins, were 
not at all fierce in nature, and were put out almost 
immediately, before any great damage could be 
done. x\lthough the Zeppelin raid was more or 
less of a surprise, and although the Zeppelin flew 
over and dropped bombs on the manufacturing 
districts of Paris, from a military point of view the 
damage done was of little consequence, as many of 
the bombs missed the objects aimed at, and such 
hits as were made, while causing great damage at 
the center of impact, had little or no effect a 
short distance away from it. 

When the war broke out, it was believed that the 



368 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

casualties among aviators would be very high. It 
is said that the French government expected and 
prepared for a casualty list of one hundred per cent 
of the original aviators. But up to the present 
it has been quite small compared with the casualties 
suffered by a great many regiments. In spite of 
this, however, the strain on aviators is much greater 
than that on the average officer and soldier. 

Formerly generals could sit on their horses on a 
hill and see practically all of their own army and all 
of the enemy's army, while watching w^hat was 
taking place. As the range and power of weapons 
increased, armies had to spread over more country 
and to conceal themselves more or less to avoid 
losses. The armies also greatly increased in size, 
so that the generals not only were unable to tell 
what the enemy was doing, but had much greater 
difficulty in keeping track of their own forces; in 
other words, as time passed armies became more and 
more blind. By diverting cavalry from its proper 
role as a fighting force and changing it into a body 
of patrols and scouts, an effort was made to clear 
up the darkness concerning the enemy. At best, 
this use of the cavalry was unsatisfactory. 

With the appearance of the aircraft, armies 
once more are able to see. Generals once more 
are being put in a position where they can keep 
in close touch with their own forces, as well as 
find out something of what their enemy is doing. 



AIRCRAFT IN THE PRESENT WAR 369 

In former days artillery officers were able to see 
their target, the enemy, but a short distance in 
front of them, and consequently could tell what 
effect their fire was having. As the increased effi- 
ciency of modern firearms compelled fighting at 
greater and greater ranges and more and more con- 
cealment on the part of the troops engaged, the 
artillery, through the difficulty of observing the 
effect of their fire became, like generals, more and 
more blind. The aeroplane, with its ability to tell 
the artillery officers how well they are shooting, 
tends to restore to these officers the control they 
had when they fired with their batteries at in- 
fantry only six or seven hundred yards away. 

In the present stage of their development, recon- 
naissance and the reporting of the effect of artillery 
fire are undoubtedly the chief functions of aircraft. 



CHAPTER XXXIII 

RECONNAISSANCE AND ESPIONAGE IN THE PRESENT 

WAR 

April, 1 91 5. 

CORRECT information as to the military prep- 
arations of a country which may be a future 
enemy is of great value in peace time. The impor- 
tance of exact knowledge of an enemy, his troops 
and their movements in war time cannot be exag- 
gerated. With the exception of Japan, undoubt- 
edly, no modern nation goes to such pains and 
expense, both in peace and in war time to gain this 
information as does Germany. As the war con- 
tinues, the Allies are coming more and more to 
understand the extent to which Germany made 
preparations in peace time, so that her generals 
might receive information of value during war. 

Information may be gained either by soldiers or 
officers working in their own uniform, or by soldiers 
or civilians working in civilian clothes or in some 
uniform of the enemy. 

From the beginning, German soldiers and officers 
in uniform have displayed great daring in obtaining 
information. Every army is preceded by scouts 
and patrols. The German scouts and patrols have 
not hesitated to push boldly long distances ahead of 
and to the flanks of their army. Quite a number 
of the prisoners captured after the battle of the 

370 



RECONNAISSANCE AND ESPIONAGE 371 

Marne consisted of patrols which had reached the 
rear of the Allies' lines and continued to push 
forward, not aware of the German retreat, or 
perhaps aware of it, but cut off and unable to get 
back. From time to time, these men were found 
hidden in forests, or were driven by hunger to 
come out of their hiding places and surrender. 
As the Germans retreated, they deliberately left 
behind soldiers and officers who hid in deserted 
farm houses and other places until the Allied troops 
had passed beyond them, so that they might be in 
rear of the Allies' line. 

Since the two armies have settled down in their 
two long lines of trenches facing each other, there 
is another way by which Germans in uniform get 
behind the lines of the Allies. The Germans have 
made many attacks on the Allies' trenches. In a 
number of instances, the head of the attack 
succeeds in breaking all the way through the line. 
The line then being closed up, these men find them- 
selves in rear of it and unable to get back. As these 
attacks are generally at night, it is easy for men 
cut off in this manner to take advantage of the 
darkness to hide in a deserted farm house or one of 
the many hay stacks scattered all over the battle- 
field. While some surrender or are captured, appar- 
ently there are always a number who choose to 
hide. During the day-time they remain hidden, 
but at night, they come out and shoot up small 



372 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

parties of troops or convoys of supplies. Their 
chances of doing this are excellent for several rea- 
sons. In the first place, a modern battlefield, being 
several miles from front to rear, furnishes in its 
many deserted buildings and its terrain ample 
opportunity for concealment. When fighting is 
going on, the fire frequently comes from a nimiber 
of directions, so that suspicion is not necessarily 
excited by its coming from what appears to be one 
of the flanks. The intense fire of modern arms has 
compelled practically all supply, troop, and indi- 
vidual movements to take place at night. In some 
places these German snipers behind the line have 
done so much damage that not only have sentries 
had to be posted in most of the ditches and near 
most of the deserted houses, but also regular 
expeditions have had to be organized to hunt them 
down. 

As long as men remain in their uniform, it is 
comparatively easy, once they have been seen, to 
catch or kill them. When a soldier or officer 
changes his uniform for that of his enemy, he does 
considerably more damage before he can be caught, 
if caught at all. 

There have been a number of incidents where 
Germans, dressed either in French or British 
uniform, have driven around in rear of the lines in 
a motor-car. In one case, several officers from 
British headquarters went out at night in one of 



RECONNAISSANCE AND ESPIONAGE 373 

the motor-cars belonging to that headquarters. 
They have not been seen since, although the car 
was reported that night and the next day in a 
number of different places, just in rear of the lines. 
As the occupants were in French uniforms, and 
did not answer the physical description of the 
British officers who started out with the car, 
undoubtedly the original occupants were disposed 
of by Germans dressed in French uniforms who 
then proceeded to use the car. 

There was a British evacuation hospital at B 

which, of course, was just off the edge of the battle- 
field, and where, during the fighting, hundreds of 
wounded from a considerable part of the line were 
received each day. One day, in October, a man 
wearing the uniform of a sergeant of the royal 
army medical corps reported to the hospital. He 
said he belonged to a certain field ambulance but 
had become separated from it, and was reporting 
to the hospital for duty. He spoke English per- 
fectly, his uniform was correct, and there was 
nothing in any way suspicious about him or his 
arrival, as in heavy fighting men frequently become 
separated from their units and in such cases should 
report to the nearest similar unit. But his eager- 
ness to question all wounded and his fluent Ger- 
man, when he spoke to German wounded prisoners, 
excited suspicion. Investigation showed that he 
did not belong to the R. A. M. C. nor to the British 



374 ^^'HY PREPAREDNESS 

ami}" at all. As a result of a court-martial, he was 

shot as a sp}-. 

Often spies or enemy sympathizers operating in 
rear of the lines cut the telephone and telegraph 
^vires leading from different headquarters to the 
trenches and from artillery observing officers to 
the batteries. 

A British infantry officer said that never yet 
had the Geniians made a night attack on the 
trenches where he was stationed, that a house or 
hay stack, or something else inflammable, just in 
rear of the trenches did not blaze up. In this way 
they were always silhouetted against the light 
from the flames, enabling the Germans to see them 
easily, but they could not readil}' see the Gennans 
in the dark. 

The men of a British battery caught a woman 
signalling with a lamp from a hole in the roof of 
a house. They were led to this discovery by the 
fact that although their battery had just changed 
to a new position, the Gennan fire followed it, and 
was almost immediateh* effective in that it killed 
several men. 

The men and officers of another battery noticed 
an old woman ^^th a dog, who very often passed 
near the battery. One day, one of the officers 
became suspicious and followed her a distance. 
He saw her. when safely behind a hedge where she 
was out of sight of the battery, release the dog from 



RECONNAISSANCE AND ESPIONAGE 375 

its leash. The dog immediately ran as fast as it 
could straight for the German lines. 

Several infantry soldiers going along a road on the 
battlefield wanted some water. They called to 
what was apparently an old woman on crutches. 
As she paid no attention, they started towards her. 
She immediately dropped her crutches, gathered 
up her skirts, displaying a pair of very strong 
masculine legs, and made off as fast as she could 
for a neighboring wood. 

That the German information system works well 
has been shown again and again by the way in 
which German batteries promptly find with their 
fire the Allied batteries which have changed posi- 
tion during the night. 

The town of L , which is within artillery 

range of the Germans, was visited one day by an 
army corps commander and some of his staff, who 
entered the town in such a manner that they could 
not possibly have been seen by the Germans from 
their lines. Within ten minutes of their arrival, 
and during a period of twenty ininutes, the Germans 
dropped forty shells into the town, showing that 
somehow they had been notified of the arrival of 
important officers. 

There can be no doubt that during the recent air 
raid on Paris that the Zeppelins were signalled to 
by people in Paris. A number already have been 
arrested for this offense. 



376 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

The hardest to deal with are the civihan spies. 
Some are Germans who have hved for so many years 
in the community that they have been accepted as 
part of it. Some of these people have remained 
and, of course, aid the Germans in every way they 
can. Those who returned at the outbreak of the 
war were mobilized and put in regiments going to 
the districts in France in which they have lived. 
In this way the German troops not only are sure 
of having guides who know the district in which 
they are operating and everything connected with 
it, but of having friends in that district when they 
arrive there. 

The most dangerous of all are the traitors, unfor- 
tunately found in every country, who for money 
are willing to betray their own country. There 
have been enough of these in the different districts 
to aid the Germans materially. 

Another means which has been used since the 
beginning of the war is to place spies, either of 
German origin, or Belgian or French traitors, among 
the refugees who come into the lines from Belgium 
or from the invaded French provinces. Large num- 
bers of these people arrive, and they generally come 
at the critical periods when all the civil and military 
authorities are most busily engaged. There is, 
therefore, no possible way in which a careful exam- 
ination can be made of each individual. For this 
reason, the army promptly moves the refugees off 



RECONNAISSANCE AND ESPIONAGE 377 

the battlefield, and the gendarmerie round them 
up in the nearest towns and see that they move on 
to districts way in the rear of where the fighting is 
going on. Only the regular inhabitants are allowed 
to live in each commune. Thus even though there 
may be spies among the refugees, the damage 
which they can do is materially decreased. 

One very important reason for sending refugees 
entirely out of the theatre of operations is that back 
of the armies, the engineer troops are constantly 
engaged in building new lines of trenches in all 
favorable positions. It being impossible to spare 
troops from the line to build these trenches, civilians 
have to be employed. If refugees could settle 
down in these districts, it would be very easy 
for spies to work on such trenches and know their 
exact position and strength, in the same way that 
Japanese disguised as Chinamen worked on all the 
Russian trenches in Manchuria and the Liao- 
Tung Peninsula. 

In all towns and villages in the districts occupied 
by the British, notices are posted saying that no 
one except those in uniform will be allowed to use 
a bicycle or an automobile ; that no one will be per- 
mitted to leave the town by any method whatso- 
ever between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m., and that no one 
will be permitted to leave his house after 6 o'clock 
at night; that access to the British lines is forbidden, 
except when the person concerned has a pass signed 



378 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

by competent British officers. No passes are given 
to people to go to towns on or near the Unes, unless 
the mayor of that town certifies that he knows the 
applicant, and there is a special reason why such 
a pass should be given. 

All military automobiles are registered and have 
military numbers painted on their hoods. Even 
with this number and although the occupants are 
all in unifomi, it is impossible to enter or leave 
any to^^^l ^^^thout a pass. At all entrances and 
exits to all towns in France, sentinels are stationed 
who allow no one by without a pass. If the pass 
is not in order, or if there is no pass, they do not 
turn the individual back but arrest him, and he is 
immediately investigated. 

Before a railway ticket can be bought, a pass must 
be obtained from the police-head of the district in 
which the individual concerned resides. On the 
completion of a railwa}' journey, no one can leave 
the dep6t until he had shown his pass. These 
passes state exactly from where to where, by what 
route, and when, the individual is pemiitted to go. 

Every individual in France must have on his per- 
son at all times papers absolutely identifying him. 
Foreigners must have not onh^ a passport but a 
perm is de sejoiir on which is their photograph with 
an official stamp affixed. This per mis de sejoiir is a 
pennission to reside in the district in which the 
foreigner happens to be living. 



RECONNAISSANCE AND ESPIONAGE 379 

On the roads between towns at different places, 
generally railroad crossings, are posted sentries who 
insist on travelers showing a proper pass. In addi- 
tion, the gendarmerie frequently patrols the roads 
and demands passes and papers from everyone they 
meet. In this way, the authorities have almost 
complete control over all individuals in France. 
In spite of this, however, and the severe punish- 
ment meted out for obtaining information for the 
enemy's use, considerable espionage still goes on. 

An enemy soldier or officer caught in the uniform 
of his own army getting information within the 
lines is a scout, and according to the laws of war 
cannot be executed ^but must be treated as a pris- 
oner of war. A soldier or officer caught in civiHan 
clothes or in a uniform other than that of his own 
country is a spy, and after trial can be executed 
as such. In Europe, such spies are generally shot; 
in the United States, they are hanged. 

A civilian who, either as a civiHan or disguised 
as a soldier acting clandestinely or under false 
pretenses, obtains or endeavors to obtain informa- 
tion for the purpose of communicating it to the 
enemy is a spy who after trial and conviction 
should be shot or hanged. 

To be a war traitor or to commit war treason 
is as serious as being a spy. In some countries, 
such as Great Britain where the laws are not suffi- 
ciently severe in deahng with spies, the death 

26 



386 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

penalty is obtained by convicting the individuals 
guilty of espionage on the charge of war treason. 
Ordinarily, war treason is committed when a ci\nlian 
inhabitant of a country occupied by an enemy 
army gives military infonnation to, or in any other 
way aids, his otvti army against that enem^-. Per- 
sons competed of this offense are called war traitors, 
and are sentenced to death. This is the law of 
everv country, includins: the United States. 



CHAPTER XXXIV 

FORTRESSES IN MODERN WAR 

September, IQ15. 

PRIOR to the war, the general pubHc had great 
faith in forts and fortresses, probably largely 
due to their outward and visible signs of strength. 
For a long time, many military authorities have 
been questioning the value, not so much of field 
fortifications but of large fortified positions pre- 
pared before the war. They have been particu- 
larly dubious of fortresses which could be sur- 
rounded; the shutting up and surrender of Bazaine's 
army in the fortress of Metz at the time of the 
Franco-Prussian War contributed much to this doubt. 

On the whole, however, military opinion has 
inclined to the belief that the fault is not with the 
principle of having strong points from which an 
army can operate or upon which it can fall back, 
but that the methods of making these points strong 
have not kept pace with the methods of attacking 
them. 

The rapid capture by the Germans of the Belgian 
fortresses has influenced public opinion to the belief 
that the day of the fortress has passed. As in most 
questions concerned with the war, the exact data on 
hand is entirely too limited for any definite conclu- 
sion to be arrived at as yet. 

381 



^^^.> WHY PREPAKFPNRSS 

Standing:;; ap^xnrently in diiwi opposition to the 
quick oapitulaiion of the Belgian tonres.<es, is the 
fact that the French fortified hne along their e:istem 
fn^itier thus far has not been penetniteil by the 
Germans where they ha\*e come in contact with 
it. This may be due to the strength of the forti- 
fications, or» as is more prv^bable. to the fact that 
they are protected by welbdefendcv.! field works 
erect eii between them i\nd the enemy. Then, too, 
up to the present time they have not been seriously 
attacked. Should heavy attacks be made upi.^n 
them, their fall or successful resistance will have 
much to do with the tutinv of tvnv.anent forti- 
lications. 

The Austrian fortress of lYremj'^ resisted for 
some months before jHelding, but when attacked 
by the Gennans and Austix^Hin\£:arians w^^s recap- 
txireil after a few days* %hting. The quick recap- 
ture prv>lxibly was etYectevl Ixvause most of the 
jx^nnanent defenses had Kvn jwrtially. or wholly, 
destro^-ed by the Austro-Hungarians before their 
surrender to the Russians. 

The fortresses of Ivangorvxi and Brest Liio\sk. 
the two southemn\ost of the four principiU for- 
tresses in Poland, fell companitively easy. I\-;m- 
gorod. the first taken, is a fortress pure and simple, 
being built at the junction of the Wieprz Rix-er with 
the Vistula, which made it an important strategic 
point aside ftvon the fact that it is iUso a railway 




liRi-sr I.I ro\sK 

ShowiUK slu'll holes m llu- Kmok^hmuI ,uu1 >U-in»lishovl >hloh .U'l\-n;vs Ivyoiv 




ONI" iM' nii~ i\Axr,oRop I'OK rs Ml' Moi.isiiicp i;v nil': Russians 

r.l-IMRl" nil'IR RI'I'Rl'AI- 



PORTRESSES IN MODERN WAR 383 

junction. It is a typical fortress on a large scale 
of the period of the past twenty years of the nine- 
teenth century. In the center is a large citadel 
built of brick, surrounded by an outer parapet of 
earth with concrete magazines and emplacements 
for the gtms. Outside of this is a ditch with ditch 
defenses, which are galleries for riflemen and 
machine guns, placed in a ditch in such a position 
as to fire down it, thus making it impossible for an 
attacker by getting into the ditch to be safe from 
the fire from the fort, as he otherwise would be. 

Around the citadel, at a distance of from four to 
five kilometers, depending upon the topographical 
features, was a ring of six forts — four west of the 
Vistula and two east of it. Between the two eastern 
forts and the citadel were two more forts, making 
eight in all. 

Apparently the experience of the Russians in 
the war had been such as to make them mistrust 
this type of fortification, for they took practically 
all of the artillery out of these forts and used it in 
the defense of a position on the hills roughly parallel 
to the eastern bank of the Vistula. This position 
was far enough from the Ivangorod forts to necessi- 
tate its capture even before the heaviest German 
and Austro-Hungarian guns could reach them; it 
was similar to that which an army takes up in the 
field and strengthens by building infantry trenches 
and artillery gun-pits. 



384 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

The Twelfth Austro- Hungarian Corps came up 
and prepared to attack Ivangorod. While these 
preparations were under way, three German divi- 
sions succeeded in crossing the Vistula, and, in 
spite of Russian attacks, penetrated beyond the 
railway nmning from Warsaw to Ivangorod. At 
the same time, the army of the Archduke Joseph 
Ferdinand, with that of von Alackensen on its 
right, was approaching from the south, hut west 
of the Vistula. Therefore, unless the Russians 
could stop the Germans on the north and the Austro- 
Hungarians and Germans on the south, it was 
only a question of time until Ivangorod would be 
svirrounded. By the time the Twelfth Corps had 
come in touch with the Archdvike on the other side 
of the Vistula, they were ready for their assault 
on the position in front of Ivangorod. After an 
artillery preparation of two hours with seventy 
guns of various calibers, the Austro-Hungarian 
infantry made the assault at 9 a.m. on August i. 
Twelve battalions (12,000 men) made the attack, 
and b}^ night they had captured the whole of the 
position, 2,500 prisoners, twenty-one heavy guns, 
eight field gims, and fifteen machine gims. Their 
own losses were only forty dead and 200 wounded. 
This capture meant that the Austro-Hungarian 
guns could be placed where they woiUd hammer 
the forts. However, the Russians shortly after 
evacuated Ivangorod, blowing up the forts and the 



FORTRESSES IN MODERN WAR 385 

main defenses of the citadel and setting the citadel 
itself on fire. It is not known whether this evacu- 
ation was due to a lack of faith in the resisting 
powers of the fortress or a feeling that the morale 
of the troops was such that if shut up in Ivangorod 
they would surrender without offering proper resist- 
ance, as was the case at Novo Georgievsk later on. 

Brest Litovsk was constructed on a plan similar 
to Ivangorod, but on a larger scale, and having in 
addition to the west an advanced line of batteries 
and permanent infantry redoubts built practically 
according to the latest ideas prevalent before this 
war. 

The Austro-Hungarians, coming from the west, 
made preparations to attack its outer line. Ger- 
man troops to their north crossed the Bug and 
threatened the communications to the east. After 
three days* preparation, the Austro-Hungarians 
subjected the outer line to a short artillery bombard- 
ment and assaulted with a division. The result 
was the same as at Ivangorod: they captured the 
position with slight loss. Incidentally, the heaviest 
gun used in the artillery preparation was a ten 
centimeter, the heavier ones being still on the road. 

On losing this position, the Russians retired to 
the inner line. One day's fighting, not heavy at 
that, ousted them from here. They then blew up 
the forts, evacuated the fortress, and mostly escaped 
to the southeast, as the Germans were closing in 



386 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

from the north. The same doubt exists as to their 
reasons for this evacuation as in the case of Ivan- 
gorod. 

With so many factors entering into the case of 
each fortress and the difficulty of gi^'ing each factor 
its proper ^Yeight, it is impossible to come to 
definite conclusions at present. Nevertheless, one 
fact does stand out clearly: probably the most 
important factor of all is the morale of the troops 
defending a fortress. The best and most modem 
fortress, with every machine man can invent, \W11 
very soon fall, unless it is garrisoned by well-trained, 
well -led, detemiincd soldiers. The man is alw'ays 
superior to the machine in the end. 



CONCLUSION 



27 



CHAPTER XXXV 

LESSONS AMERICA SHOULD LEARN FROM THE 
GREAT WAR 

DURING the several months that the author 
has been home, his work for preparedness 
has brought him in contact with thousands of his 
fellow countrymen and countrywomen. He has 
been particularly impressed with the fact that 
American people, in general, have no conception 
of what war really is. In discussions of the present 
war and of preparedness, the idea continuously 
crops up that because we do not think a thing is 
right it cannot happen. 

The American people apparently do not realize 
that the fact that nations cannot agree as to what 
constitutes the right or wrong of a question is what 
causes war, and that once war comes, pure force 
settles the matter; in other words, it seems almost 
impossible to make us see that we might be fully 
convinced that all the right in the world was on 
our side and all the wrong on the other and yet 
be forced to yield to the other side because of its 
superior physical force. 

In many quarters there is a tendency to avoid 
disagreeable facts which tend to upset preconceived 
notions or prejudices and to become angry with 
those who enunciate these facts, in much the same 

389 



390 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

manner as some people avoid all mention of death 
and dislike anyone who brings up the subject. 
If tnith is to be avoided because disagreeable, then 
reason is suiTendering to fear. No race which 
regulates its acti^4ties through feai* ever has sur- 
\nved competition with one governing itself by 
reason and thereby overcoming fear. 

Even those of us who hope for adequate prepar- 
ation for national defense too often do not under- 
stand what a nation in arms really implies; what 
invasion really means; and what battle really is. 

The best way to undei-stand the meaning of a 
nation in arms, as it is understood by the Europe:in 
nations engaged in this war. \^'ith the single excep- 
tion of Great Britain, is for every man, from eight- 
een to forty-eight inclusive, not physically incapac- 
itated, to imagine himself at some one of our army 
posts imdergoing \'igorous recruit training nine or 
ten hours a day: or m a line of trench stretching 
from Albany. Xew York, to Richmond, Virginia; 
or in a bed in some one of the many hospitals in 
the United States recovering from a womid or 
womids; or guarding one of our many bridges or 
railways. Let every woman think of what it would 
mean to have every one of her male relatives or 
friends between these ages in one of these positions, 
exposed to sudden death or undergoing suffering. 
That is what a nation in arms means. 

But. sav a s^eat manv, "We don't want that!" 



LESSONS FOR AMERICA 391 

Perfectly true, we do not want it; but until we can 
find some way of settling the affairs of this world 
without fighting, we will have to face it. 

We will have to face such a condition simply for 
the reason that any real foe who attacks us will 
put the whole of his manhood in the field, and the 
only way we can get sufficient numbers to resist, is to 
do the same with ours. Modern war demands this. 

Universal military service cannot be escaped, if 
a country wishes to be prepared to meet its rivals 
on equal terms. From the beginning of this war 
every force Great Britain has put in the field has 
suffered from the lack of sufficient troops. After 
more than a year and a half of war, this is still true. 
Her experience proves what the history of other 
nations taught them many years ago, and what our 
history should have taught us long since — that 
numbers can be obtained only by enforcing universal 
military service. 

When anned troops of one nation enter by force 
the territory of another, they are not going to per- 
mit their movements nor the enforcement of their 
will to be in any way interfered with by the inhabi- 
tants. They have entered for the purpose of de- 
stroying the armed forces of that country and by 
this means to make it yield to the will of their own 
people. Nothing will stop them from carrying out 
this mission other than defeat at the hands of the 
army of the invaded country. 



;,02 WTIV PREPAREDNESS 

There are but two honorable alternatives open to 
a man in time of war. One is to enter the army of 
his country and fight openly in its miifomi. This 
gives him the right to kill and wound the enemy and 
other^^4se hinder his advance, and to defeat him; 
and with these rights comes the risk that the enemy 
\\i\\ do the same to him, because his imifonn marks 
him plainly as being an opponent. However, the 
imifonn also marks him as having the rights of a 
belligerent, so that when wounded or captured he 
is entitled to live and to reasonably good treatment. 
The second course open to a man is to remain a 
civilian and, by carefully abstaining from all hos- 
tile acts, gain that immimity from hasm which is 
accorded ci\iliaiis who are ob\-iously non-com- 
batant. 

No army will tolerate civilians to cut its telegraph 
or telephone wires, to tamper ^^•ith its railway or 
wagon transportation, or to shoot at or othensise 
kill or woimd its men. AMien these things occur 
the ciA^lian responsible, if caught, almost invariably 
is executed at once without trial. ^^Tlere the 
individual or indi\H[duals responsible cannot be 
captured immediately, the conmiimity is pimished. 
The punishment is kept up as long as the hostile 
acts continue, and, in most cases, increased in 
severity until they cease. 

If ci\'ilians ^^•isll so fivr as possible to avoid 
any conflict ^^•ith the in\'ader, they must keep 



LESSONS FOR AMERICA 393 

their hands off firearms, wire-cutters, and explo- 
sives. Wherever fighting tal^es place between 
two bodies of troops, it is inevitable that most 
of the houses on the battlefield will be de- 
stroyed. To be safe, the people who live in 
these houses must abandon them and go far 
enough to the rear to be out of range. If they 
remain on the battlefield, some will be killed and 
wounded. 

Many of us say: "This is horrible! It is not 
right." The fact remains, however, that the only 
way to avoid it is to be strong enough to prevent 
any power from invading our country. 

Once an invasion takes place, this is going to 
happen. Protesting in writing, or in speech, will 
not stop it; the only thing that will stop it is suffi- 
cient armed force to destroy the invader or drive 
him back where he came from. 

Many seem to imagine that a battle is a kind of 
a game, with governing rules, umpires and referees 
to apply them and the police within reach to stop 
the play, if it become too rough. They do not 
seem to grasp the basic fact that a battlefield is a 
place where two bodies of men meet, each deter- 
mined to die rather than to yield to the other. 
Both cannot succeed; one must yield. This means 
that the battlefield must be made such a place of 
terror that finally the instinct of self-preservation 
will overcome the determination of one side or the 



304 WHY PREPAREDNESS 

other to die rather than ^ield, and they nin away 
or surrender in the hope they may not die. \Miile 
the kilhng or wounding "\A^ich takes place in battle 
is done with the purpose of reditcing the number 
of opponents operating weapons of some kind, 
probably the most important result accomplished 
by it is the way in which it weakens the determina- 
tion of the men left alive and iminjured. The man 
who gets the top of his head shot off in battle is 
not worried about it because he is dead. His neigh- 
bors who see it done and are spattered with his 
blood and brains, however, are worried about it 
and do not soon forget it. 

Nothing can save troops in battle other than their 
O'^^Ti skill and detennination. Lacking these qual- 
ities, the men are lost, as. mil ike a street fight or 
a riot, there is no police force at hand to stop the 
successful opponent from enforcing his vnll to the 
limit. 

Untrained or partially-trained troops cannot 
succeed against well-trained ones; not only because 
the latter can handle their weapons more effica- 
ciously but, primarily, because the latter through 
discipline have reached the point where the instinct 
of self-preservation is so well submerged in a sense 
of duty that the terrors of the battlefield cannot 
bring it to the smiace, while w^th the imtrained, 
it is on top to start A^-ith. 

It is easv to arouse the avera.s:e American to an 



LESSONS FOR AMERICA 395 

interest in the mechanical part of war. He always 
wants to know the caliber of guns, their range, the 
number of shots they can fire a minute, what the 
ammunition weighs, how many each army has, and 
so on; the newer and more powerful the weapon, 
the greater his interest. This however seems to 
be about as far as he is willing to go. He seems to 
think that the mere possession of these weapons 
settles the entire question of war. He may admit 
that training is essential before a soldier can use 
these weapons properly, but always greatly under- 
estimates the time necessary, probably because 
he is given to confusing merely understanding how 
a weapon works with being so accustomed to its 
proper use as to handle it almost automatically 
in time of such great stress as is common in battle. 

While the average American is interested in 
weapons and will admit the necessity for training 
in their use, he practically never considers discipline, 
or does so only to despise it. Yet the one thing, 
above everything else, on which all European offi- 
cers to whom the author talked agreed was the 
absolute necessit}^ of discipline — Belgian, British, 
French, German, and Austro-Hungarian all insisted 
that for battle troops could not have too much 
of it. 

By discipline is not meant subserviency, which 
apparently to the American mind is synonymous 
with discipline, but that subordination of the selfish 



59^^ WHY PREPAREDNESS 

instincts of the individual which makes him work 
^^•ith all his will for the accomplishment of an end 
in order to benefit the whole of which he is merely 
a part; in other words, a mental condition which 
makes the soldier and officer think not of their 
personal danger but solely of the successful accom- 
plishment of the duty which has been assigned to 
the military unit to which they belong. The posses- 
sion of this discipline is what enables well-trained 
troops successfully and easily to withstand condi- 
tions which scatter the untrained to the \\-inds. 
Furthermore, it cannot be acquired in a few weeks 
or a few months. 

Above all. success in war demands a tmited peo- 
ple who firmly believe in a cause and are deter- 
mined to have it triumph no matter what sectional, 
political, class, or personal, interest may suffer. 

Have we such a people? If not. are we working 
toward that end or in the contrary direction? The 
discussion of this question is beyond the scope of 
the present volume. Present-day indications are. 
however, that the time has come when most serious 
consideration should be given this most important 
question. 

Most of the food needed for an army can be 
bought at any time. pro\'ided the money necessary 
is at hand and the markets of the world are open. 
Since the beginning of the war, the markets of the 
world have been open to Great Britain and her 



LESSONS FOR AMERICA 397 

allies, and practically closed to Germany and hers 
— and this without a decisive sea fight. The 
reason is simple: in times of peace Great Britain 
took advantage of her superior resources to build 
a fleet so much larger than any Germany could 
afford, that up to the present the supremacy of her 
fleet has remained practical^ unchallenged. In 
other words, where one of the belligerents in times 
of peace translated superior potential resources into 
a fighting force, supremacy has been unquestioned 
since the war began. The vast amount of the many 
kinds of material needed to equip an army cannot 
be procured quickly in time of war, unless proper 
preparations are made in time of peace. 

The Entente Allies practically have unlimited 
financial resources and also have the markets of 
the world open to them. In spite of this, and in 
spite of their superior numbers, after more than a 
year and half of war, Germany is still on the offen- 
sive; that is, up to the present her enemies have 
not been able to take the initiative away from her 
and put her on the defensive, the first step toward 
her defeat. This is explained by the fact that 
although possessing smaller potential resources, 
Germany carefully made all arrangements in time 
of peace to translate them immediately into fighting 
armies with everything necessary to sustain them 
in time of war. The obvious lesson is that only 
where superior potential resources are translated 



39S WHY PREPAREDNESS 

into a fighting force prior to war are they of imme- 
diate value when war comes, if of vakie at all. 

The present war shows, as has ever>' othex, that 
proper preparation in time of peace insures the 
ability to strike at once and vnXh the full force of 
the nation from the ver\- beginning, with the result 
that the greatest effect is obtained with the least 
cost. 

Failiu-e to prepare means resting on the defensive 
from the beginning, with strong possibilities of 
being defeated before the resources of the nation 
can be put into such shape as to enable the offensive 
to be taken. Successfully taking the offensive 
is the first step in the defeat of an enemy. I'ntil 
that step can be taken, the enemy has the advan- 
tage. Prussia learned her lesson at Jena and 
Auerstadt in 1806; Austria learned hers at Konig- 
gratz in 1 866 ; France, at Sedan and Metz in 1 870-7 1 ; 
Russia, at Liao-Yang and ]Mukden in 1904-05; 
Great Britain is learning her lesson to-day; while 
Italy, Japan, Argentine. Chile, and all the other 
nations of importance have profited by these lessons 
and have adopted this principle; "In time of 
peace prepare for war." 

The United States alone refuses to profit. Are 
we going to remain so blind, so obstinate in our 
stupidity, pride, and prejudice that nothing but 
disastrous and himiiliating defeat on our Atlantic 
or Pacific seaboard, or on both, will con\'ince us? 



INDEX 



Aeroplane in war, 227, 357-369 

— observation of artillery fire, 
331, 361, 362 

— bombs, 281, 366 

— reconnaissance, 361, 369 
Allowance to dependents in 

France, 59 
Aisne, battle of the, 133 
Ambulance, field, 294 
American Ambulance Corps in 

France, 216, 217 
Ammunition trains, 228, 328 
Armies, strength of the opposed, 

— France, 24, 55; Great Britain, 
88, 93; Germany, 158 
Armies, comparative strengtli of, 

122 
Arras in war time, 31-40 

— rviins of Town Hail of, 38 
Artillery, 326-344 

— Austrian, 305-mm. gun, 343 

— bombardments, 254, 255 

— concealment of, 39, 328 

— curtain of fire, 339 

— effective fire of, 319 

— eft'ect on green troops of, 280 

— French, 32 

— French 75-mm., 313-325 

— gun-pits for, 329 

— gun-pits for anti-aircraft guns, 

330 
— indirect fire of, 320 
— observation points, 69, 233, 

330 
— zone, 229 
Austro-Hungarian army, 177, 178 
Austria- Hungary threatened, 176 

Barbed wire entanglements, 233, 

244, 265 
Battlefield, approach to modern, 

223-236 
Bayonet fighting, 255 

— in trench warfare, 256, 264, 

283, 311 



Belgium, invasion of, part of 

Gennan strategy, 126 
Bomb-proof chambers, 245 
Brest Litovsk, 385 

— fall of, 190, 210 
Breastworks, 248 
British armed strength, 8S-89 
— army, equipment of, 1 04-1 11 
— at the battle of Marne, 90 
— attitude, 7, 10 
— campaign in France and 

Belgium, 88-94 
— casualties, 93, 113, 138 
— Indian troops, 12, 100, 284, 

285 
— infantry, 108 
— losses, 93 
— military sj'^stem, 88, 95-103, 

115 
— troops, morale of, 283, 284, 

286 
— wounded, 215-221 
— volunteer system, 98, 99, 

115-121 
— recruiting methods, 1 1 5 

Campaign, summary of, in western 
theatre, 122; in eastern 
theatre, 204 

Casualties, average British, per 
day, 113, 138 
— French, 93 
— French at battle of Marne, 42 

Cavalry, 345-351 

— Austro-Hungarian, 177 

Charleroi, 89, 128 

Civil government of occupied 
territory, 199. 

Civilian population, dangers to, 
39, 64-87; Poland, 193, 199, 
201 

Communications, Austro-Hungar- 
ian- German, in Poland, 
182-186 



399 



400 



INDEX 



Compulsory militan'' service, 
French, 22-24, 43. 49: 
needed in Britain, 94, 105, 
112-121 

Confidence, necessity of, in oflficers, 

48. 149 

Conscript soldiers, spirit of, 44, 54 
Conscription in Europe, 45 

— advantages of, 1 1 1 
Cossacks, 195 

Curtain of fire, artillerj^ 339 
Czechs, attempted surrender of, 
to Russians, 179 

Depdts, regimental, 55 
Discipline, 4S, 49, 150 

— habit of, 2 So 

— importance of, 46 

— in Prussian Army, 155 

— purpose of, 47 
Dressing stations, 290 
Dunaiec River, Russian defeat on, 
'341 

Emden, the cruiser, 1 1 
Engineer troops, work of, 66 

— mining, 267-275 

— work of Germans, 183, 1S4 
Entrenching tools, French, 277 
Equipment, German army, 162 
Espionage, 370-3S0 

Field ambulances, 293, 294 
First aid to wounded, 289 
Flanking movement, French, 133- 

135 
Fortresses, 125, 3S1-3S6 
French "75", 313-325 

— army of 1S70, 41, 43 

— attitude toward the war, 8, 

15. 54. 71 
— mobilization, 25-30 
— military- system, 22-25, 51-57 
— postal regxilations in war, 59 
— strategy, 41 
— system for maintaining army 

' in war, 51-57 
— wounded, 19 

German Army, beginning of, 155; 
equipment, 162; peace 
organization, 15S 

— militan,' s\-stem, 157; main- 
taining army in war, 1 59-1 61 

— attitude towards war, 162 



Gurkhas, fighting spirit of, 12 

Hand-grenades, 265, 311 
Head-cover in trenches, 246 
High-explosive shells, 322, 336 
Hong-Kong at the outbreak of 

war, 1-5 
Hospital Corps, 289-306 

— evacuation, 297 

— base, 304 

— trains, 303, 304 

Infantry, 307-312 

— attacks, 237 

— in trenches, 234, 288 

— mental strain under artillery 
fire, 308 

— under fire, 229, 339 
Italy, entrance in war of, 173 
Ivangorod, 3S2 

— fall of, 210, 384 

Joffre, General, famous order of, 
42, 130. 

Kitchener's new arm\', 98, 104-1 1 1 

Liege, 127 

Listening galleries, 268 

Machine guns, 260, 261, 352-356 
— in trench warfare, 355 

Malingerers, 284 

Mame, battle of, 130-132 
— British at, 42, 90, 129, 131 

Marseilles at the outbreak of the 
war, 15, 16 

Mass formation in attack, 167 

jNIelinite, 270 

Mining operations, 267-271 

Mons, British at, 88, 89, 128 

Morale, effect on, of wounded, 47, 
216, 278, 2S0; artillery, 280; 
inaction in trenches, 281 
— importance of, 215 

Mortars, trench, 266, 311 

Motor-trucks, 224, 229 

Music in British army, 2S6 
— effect of, in the field, 106 
— in Hungarian army, 201 

Namur, 127 

Napoleon on casualties, 16S 



INDEX 



401 



Neuve Chapelle, British at, 92, 

93. 114 

Night attacks, 250, 257 

Nova Alexandria, burning of, 195 

Novo Georgievsk, 208, 210 

Object of warfare, 46 

Offensive of Allies postponed, 205 

— German, attempt to reach 

Calais, 136, 207; on 

Dunajec, 207 ; transferred 

from west to east, 204 

Open extended order of attack, 
weakness of, 168 

Overhead cover, 248 

Paris in war times, 19-21 
Pioneer battalions, German, 183 
Police, battle, 166 
Polish brigades in German arm}"-, 

203 
Poland, invasion of, 193-203 
Polish quadrilateral of fortresses, 

208 
Preparedness, British lack of, 89, 

94, 100, 171 

— pleas for British, 102 
Prussian military system under 

Frederick, 155 
Przemysl, siege of, 204 

— fall of, 205, 341, 382 
Psychology of battle, 278-287 

Recruiting, British methods of, 1 15 
Railway battalions of Germans, 183 
Reconnaissance, 370 
Refugees, French, 60; Polish, 202 
Russian prisoners, 187-192 



St. Mihiel, German advance at, 

137 
Sapping operations, 262 
Shrapnel, 321 
Star shells, 259 
Strategy, German, 122, 169, 170, 

171, 
— fundamental principles of 

German, 124 
— French, 125 
— of Allies, 139 
Swiss military system, 145, 146; 

beginning of, 148 
— mobilization, 147 

Tactics, German, 169 
Transport wagons, 185 
Trench warfare, 42, 234-277 
Trenches, best location for, 243 

Uneasiness of troops before battle, 
278, 279 

Volunteer system, British, 98-101, 
115-118 
— injustice of, 119 
— failure of, 120 

Warsaw, fall of, 210 

West Point, 150 

Wounded, 228, 293-306 
— care of the, 288-306 
— dressing stations for, 234 
— experiences of, 218 

Ypres, Germans at, 137 



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